Reservations not connected with essential. I've done my best to closely scan the documents concerning the 29 April mini "defence summit" - the "joint statement" of the four participating countries (Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg) and the final press conference, of course, but also most of the comments that followed (and partly proceeded) the summit. I have not changed my views in the slightest - I thought the initiative a good idea when it was announced and I view its outcome and how it was organised as positive. Positive for the European project, apart from a few reservations unconnected with the essential - concerning the timing and the circumstances which will, I think, gradually fade from memory in the light of future developments.
Five reasons for this positive view. Here is why I take this view, starting with the most obvious (almost banal) reasons but which should be mentioned nonetheless:
Most Member States, the EU Institutions and European public opinion clearly indicate that the EU should have a common foreign and defence policy. This is a precondition for giving Europe weight on the world stage. Opinion polls and official views largely coincide here.
The Convention's work has proved that Member States do not agree about the EU's defence objectives. If the Convention manages to find consensus wording for this bit of the Constitutional Treaty, it will do so by setting out three different levels of commitment - the first would be restricted to extended "Petersberg missions" (some Member States would not participate in military operations); the second would be based on "structured cooperation" between countries prepared to make more binding commitments and arm themselves with the resources to meet them; and the third level would involve a mutual defence commitment between the countries in question. A "solidarity clause" covering terrorist attacks in particular would complete the package. The result is that whatever happens, defence Europe will not be formed from 25 countries, not because of desire to exclude any one country but because of the specific wishes of countries that don't want to be involved. In this situation, lamenting that the "defence summit" wasn't organised along normal institutional lines smack of hypocrisy (see next point).
A European Council on this subject would have given a voice to passionate rhetoric and no doubt a wonderful outlining of views on the opportunity, limits and prospects of defence Europe, but would not have led to any decisions or operational initiatives. Moreover, the idea of making progress in this area came from two countries, France and the UK, and as far as I know it has been seen not just as positive, but as a genuine turning point in the history of the European project because it got the ball rolling for an idea and ambitions that seemed to have been abandoned following the mishaps of previous years, previous decades.
The fact is big European ideas that do not have unanimous support at the start from Member States have always been launched by a small group of countries that feel the need for them. The Schengen Treaty was started by two (France and Germany, but the Benelux countries joined them almost immediately) and the euro would not yet be in existence if people had waited for everyone to agree before creating it. Back then the ineffable Ralf Dahrendorf lashed out against the people who planned the single currency, accusing them of … smashing the EU at a time when the UK wasn't interested. So the bad Europeans are the ones who want to make progress, rather than the ones holding Europe back! I get the impression that Ralf Dahrendorf is not alone in this tortuous logic. When it is necessary and urgent to do something, it has to be done, and if not every country agrees, then a handful can take the initiative, as long as it is clear and explicit that all the others can join in. In the case in question, the initiative was first launched by two countries, then four countries took it up. Both conditions for taking action were in place (namely urgency and lack of unanimous agreement so a common initiative cannot be taken).
The four-way mini-summit ended in significant operational decisions that would have been impossible in a meeting of 15 countries (or 25). I suggest people read not just the summaries and commentaries but also the full text of the four countries' conclusions (published in annex to our bulletin on 1 May). The starting point is that Europe has to have a "credible" defence instrument if it wants to play a role on the international scene and the time has come to enter a new phase in the construction of a "Security and Defence Europe" that could give the Atlantic Alliance new vitality (in the fortunate wording of Michel Barnier): "credible defence to arouse US confidence'.
The assertion that what has been proposed does not represent anything because everything is already being discussed in the Convention is totally inept. The second part of the "statement" of the Four in fact indicates what the Four expect from the Convention, taking up the Convention Praesidium's proposals and calling on Convention Members to approve them. What the Four add (and this is important) is that that they call on the Intergovernmental Conference to approve them too. We should not forget that the statement includes a "general common solidarity and security clause" that will link for all time the destinies of the countries wishing to subscribe to it.
What the Four will do. Then there is everything that is added to the Convention's draft, firstly the "concept of a "European Security and Defence Union" or USDU (an acronym we will have to get used to recognising) with an indication of concrete commitments to be met by countries that want to participate. These are not only general commitments. They include, for example, "participating in major equipment programmes" like the A400M protect (which neither Italy nor Poland are planning to be involved in, in fact). The final part of the statement outlines the seven initiatives that the Four have already decided on and which are open to the other Member States. Here we are back to ever harder concrete - strengthening the Franco-German brigade with Belgians and Luxembourgers; setting up a European air transport command by June 2004; followed by a European defence capacity to counter bacteriological and chemical weapons; a European emergency humanitarian aid system; European training centres; and (point 6) a new "collective capacity planning and operations management" unit. This is most controversial point and is a blueprint for an "multinational deployable force headquarters" (explicitly mentioned in point 7). For the Four, this is not just an idea floating around, they have already indicated where it would be based (Tervuren on the outskirts of Brussels) and its start-up date (summer 2004).
A desire with no certainty. The vital question now is will the idea of USDU and the commitments needed to participate in its, be taken up by the Convention? The wording in the statement of the Four is doubtful, stating we "would like" this concrete cooperation to be incorporated in the EU's constitutional treaty so that in the long term all current and future Member States can join in. In my view, the wording of this paragraph means that if the desire of the Four does not come to pass, if the idea of a European Security and Defence Union is not incorporated in the constitutional treaty, the Four and the other Member States prepared to participate in it will achieve it on the fringes of the treaty. This is the wording that was chosen for the Schengen Treaty.
Is it possible to predict today how many current and future Member States may agree to get involved in USDU? I don't think that critical or negative views should be taken literally or seen as final. I will leave aside "ironic wording" ("band of Four") which we have grown so used to since the time of the single currency (at the beginning it was the "band of Three") and it would be facile to repeat the sarcasm that greeted the idea, both on the other side of the Atlantic and elsewhere (including a Nobel Prize winner), I will also ignore the views taken by the leaders of the German parties the CDU/CSU since in essence this political force shared the principles and objectives of the "statement of the Four" - strengthening the weight of Europe in foreign and security policy, in partnership with the United States, by putting in place credible military capacity. The aggressive tone used by several figureheads from these two parties seems to be more a matter of domestic politics than a desire to change Germany's European policy in this area. In any case, how could the party of Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl oppose the development of European force rather than national forces?
More profound analysis is justified, however, for the reactions and views of Spain, Italy, the UK and Central and Eastern European countries. We have to separate fundamental criticisms and those that only concern the timing and modalities. I intend to return to this, along with supporting documents.
Balance and prudence in Athens and Brussels. For the moment, I will simply highlight the prudence and balance of the attitudes of the Greek Presidency of the Council and the European Commission. Avoiding spectacular statements, both have insisted that the initiatives of the Four be open to all Member States and constructed so as they can be incorporated in the EU's institutional structure. Costas Simitis has left it to governments to decide whether it was a good idea for the Presidency to attend the mini-summit; several said No and Simitis abstained. Romano Prodi expressed prudent support a few years ago to the initiative of the Four, seeing it as the starting point for Community projects. Michel Barnier, the Commissioner particularly concerned because he chaired the Convention's defence working group, has taken a constructive attitude by highlighting the areas likely to develop positively.
(F.R.)