What Valéry Giscard d'Estaing really thinks. If I believe that the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) should come back to the "European Commission" chapter of the draft Constitutional Treaty as written by the Convention (see this column of 2 September), it is not because I do not share Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's views on the subject. Quite the contrary: I do not feel that the current draft properly reflects his ideas.
The Convention President has always forcefully maintained that the Commission must be independent of the States, and that its composition should not be determined on the basis of the Commissioners' nationalities. It would be overly fastidious to cite all the cases in which he has defended this principle. I will limit myself to a few examples. In "Le Point" of 9 May: "the row over Commissioners' nationalities leads to deadlock. The Commission represents the joint interests of Europe, not that of the States! The Commission needs to be re-Europised, with as many Commissioners as there are jobs to do, and genuinely constituting a European college". In "La Stampa" of 10 July: "The Commission represents Europe's interests, not national interests. Its composition should be based on the skills of those that belong to it. In an ever-larger Union, we will have to get used to a different kind of reasoning. When we welcome six new Member States from the former Yugoslavia, should they have six Commissioners, on the same basis as Germany, France, Italy, and the other founding countries? In any event, they are represented by the Parliament and the Council". In a press conference in July, VGE explained that those responsible for appointing Commissioners should sit down in front of a map of Europe, remove national boundaries, and look for the most suitable, Europe-minded people (based on their beliefs, experience, skills) to represent common European interests.
Problems with the current formula. In fact, the formula decided upon by the Convention does not answer these principles. As we know, it provides for a President, a Vice-President, thirteen Commissioners of different nationalities with voting rights, plus a number of Commissioners with no voting rights, there to ensure that all nationalities are represented. The Commissioners are appointed "according to an equal rotation system between all Member States (...) Member States are treated strictly equally to determine in which order and for how long their nationals will be present in the college". I attempted to list the consequences of such a formula in this column on 18 July. First of all, it would be impossible to keep a high-quality Commissioner in the post, once the time comes when this nationality has to cede its place among the "deliberative" Commissioners to someone of another nationality: forced out by equal rotation... And it is unthinkable that a Commissioner who has plied his qualities and personality would be happy to become a simple "advisory" Commissioner. Gone are the days when Jacques Delors was made President three times in a row, and Karel van Liert or Mario Monti, and many others, took on a double mandate: rotation would be automatic and egalitarian, even in the absence of a candidate with the necessary qualities from the country whose turn it is. Professor Xavier Delacourt of the University of Strasbourg pictures the scene: "two or three tin-pot Commissioners from the larger States, listening from their back-bench to the voting negotiations taking place between the real Commissioners from Malta and Cyprus...".
Perhaps with reservations. Why did VGE agree to a formula so far removed from his beliefs? It is perhaps understandable: it was needed so that the Convention could reach its consensus, as opposed to going down the "options" route, which would allow the IGC to re-open the debate on the whole Constitution. On 20 June, VGE told the Thessaloniki Summit: "the mission of the college is to defend common European interests. The real selection criterion should be based on skill and commitment to Europe, with no ethnic considerations. But the culture that has grown up recently militates in favour of equal access to the Commission by all Member States". VGE has acknowledged that equal rotation "fails to take account of disparities in resources and population of the Member States, and may lead to the college's being composed in such a way as may be contested, which would greatly undermine the Commission's moral authority". He did, however, say that this weakness is atoned for by the general provision under which "each successive college is composed in such a way as to satisfactorily reflect the demographic and geographic variety of all Member States of the Union".
But this principled assertion is very weak when faced with the legal provisions mentioned etc. I therefore think it likely that VGE agreed to the current text with another idea in mind: that it is never applied. The new formula will not enter into force until 2009, until then Member States (especially accession countries particularly affected by this issue) could, with experience, take stock of the need to pay more respect to what exactly the Commission stands for. Meanwhile, the Treaty of Nice is being applied, namely, the formula of "one Commissioner per nationality", completely inadequate, as it cumulates inconvenient repercussions: excessive dimensions and insignificant weight of the large countries (which, including Spain and Poland, will only have 6 out of 25 votes). I've already underlined that the claimed historical equality between the large and the small countries at the Commission is legendary - it has never existed even in the era of Jean Monnet. In the highest authority of the ECSC, four members came from the two large countries (France and Germany) and four from the small countries (the three Benelux countries as well as Italy), for whom on the question of coal and steel, excluded them from the large countries). Perfect equality, as in the current Commission where ten Commissioners have the nationality of the five large counties and ten of the small and medium countries.
Agreeing temporarily. Nevertheless, I recognise that for the moment it is politically impossible to not admit that every Member State can have a Commissioner of its own nationality, this would not be agreed to by the public in the new Member States. In an initial phase, a Commissioner of every nationality is precious not only to get known and understood the specificities of one's country of origin in Brussels but also - as Jacques Delors remarked - to better explain to one's compatriots and their leaders the ways the Union works and what it stands for. At the same time, I don't think it opportune to include in the Constitution, in a fixed and definitive way, the simplistic formula of a Commissioner per country. It includes the very real danger that some large countries, it they agree to it, would draw the conclusion that such a Commission would not have real and significant executive powers and that the future "European government" would figure in it even less, given its unbalanced make up.
In conclusion, I consider that a definitive and satisfactory solution cannot be worked out today: the conditions have not been met. Lengthy discussions are still necessary to reach consensus on the functioning of a Commission where all countries find their place. I am well aware of certain values and that first class European experience have already contributed to thoughts about the matter and which are still involved in continuing to consider the case, our agency has regularly reported back on the issue - contributions from the association "Our Europe" chaired by Jacques Delors or the document by Robert Toulemon, to which can be added the analyses of Professor Dusan Sidjanski from the University of Geneva and many others - just to mention the reflections made by the Institutions and Community bodies and political groups at the European Parliament. But moving from reflection to action is extremely complicated! It is necessary to convince the competent authorities, overcome prejudice and distrust, take into account public opinion etc. The moment is not yet nigh for obtaining a consensus on a definitive and detailed solution that is likely to be accepted by all governments and approved by all the different Parliaments. Tthe methods of how a Commission of 25 members works should first of all be tested by the next Commission, which will consist in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Nice (hoping that the experience will be a positive one).
The only issue for the IGC. This is why I consider that the only issue for the IGC is to radically simplify the provisions relating to the Commission, maintaining those of a general character (autonomy, role in the institutional balance, essential tasks) but by leaving open those on the composition and how it works, for which the definition will be conferred by the Constitution at the European Council and European Parliament. The Constitution could very well renounce the imposition of the number of Commissioners and other similar rules. The 2009 deadline could also be got rid of, new rules could be applied earlier as soon as there is an agreement.
The major question is to assure the small and medium counties that the definitive formula will not be elaborated to their own detriment. Their governments and Parliaments will not be able, in the absence of exact guarantees, to agree tot handing over to the institutions the responsibility of deciding on this issue. The two essential elements of these guarantees can only reside in the definition of firm and clear principles on the legal equality of Member States and the setting up of procedures guaranteeing that the final decisions can only be taken by the large countries if agreed to by the small and medium sized countries and by trusting the Community spirit of all those concerned with regard to the effective functioning of the new Commission, which will be appointed next year.
An amendment does not provide any ideal solution? I am aware of that. If anyone has a better idea, it would be most welcome.
(F.R.)