A few more months for the Convention. The facts demonstrate that Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was right. The European Parliament's inability to adopt a resolution on the war on Iraq, and the violence of the views exchanged by the various political forces (see our bulletin of 28 March, page 6) confirm that for the moment it is not possible to hold a serene and constructive debate within the European Union that could lead to a “European” position. People have to calm down, scar tissue needs to form over certain injuries, and rankling needs to be soothed. Some (but not all) US political forces are trying to widen gaps between European countries and this is also having a negative impact: the United Kingdom is being called upon to burn bridges with the EU's “political institutions", while the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are being encouraged to form a group of US political allies within the European Union and to see the EU as no more than an economic grouping…
What is the relationship between these trends, which one hopes are temporary, and VGE's attitude? It has to do with the Convention's timetable. Its Chairman believes that at the current time it would not be appropriate to invite Convention Members to debate the Common European Foreign Policy and the Common European Defence Policy, or draft articles in the Constitutional Treaty on such issues. We must wait until the end of the war, when people calm down, and avoid being hasty, not fearing to postpone concluding the Convention's work until the end of September (see this column on 21 March). This idea of VGE's has not been universally accepted. It is not merely a timetabling issue - a few more months will be essential to allow the Convention to fine-tune carefully thought out and credible texts on the Common Foreign and Defence Policy.
The real objectives of those who are objecting. In my view, the people opposing the idea of postponing the 30 June deadline for the summing up of the Convention's work can be divided into two categories:
a) people who are pleased with the idea that the Convention may not, for lack of time, manage to define a worthy draft CFSP and CFDP, and will have to do a botch job, leaving various options open. In this case, the Convention's draft texts would have virtually no weight and the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) that will take over, would have complete freedom of action. This would mean the Constitutional Treaty being negotiated by governments, even areas already largely decided (legal personality, incorporating the Charter of Fundamental Rights, etc) would be up for discussion. The Amsterdam and Nice Treaties give us an example of what could be the outcome of the IGC in the current phase of the European project. A number of Convention Members and governments would be delighted with a failure of the Convention, with a throttling of this new method of negotiating international treaties, and with a return to the intergovernmental negotiation method.
b) people who, in good faith, have not understood the true meaning of VGE's attitude. They are clearly not aiming at acting as a block on the Convention, but rather to wait for the few weeks that are necessary if the debate on the political challenges is to be constructive. When VGE said it would not be possible to submit the draft Constitutional Treaty to the 22 June Thessalonika Summit, he mentioned the already packed agenda for the Summit. This was only a way of relieving tension. But the President of the Council, Costas Simitis, took him literally and suggested… the date of 30 June. Only one more week, compared with the initial timetable, for finishing the draft Treaty! VGE would clearly not have any problems with addressing heads of government on 30 June; but not to outline the final text. He would give a briefing on progress and invite the prime ministers to express their view on some of the vital issues still not settled… It is understandable that Costas Simitis is disappointed at the presentation of the Convention's text not being made in Athens under his Presidency, but there is a simple solution. It could be decided that the Convention's draft text be presented, as soon as it is ready, to a special Summit in Athens convened after the end of the Greek Presidency, which the Italian Presidency should have no problem in accepting (especially if it wants the Constitutional Treaty itself to be signed in Rome, even if this is done in 2004 under the Irish Presidency).
And what about the European Parliament? As an institution erected over and above individual viewpoints (which clearly remain free), the EP should have the modesty to tone down its accusations of the Council and Member States for not managing to define a European view on the Iraqi business. The EP has not been able to do better, despite its option of deciding by a simple majority vote.
(F.R.)