Two bad formulae. The European Commission is running all the risks here! In the search for a compromise on the Constitution for Europe, most governments are standing firm on a number of essential points, such as the new majority voting formula, and progress in defence matters. However, convictions are not as firm on the Commission, and it looks like the idea of making the principle of one Commissioner per country definite, is a done deal. The IGC President, Franco Frattini, said: "Romano Prodi has explained that the Commission can work very well with 26, 27, or 28 members. I personally thought a smaller Commission would be better. I was not converted, but I did take note. Prodi taught us a lesson. I cannot be more realistic than the king…"
The alternative solution is the one put forward by the Convention. In the second of the "Convention papers", Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Giuliano Amato and Jean-Luc Dehaene describe with clarity and proficiency the significance of the Commission, its irreplaceable role in defending the interests of European, the importance of its being strong and independent, and explained that they had reached the conclusion that the optimum, most reasonable number of Commissioners is fifteen, with no rules on nationality set in stone. Any more, and the Commission would no longer be a college. They said: "the word college covers a structure which is small and egalitarian enough to be able to conduct an in-depth discussion and reach a common position. Studies carried out on this subject put the number of Commissioners which would allow the Commission to keep its collegial nature between nine and fifteen".
Unfortunately, the Convention's proposal does not answer these principles, especially the essential principle whereby nationality should come into it as little as possible in the choice of Commissioners. We know that the Convention's draft provides for fifteen Commissioners with voting rights, and a number of Commissioners without voting rights, equal to the number of Member States whose nationalities are not represented in the former group. The rotation between these two categories of Commissioner would be meticulously egalitarian: when one nationality's turn begins, another's ends. At present, a Commissioner can be confirmed several times; Jacques Delors had three terms as President. This would no longer be allowed; individual qualities, even though they are given as the number one selection criterion, would have to bow to nationality. What top-flight individual is going to accept a non-voting Commissioner's job? VGE and his vice-presidents are not trying to hide the fact that the formula they have chosen "is not perfect, and contains ambiguities", and that the initial draft planned a college of 15 Commissioners "with no nationality conditions attached: only the skills and European commitment would be taken into account". The final result is "a compromise drafted at length between members of the Convention". We can see this as an unenthusiastic defence; it wouldn't take much for them to admit that they don't like the compromise at all...
Arbitrary composition. Regrettably, the "one Commissioner per country" approach is even worse. The oft-quoted difficulty of functioning is not its worst shortcoming. The real problem is the arbitrary nature of this kind of Commission. Its composition depends on the ease with which the Member States can divide into two or more. The former Czechoslovakia is today two independent States, and therefore two Commissioners. The former federation of Yugoslavia is now six States, and it doesn't end there because observers are doubtful as to the sustainability of the union between Serbia and Montenegro; and how knows what the future holds for Kosovo? When it enters the Union, if the "one Commissioner per country" is enshrined in the Constitution, the former Yugoslavia will have the right to as many Commissioners as the six founding countries, and could go even further. Where is the political legitimacy of a Commission whose composition depends on the political happenstance of its smallest members? If, for the time being, their main worry is of an ethnic nature (think of the Bosnia-Herzegovina episodes, the Cyprus drama), how can a Commission built on these foundations represent the common European interest?
A battered economic authority. It's just as much of an economic problem as well. In the current Commission, most Commissioners belong to the euro zone, and nobody has challenged its legitimacy to discuss the application of the Stability Pact, to propose what it has proposed and vigorously to defend its position before the Council. As of next October, in the new Commission, euro zone Commissioners will be in the minority, and will be more so with every successive wave of expansion; how will the Commission have the authority to determine what the countries of this zone should do? And how can "recommendations", or even "proposals", to this effect be worded, if Council can only modify them unanimously? In the next Commission, Commissioners from the small and medium-sized States will have 19 votes out of 25. How are the larger Member States, who provide most of the Union's financial means, to accept that this Commission's proposals on future funding are the cornerstone and the starting point for negotiations between Member States, as in the days of Jacques Delors? If the "net contributor" countries are massively in the minority, are they going to agree that the others should decide how much they should put into the kitty? This problem has not escaped the notice of VGE, Mr Amato and Mr Dehaene, who, in the aforementioned "Convention paper", wrote this about the one Commissioner per country formula: "We do not see where such a Commission would find the authority it needs to intervene in the Union's economic governance, or to propose mutually acceptable financial schemes".
Romano Prodi and his Commission are certainly not unaware of it, and in their "one Commissioner per country" proposal, they also planned a thorough review of how the college works. The Commission would be "structured in groups of Commissioners", each group able to take decisions on behalf of the college. But these provisions gave rise to a great many reservations; the Benelux countries were resolutely against them, as they thought it likely that these "groups" would be dominated by the larger countries.
The reasonable solution exists, but is not yet politically practicable. The reasonable solution exists and to the best of my knowledge, only Jean-Luc Dehaene has dared speak its name: "a Commission of fifteen members, in which the largest countries would each have a national permanently, and the others would have theirs when it is their turn" (see this column of 6 December). Others tried different variations, based on geographical groupings of small countries, for instance. But these formulae are not politically practicable in the current phase of European integration. Even Jacques Delors has come to the conclusion that at the beginning, it is politically impossible (and would be psychologically clumsy) not to give each new Member State its own Commissioner. Fair enough; but, for pity's sake, don't talk to me about respect for the equality of the Member States as envisaged by the founding fathers of Europe, because the High Authority of the ECSC chaired by Jean Monnet had eight members for six countries: two each for France and Germany, one each for the other four. Not only was population taken into account, but also economic weight (Italy's coal and steel industry being small). The balance between the large and small countries is also a fact of the current Prodi Commission, which has twenty members: ten for the largest countries, and ten for the small and medium-sized ones. The Treaty of Nice knocked the balance out of whack, with its six Commissioners for the most populous countries, and nineteen for the rest.
Conclusions to be drawn. Here are the conclusions which I believe should be drawn from the above considerations.
1. Both formulae on the table of the IGC are inappropriate for a Constitution which is supposed to be written for half a century.
2. The Convention's formula (15 Commissioners with voting rights, plus Commissioners without "from all other Member States"), not only breaks the equality between members of the college, but also brings in a rigid rotation system based solely on nationality for Commissioners with voting rights. Extending the mandate of Commissioners of exceptional quality will become extremely difficult, impossible after two terms; the best Commissioner in the world will have to give way to a Commissioner of a different nationality, even if the country in question does not at that time have anyone of the calibre the role calls for.
3. The "one Commissioner per country" formula has so many weaknesses as to be unacceptable beyond a brief period. With the (hoped-for) arrival of the Balkan countries, it will be totally absurd. It cannot be included in a Constitution with any pretension to longevity.
4. The most "European" formulae (Commissioners appointed without national considerations), or involving rotation which is not rigorously egalitarian, are not yet ripe. To my knowledge, only in France, Belgium and Cyprus have authorities expressed any willingness to have no Commissioner of their nationality at certain times. That's not quite enough, is it?
There is only one reasonable solution, then: leave detailed rules on the composition of the Commission out of the Constitution. They don't need to be in there anyway. For the next Commission, the Treaty of Nice will have to be applied in any case, as the Constitution will not yet have entered into force. Europe will have time to agree on a better formula, based around either a limited Commission, or new rules for the functioning of a large Commission. The Treaty of Nice will be the default. The whole Treaty, including article 4 of the "enlargement" protocol which reads; "Once the Union has 27 members, the number of members of the Commission is lower than the number of Member States". It does not say "could be" lower, it says "is" lower. This should help to find a compromise in good time.
(F.R.)