Ambitions that won't be abandoned. I don't believe EU countries wanting a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) will abandon their ambitions should the upcoming IGC not approve the measures set out in the Convention's draft Constitution. I am certain that the opposite is true. The Convention foresaw in this field a high level of differentiation and voluntarism - Member States would have great freedom over the commitments they subscribe to in line with their views and traditions. In event of failure of the IGC, in my view defence would be one of the first areas to be subject to new initiatives in the form of "strengthened cooperation" if the Constitution provides for this or in other forms if necessary and all those who so desire would participate. For the moment, the Member States in question are keeping quiet about their plans, awaiting the outcome of the IGC (see yesterday's column) but there are indications that the issue remains on the agenda and in the minds of their leaders.
European Commissioner Michel Barnier spoke about it in a speech in Arcachon this week. He is particularly qualified to talk about it because he chaired the Convention defence work group. First he confirmed several European countries' determination, including France, to provide themselves with the means of better contributing to peace and stability, an objective to be pursued at European level because many understand the limits of purely national responses and want to see the EU give itself the means to match its strength. Barnier restated the Convention's four proposals to this end: a) incorporating the war on terror as one of the peace-keeping and peace restoration tasks (the "Petersberg missions"); b) giving the EU a genuine capacity to react to external attacks on one or more Member States by including a "solidarity clause" in the Constitution whereby all civilian and military tools available to the EU and its Member States can be mobilised to prevent and respond to new threats (terrorist attacks, nuclear proliferation, bacteriological and chemical weapons); c) get Member States to decisively strengthen their military capacities to ensure a and b are not mere theory, and create a European Arms Agency to realise the "EU reflex" that's absent today; and d) allow Member States to decide how far to commit themselves to additional initiatives.
In the Treaty or elsewhere. On the fourth point, I quote Michel Barnier's remarks: "Member States of the European Union, current and future, do not share the same European defence and security ambitions. Political will varies considerably among Member States, whether they are attached to NATO and the transatlantic link in a primordial way or whether they have a long tradition of neutrality. So should we give up? Should we wait, for how many years, how many decades, for an unlikely compromise? The Convention concluded, on the contrary, that one had to leave the most committed Member States the option of continuing avant-garde forms within the European Union's Constitutional framework." Further commitments could be made on crisis management outside the EU and "collective defence" commitments. Member States meeting certain quantitative and qualitative criteria could join these more advanced forms of cooperation. Barnier cited as the countries interested in such initiatives France, Germany, the UK, Belgium and several Member States which understand that such cooperation will take place outside the European treaties if they cannot take place within them.
Focus on industry. Given the very limited powers and responsibilities of the Commission with regard to the military, Michel Barnier stressed the industrial aspect of the defence and arms policy. He pointed out the growing R&D gap with the United States, adding that the positive consequences of military research on civilian industry are such that the investment delays in this sector heavily penalise the entire economy. He quoted some national decisions in the opposite direction from the desired direction, Poland's purchase of US F16 fighter planes and various EU countries' support for the JSF fighter being developed by US company Lockheed Martin. The outcome is that military aeronautical research - a domain of technological and scientific excellence - may largely escape from Europe, he said.
A European Security Research Policy? European Research Commissioner Philippe Busquin addressed the Kangaroo Group at the European Parliament on Wednesday on the latest developments in the European arms policy, calling for a European Security Research Policy, in other words including defence research in the EU's framework research programme. The sensitive nature of this made him very prudent, not making statements but asking questions, calling on the EP to reflect and potentially to react. But the tone of his questions leaves no doubt about his ideas. He said the European Parliament could play a "decisive role", adding that it is largely under the pressure of the European Parliament that the EU's framework research programmes have always had an exclusively civilian aim. At the same time, however, it is the European Parliament that called on the Commission to update its 1998 Communication on the arms policy and which, via the Molitor report, highlighted the low level of Member States' defence budgets dedicated to research. The Commission mentioned "dual research" (both civilian and military together) in its 2002 Communication on the European Research Area, and Busquin said "to his surprise, this didn't raise any debate".
Since then mentalities have developed a lot, he said, noting four reasons why it is urgent to develop a European Security Defence Policy: a) threats on the security of citizens and modern society; b) it is impossible to have a credible security and defence policy without a strong and competitive defence industry and a health environment for R&D investment; c) the cost of artificially separating civilian and military research, a separation which is a "European invention"; and d) security research's place in the Lisbon Strategy for a competitive EU economy. Busquin said he was optimistic about the establishment of an "Arms, Research and Military Capacity Agency" foreseen in the Convention's draft Constitution. He said he thought the agency would be set up at some point and is happy because it will help develop the "EU reflex" in this area which used to be seen as coming under national sovereignty (and which no doubt operate using the intergovernmentally).
Preparations have begun. Optimistic but also convinced that the institutional debate over the Arms Agency will take some time. But speed is necessary and research must, in Busquin's view, be carried out within the EU framework. Which is why he said that on his initiative, the European Commission had decided on preparatory work on security research. It will start in the first half of 2004 and should show the value added of EU cooperation in security research using the Community Method. It should help develop appropriate means of dealing with intellectual property legislation, cofunding, etc, and will develop a programme for security research itself in the longer term, which the Commission might foresee for 2005 or 2006. The Commission has already earmarked EUR 65 million for 2004, 2005 and 2006 and Busquin hoped the European Parliament, as Budget Authority, would soon endorse the part of the budget earmarked for next year.
Busquin and Industry Commissioner Erkki Liikanen have created a 25-member group (including MEPs von Wogau, Eryl McNally and Plooij-Van Gorsel) to unveil a report next spring with the broad outlines of a future EU security research programme. Does this new term cover military research itself? Busquin asked the question but did not explicitly reply, noting that the distinction between civilian research and military research is becoming more and more artificial and costly, saying that security threats do not take account of this distinction.
In parallel, the Commission is organising consultation with industry and Member States' governments (and defence ministry representatives). Busquin said the Commission has two years to do these preparations and propose a genuine EU security defence programme. In the meantime, the EU should have developed and endorsed the "security doctrine" Javier Solana is working on, a political basis to act together in the field of arms and R&D.
As we see, the Commission is already firmly committed to preparatory work in domains that fall in full or in part under its powers. But the defence sector is mostly the responsibility of the Member States and it will therefore be of interest to follow developments in the countries most interested in European cooperation. I will try to do so next week.
(F.R.)