An arbitrary operation. Today I am going to do something that is rather debatable from a point of view of journalistic ethics. I am going to divide up the exposé by Jean-Louis Bourlangues on the Convention and its results in a series of short, incisive sentences. The exposé followed a logical line and becomes a personal choice of disparate remarks and assertions. What gave me the authority? Nothing, but the fact that the exposé of the European Parliamentarian itself was already a revealing firework display. Commentaries on the Convention do not always have a brilliant character (my readers know that only too well, alas); but why not admit it sometimes? They discourage the listeners (or the readers). For once, this is not the case, it appears to me normal to take advantage of it and above all to allow the loyal readers of this column to benefit from it.
In order to apologise (above all, to the author) for this impertinence, I am all the same going to summarise the structure of Mr Bourlangues' talk, the only part outlined on a page in front of him; the rest of his talk was improvised. This structure from which he distanced himself according to the enthusiasm and inspiration was his concession to the education received at ENA, this famous French university institution which he went to as a studious youth. In presenting the speaker to the public, Fernand Herman (the event took place in one of the priceless occasional meetings that this former MEP organises at the "Atelier" between 12.30H-14.00H and which are attended by a loyal public that is keen to participate) referred to the ENA as one of the formative factors in the personality of Mr Bouglangues, who in reply to the surprised murmurs of his listeners, retorted, "nobody is perfect".
Three reasons for choosing. But it is not by preference that on the same day that the Convention was celebrating the end of its work that I dedicate this section to a rather non-conformist view and which is not spared from criticism (sometimes subject to sarcasm) to the Constitutional draft that will now be definitive. To other reasons motivate me to do it. The first is that at the time of the congratulations (more than deserved) made to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and his Convention Members, it is opportune to reassert that the draft that they came up with from a European point of view is totally satisfying. This does not mean that I share the totality of the thorough remarks made by Mr Bourlangues but hr moment when I appoint him as the spokesman for the dissatisfied then I will be accurately reproducing his thoughts. The second reason is in my opinion more important and is the conclusion reached by Mr Boulanges (see below). I think it represents what is crucial and those who criticise the draft Constitution would do well to take their inspiration from it. Whatever shortcomings there are, this draft has to be supported by taking into account what would happen if it did not exist. Last March, Mr Bourlangues himself wrote, "Nobody can ignore the dangers of the draft Constitution being aborted". The child has been born. Its existence proves that: a) the Convention method (instead of diplomatic conferences from yesteryear) succeeded and will continue; b) the Constitutional treaty will free us from the Treaty of Nice; c) this treaty includes sufficient progress to be considered as a step forward in European construction; d) the Convention was able to avoid the mortal danger of a draft of "options" (which I described as a "disaster scenario"); e) it will be very difficult for Heads of Governments to undo them if the pro-Europeans correctly exercise and if needs be vigorously the job of monitoring it. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's formula in which the "draft is "imperfect by unexpected", is fair; VGE won his bet for Europe, it is not necessary to reap the rewards and protect them.
The for and against. The previous considerations do not mean that we don't have the right to grumble. Jean-Louis Bourlangues, does and so much the better. Here, then, just to begin with is the structure of his talk (in the language of one who went to ENA).
a) the draft Constitutional treaty is not a Constitution but simply another European treaty
b) the praise it has received is excessive but understandable as all those who contributed to the enterprise want to present the final result positively with no losers. Convention Members sought to "keep the instrument" and logically defend their accomplishment; the European Parliament has seen its role increase (thanks notably to more widespread use of codecision), which was its main objective; national parliaments obtained control (in theory) of subsidiarity; the federalists "avoided the worst"; the same for the Eurosceptics; Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was able to tune into the "the need for European success" felt by public opinion;
c) the positive results are not to be underestimated, especially with the extension of the "Community method" (generalised codecision, extended majority voting, unification of the pillars);
d) reasons for hesitations are just as convincing. Here are some of the main ones: birth of an "executive triumvirate" (President of the European Council, President of the Commission, Minister of Foreign Affairs); maintenance of the imbalance in the institutions (made worse at the Commission); absence of coordination of economic policies; in a paralysing multiannual "financial framework; for a common foreign policy, or at least an "improved Petersburg";
e) despite that, it is impossible to reject the draft as the situation would be even worse: we would go back to the Treaty of Nice, "Best take it rather than leave it".
this last sentence represents the conclusion that should be shared. If we exclusively highlight the shortfalls (which are undeniable) by ignoring the progress (also undeniable), the result would be to call on citizens to throw out an obvious advance in European construction.
The formulas we can't forget. Here is the promised anthology of formulas with which Jean-Louis Bourlangues presented his auditors with the route taken by the Convention and the results it achieved.
- after so much hope, "we are left with choosing between Nice and Nice+", namely between maintaining the Treaty of Nice with the addition of another treaty, "which improves some things and worsens others";
-"Valéry Giscard d'Estaing had wittingly orchestrated the internal crisis at the Convention, which was then brilliantly overcome" (reference to the moment when a group of Convention Members, representing a considerable number of national governments asked the Convention to renounce reform of the institutions by confirming, in this aspect, the provisions from the Treaty of Nice). Following reflections, Mr Bourlangues revised his affirmation somewhat, explaining that VGE had not really "orchestrated" the crisis but that he had "very ably run with it" namely, that he had ridden the movement out;
- the national parliamentarians were able to "escape from the ghostly condemnation of the European Union and understand that reticent elements were the governments";
- "the European Parliament behaved a bit like a Member State by looking after its own interests and powers rather than the general European interest";
- "the Congress of European Peoples, which VGE though useful but which the European Parliament feared as a competitor";
- as well as generalised EP/Council codecision and the extension of decision to qualified majority, "the European Parliament apparently obtained more in budgetary matters, the annual spending section but its supplementary powers have been drained of any substance with regard to the multiannual financial perspectives imposed on Parliament with the ceilings. The obligatory financial framework will paralyse the budgetary powers; annual budgets will just be the operational transposition of this framework";
-"proportional degression in the compositition of the European Parliament will be ultimately ruled out and Germany will maintain its advantage;
- "control over subsidiarity by national parliaments is a mythical mechanism that never really existed. But the national parliaments are happy etc"
- "the Mr Europea affaris who would be able to answer the phone to Henry Kissinger or one of his successors is certainly not overseen by the executive triumvirate (President of the European Council, President of the European Commission; European Minister of Affaris) created by the Convention; as the hypothetical Henry Kissinger will have three European interlocuters instead of two and the Heads of government will do what they want. It is said that this is a "manageable complexity", I find the formula rather funny";
- "the solution retained for the composition of the European Parliament is mediocre and that on the European Commission is bad";
- during the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), "we expect nothing of government except that they limit their nuisance capability".
The pulbic was very satisfied with this non-conformist presentation and at the same time convinced of the need to safeguard what has the priceless value of already existing. Fron next week the priority will change; less fighting about the draft and more defence of the precautions to take to prevent one or other government from reopening the totality of negotiations again. I will try and bring a small number of ideas to this more than delicate and complex issue, which could contain many pitfalls.
(F.R.)