I shall continue with my overview of the texts adopted by the Summit on 17 and 18 June, on subjects which were overshadowed by the issue of the Constitution and the presidency of the European Commission constantly in the limelight of the media and commentators (see this column yesterday for the texts on the area of freedom, security and justice, and economic and social affairs.
Accession candidates. One of the decisions taken by the Summit was, however, covered: that of opening accession talks with Croatia early 2005 while setting out several conditions for such talks to come to a positive result (see our bulletin of 19 June, page 7). The Commission was also invited to prepare a "pre-accession strategy" for this country, comprising a financial instrument. In another paragraph, the Heads of Government stress that granting Croatia the status of "candidate country" should encourage the other countries of the region to continue with reforms set out in the Thessaloniki agenda, and they insist on the need for closer regional cooperation. This, I believe, is very timely as some countries (in the Balkans and elsewhere) sometimes forget that the priority aim of European integration was and remains reconciliation between the countries that were in conflict only yesterday. This is how the EEC was born and the idea of entering a Union without having first of all put a final end to regional conflicts is an unacceptable deviation from the very nature of European construction.
The Summit also confirmed the timetable for Bulgaria and Romania: signing of the Accession Treaties as soon as possible in 2005, with entry into force in 2007. For Turkey (see our bulletin of 19 June, page 7), the Council undertook to open membership talks "without delay" if this December's Commission assessment is positive. The Summit said it considers as "important and wide-ranging" the constitutional amendments made to date by Turkey, while adding a hefty list of areas where progress is still indispensable, including: freedom of expression, association and religion; cultural rights, and the further alignment of civil-military relations with EU practice and the situation in the South-East of the country.
Positions taken on individual countries. The texts adopted concern:
a) Presidential elections in Serbia. Elections take place on Sunday and are a "crucial moment for Serbia" which must "move decisively away from the isolation of the past" and toward regional cooperation on the road to democracy, reform, respect of human rights, rule of law and international obligations. The Union, for its part, "wants to work with Serbian leaders in the spirit of European integration and on the basis of a shared commitment to European values".
b) Iraq. The significant thing about this text is that it represents an EU "common position" after so many different stances in the past. There are no surprises, however. The Union welcomes the evolution toward a "fully sovereign" Iraqi government and the prospect of elections in 2005 and insists on respect of human rights, condemns terrorist attacks and sets out a series of measures that the EU is envisaging: technical and economic assistance, enhanced representation of the EU in Iraq ("as circumstances permit"), etc. The Council is invited to examine, in July, the Commission and Mr Solana's recommendations on this, and to come to an agreement on the first steps to be taken.
One detail just be underlined: the text states that the 30 June deadline will, with the re-establishment of Iraqi sovereignty, mark the "end of the occupation", a term which rings like a confession.
c) Middle East Process. What can one say about this umpteenth European text on this issue? It affirms the EU's firm resolve to give fresh impetus to peace talks, it states it is concerned about the continuing violence, and welcomes certain prospects (on which Europe cannot in fact bring its influence to bear), and so on. From a more concrete point of view, the Palestinian Authority is invited to "consolidate all Palestinian security services under the clear control of a duly empowered Prime Minister and Interior Minister". Pie in the sky? The Union states it is willing to cooperate in this task and to help the Palestinian Authority maintain public order. Israel, for its part, should "reverse its settlement policy", dismantle outposts and put an end to land confiscation and the construction of the "security fence", etc. Any more pious hopes?
d) Sudan/Darfur. The Heads of Government state their deep concern for the situation and urge the parties to come to a political agreement, etc. All this, of course, comes from a good sentiment. Fortunately, in addition to empty phrases, Europe is still leading as far as humanitarian aid goes.
e) Democratic Republic of Congo. In this case also, the Summit's concern is the concerns of the Summit are deep and calls for action pressing. The EU's willingness to help neighbouring countries in their efforts to restore peace is nonetheless confirmed.
f) Iran. The Union's desire to move toward a closer relationship with Iran is restated, but there are mainly preconditions concerning: the nuclear programme, cooperation with the IAEA "in a spirit of full transparency", the fight against terrorism, human rights and the Iranian approach to the Middle East peace process. Very recent differences over the unfolding and the results of the last bilateral dialogue session on human rights (see our bulletin of 22 June, p.9) confirm the gaps in the normalisation process.
New strategies and regional partnerships. The European Commission's initiative concerning the "European neighbour policy" was hailed by the Heads of Government given the fact that enlargement displaced the Union's external borders eastward. The new border countries have the wiieight and size of Ukraine and Belarus. Moldova will soon be added to this and the common borders with Russia, previously limited to Finland and the Kaliningrad enclave, have been considerably lengthened. At the same time, with the membership of Cyprus and Malta, the countries of the southern rim of the Mediterranean have become nearer. It is therefore normal for the Union to contemplate strengthening its relations with the border countries, and beyond. The Summit therefore welcomes the prospect of more regular and indepth dialogue and also development cooperation. It approves the inclusion, in the neighbour policy, even of countries that do not have common borders with the EU such as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, explicitly mentioned. Belarus will, however, have had to have set up a "democratic form of government" before enjoying the advantages of the new policy. The Union will help it by providing support for the civil society in Belarus.
Support of principle is not accompanied by any form of approval of objectives such as the creation of common economic areas or the "four freedoms" of movement (goods, persons, services and capital). Only the specific paragraph relating to Russia recalls that the creation of four "common areas" is part of the common programme. It is already too much as far as I'm concerned. Has the experience of free trade areas promised to right and left not taught us anything? I do not like Romano Prodi's slogan "Everything but Institutions" as I consider the four common areas envisaged can only be achieved with a substantial degree of common rules and institutions.
The Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East also had the Summit's support, in the aim of promoting "a common zone of peace, prosperity and progress". The means given for building this zone seem reasonable: political reform, good governance, human rights, trade and economic cooperation, economic liberalisation, conflict prevention, the fight against terrorism, and against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and illegal immigration. Very wisely, there is no mention of free trade areas. Furthermore, according to the summit, the soltuion of the Israeli-Arab conflict, while being an essential goal, must not be a "precondition … for reform" (otherwise it would be a pretext for not doing anything in the meantime).
Consolidation of the CFSP and ESDP. The Summit did not announce anything extraordinary in these fields but the confirmation and the approval of what is under way or envisaged is in itself significant. By restating that the "European Security Strategy" adopted by the European Council of December 2003 represents the essential framework of the CFSP, the Heads of Government welcome progress made in the first half of 2004 in four priority fields. Mainly, they insist on "effective multilateralism" of the strategy by strengthening the role of the United Nations and with the possible use of sanctions imposed on countries at fault. A global policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina was adopted. Its text does not appear in the "conclusions" but the Heads of Government speak of "practical arrangements to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of the EU's engagement in support of the European perspective of the country". The perplexity caused by the lack of positive development in Bosnia-Herzegovina, whether political or economic, are well-known. This country should not imagine continuing to live indefinitely from external financing without concrete progress on its part.
Concerning ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy), the Summti welcomes progress aimed at the mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (the NATO summit on Monday and Tuesday could decide to put an end to the SFOR mission allowing the ESDP to take over), as well as the Proxima operation in Macedonia and the preparation of the "rule of law" mission in Georgia. Also, and above all, the action plans aimed at allowing the EU to conduct rapid reaction military operations in the context of crisi management are approved. An ad hoc declaration on NATO/EU consultation stresses that the European Council has decided the necessary means for rapid establishment of a European operations centre should be avialable for 1 January 2006 at the latest. (F.R.)