A first pillar. The guidelines put forward by the Commission to rejig the European "generalised system of preferences" (GSP) in favour of developing countries (see our bulletin of 8 July, p.8/9) in my view represents a first pillar on which to build the globalisation as conceived by Pascal Lamy, a mixture of a mature political objective and a pragmatic and concrete implementation. I shall not dwell on his political objective: I summarised it amply in this column on 8 July. Its finishing point, a "global governance" of the economy, should be continued under a gradual approach, starting with measures to favour the poorest countries to help them take an active role in the international economy. And it is from this point of view that the new GSP proposed for 2006-2015 comes under the overall framework of the objective.
It is true that the Commission's plans did not come into being overnight; the kernel already exists in the current GSP, its main ideas have long been under discussion, and the EU has already made several largely unsuccessful attempts to include them in world trade negotiations (WTO). However, this is the first time that they have appeared coherently and systematically in a project destined to become a Union instrument. This project is characterised by three elements (plus one):
1. Competitiveness criterion. The benefits of GSPs should be reserved for countries which, without tariff preferences, would not be able to carve themselves out a reasonable niche in world trade. Countries which are already able to compete should not benefit. What, with this in mind, would be the point of preferences in favour of Chinese textiles and clothing products, which are taking over the world? The result of this would be to wipe the countries we should be helping right out of this market.
2. Sustainable development and international rules. The Commission aims explicitly to favour countries which, in their production methods, favour the principles of "sustainable development", via not only environmental norms, but also social and anti-drugs ones (no production, fight against trafficking). The GSPs would therefore help to bring in the rules the EU is trying in vain to include in world trade rules. The developing countries would have an incentive to follow them (with the support and assistance of the Union) in exchange for easier access to the European market. Europe does not set itself up as a judge of outside behaviour, but it does ask countries which hope to benefit from additional advantages to ratify international conventions on various environmental standards, human rights, workers' rights, the respect for minimum social standards (with no relation to salaries).
3. Regional co-operation between beneficiary countries. All too often, countries which intend to enter close relations with the EU, or which the EU has promised regional links, tend each to look for improved access to the European market for itself, and neglect their ties with their neighbours. This attitude is quite wrong from a political as well as an economic point of view. The Commission feels that a "cumulation of origin", which could do an awful lot to help "preferential" exports to the Union, should involve a high level of regional co-operation.
Most of the orientations described already exist in the current GSP, but in embryonic form, or are too complicated to be operational. If the Member States agree to reinforce them and make them systematic, this would be a first step towards a first package of world rules, a rough draft of the "global governance" which would make globalisation fairer and more controllable.
A simplification of mechanisms is proposed (and this is the fourth element), with a view to allowing countries which are the least well-prepared administratively to benefit from the European GSP regardless.
The Chinese case. Some commentators see only one aim behind this reform: to rein in the predominance China has achieved by using the European GSP. I do not agree. It's more a question of the balance to be found, to return the GSP to its origin aim: to support the poorest countries so that they do not remain eternally excluded. In any case, China would not be completely abandoned: only Chinese products which are largely competitive already would lose the benefit of tariff preferences. Continuing to encourage and help the access of these products to the European market up to 2015 would mean the really poor countries losing all hope of ever gaining access, which is the diametric opposite of the stated objective.
(F.R.)