No surprises. Exactly as forecast, for better or for worse. In Rome on Saturday, the "tough" countries played it tough, the flexible countries were flexible. The formal opening of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which is supposed to give rise to a Constitution for Europe, brought nothing really new; it confirmed what had already emerged from initial statements of views, and the gulf between the governments which are prepared to subscribe to the text as it came out of the Convention (in spite of qualms on one point or another), and those with explicit reservations on significant parts of the draft, and want it re-negotiated. The first group is essentially, but not exclusively, made up of the six founding countries plus the United Kingdom; the second is led by Spain and Poland, joined by several of the acceding countries. But it should not be over-simplified. The reluctant countries do not all have the same reasons. Madrid and Warsaw feel they are gambling their weight in majority deliberations in Council, and others their permanent presence, on an equal footing, within the European Commission.
We knew all this (see this column of 3 October, and the summary of national positions in the bulletin of the same day, page 7 onwards), so much so that the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Jean-Claude Juncker, said that in his experience (and he is far and away the Head of Government who has attended the most European Summits), that the meeting in Rome brought "no added value" to the debate. It did, however, provide greater insight into various political and psychological elements of the respective positions. Furthermore, President Silvio Berlusconi prepared the ground for repudiating all responsibility should the IGC fail to reach consensus by the end of the year. It would, he believes, not be a failure on the part of the current Presidency if consensus were reached under the Irish; the only real requirement is that consensus be achieved before the forthcoming European elections (June 2004), so that the citizens have as much information as possible about what they are voting for.
Spanish and Polish opposition to "constructive disagreement". In order to understand the various political, psychological and possibly also tactical positions, we must take account not only of what was said in Rome, but also of certain previous statements of views or exchanges of letters.
In particular, at the 29 September session of the "General Affairs" Council, President Franco Frattini announced the doctrine of the "constructive disagreement", by which a country proposing an amendment to the current draft during the IGC would have to provide evidence of "unanimity of consensus" for this change. There followed a definite reaction (described by certain observers as "nervous") on the part of the Spanish and Polish Foreign Ministers. Ms Ana Palacio challenged the existence of sufficient support for the doctrine of "alternative consensus", stating that this doctrine is based on the mistaken theory that the Convention's draft reflects consensus between the governments. This is true for parts of it, she said, but not for others, and the temptation of imposing the Convention's text would create no very cordial atmosphere within the IGC. Vlodzimierz Czimoszewicz openly described Mr Frattini's approach as "unacceptable", as the IGC is the appropriate body for all "legitimate concerns" to be expressed; it should accord all subjects the same attention, whether a consensus exists or not. The Spanish and Polish position was re-affirmed with as much (if not more) determination after the meeting on 30 September at the highest level. Alexander Kwasniewski declared that the Treaty of Nice had been the basis on which the people of Poland had voted to join the EU; the institutional system it laid down could not be changed, as any other system would neither be approved by the Polish parliament nor ratified following a referendum. José Maria Aznar pointed out that the Treaty of Nice had been ratified, and could not be changed without Spain's agreement.
Several observers, and even advocates of the Constitutional draft, placed this dossier at the centre of problems to be faced by the IGC. Convention Vice-President Giuliano Amato sees in it the potential cause of the failure of the whole negotiation, and spoke of the "disastrous hypothesis" of the Constitutional Treaty still being unsigned before the European elections. This is somewhat excessive, and overlooks the tactical element of Spain's position. On the sidelines of the meeting in Rome, Mr Aznar let it be known that it was important to his country to depart from a position of strength, and Ms Ana Palacio hoped to calm things down by saying, behind the scenes, that she was sure compromise would be reached. But after the peremptory statements it made, the Polish government would find it psychologically and politically tough to accept any other solution than Nice; which, however, it will find itself having to do, as the double majority formula is clearly the better, and can be adapted by playing with the percentages (for example, by raising the percentage of States to 60%, the same as for the population). The fact remains that the concordance between Spain and Poland is rock-solid, because it is based on atlantism (Mr Aznar feels that a united Europe cannot be anything other than Atlantic, and looking at an atlas will help to show why), and on the insistence on a reference to Europe's Christian roots. And Mr Berlusconi is not unsympathetic to either of these points.
It is also worth noting the overtures to Mr Berlusconi made by a group of eastern European countries, on the composition of the Commission in particular, and by a "mixed group" (two Member States: Austria and Finland, a Mediterranean country, Malta, and four central and eastern European countries, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia and Lithuania) which stressed the status of the full-time President of the European Council, and on the composition of the European Parliament (see our bulletin of 4 October, p.4).
Weighty implications. But do these considerations really represent the essence of what happened in Rome? Certain observers think not, they feel the essence is elsewhere. They feel it lies more in the statements made in the final press conferences by French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who established a link between the success of the IGC and negotiations on the future funding of the Union, to start next year, once the fate of the Constitution is certain. Mr Chirac stated that there is "naturally a link" between the dossiers: blocking the Constitution means also blocking the financial perspectives for the period (in principle) 2007-2013. The German Chancellor did not wait for the meeting in Rome to point the odd acid comment at those who criticised his government for not respecting the stability pact rules on budgetary deficit. He observed that one possible saving could be the reduction of the German contribution to the Union's budget, and that Spain is certainly in a nicer budgetary position, due to all the European subsidies it enjoys.
Is this attitude (presented by a French newspaper under the heading "no constitution, no money") a kind of blackmail? Some people think so. Not at all, say the authorities of other Member States (Belgian Minister Louis Michel said "there is nothing wrong with responding in kind when attacked harshly"), who say: the Union has its political ambitions, it should be more than just an economic project; the slogan "Economics with the EU, politics with the US" is unacceptable.
Things are clearly slipping a bit, as several central European countries, who are far from considering the EU a purely economic project, have expressed their total support for political and even military projects (Hungary, for instance), and despite the President of the Czech Republic's marked detachment, one might say disdain, for political Europe, we know how little the Prague government and the majority of the population share his view.
Why, then, am I quoting statements that will do little to calm anybody's nerves? Because I feel that the difference of opinion and the deep-seated reasons for certain behaviour must come to light if negotiations are to be sincere and open. Some governments feel that the Spanish attitude on voting methods in Council is motivated by precisely the concern of not allowing the most populated countries the possibility of blocking certain budgetary decisions. They should say it or let is be known unambiguously. European Parliament President Pat Cox was right to wonder aloud: "how would public opinion react if we had to redo the Convention's work behind closed doors to reach a miserable, smaller common denominator?".
Sectorial Ministers defend their prerogatives. Has the work of unravelling the Convention's draft already started? At the first session of negotiations after the end of the Summit, the Foreign Ministers eliminated one of the planned novelties: the creation of a "Legislative Council" which alone (apart, of course, from the European Parliament) would approve Community legislation (see yesterday's bulletin, page 7). I would not make too much out of this first negative decision, because I disagree with the significance this Legislative Council was accorded by Convention Vice-President Giuliano Amato. He felt it would preface the Council's transformation into a "second chamber", with the Commission as the Union's only "government". I do not believe in this kind of institutional evolution, which does not correspond to the "Community method", under which executive power is shared between Commission and Council. Denuded of these exaggerated prospects, the Legislative Council would have been useful for clarifying and simplifying legislative functions. But the Sectorial Ministers did not want to lose their decision-making powers. Shame, but what's really at stake lies elsewhere.
(F.R.)