Ms Paciotti is right. In reporting back on the Parliamentary debate on the Presidency of the European Council (see this section on 20 February) I was obliged to not include some of the contributions. I'll now have a look at the intervention of Elena Paciotti (democratici di sinistra), who developed a powerful argument against a long-term full-time President of the European Council. The Council is by nature unstable and subject to change: it consists of ministers (or Heads of Government, for the European Council) in the service of their countries. If a government changes following general elections - with the increase in the number of Member States, this will happen all the time - the composition of the Council will also change. Ms Paciotti pointed out that a President elected by governments, of which a significant number will have come to an end, would lose its legitimacy.
I share this opinion. In the institutional balance, where the EP represents the people and the Commission represents the common interest, the Council represents the countries. Its legitimacy results from the effective character of this task. If several Heads of governments change, following elections or other changes, how will they be able to feel represented by a President chosen by their predecessors (and often their adversaries)? In the case of dissolution of the European Parliament or censure against the Commission, their Presidents cease, ipso facto, to function. The same thing should go for the European Council. Its President can only be either a Head of State or of a government in office if its legitimacy is not to be put in doubt (possibly with a triple mandate of the current six months, backed up by several Vice Presidents).
The role of the small countries. Another intervention that I only referred to in passing, was that of Max van den berg (Socialist). They are less riddled by nationalism, have fewer national goals and more ties with their neighbouring countries, with which they are used to permanently collaborating. For two and a half years they are the ones who have been pushing Europe forward concretely, particularly in the effectiveness of the Presidency of the Council. Certainly, for the grand designs of the range of the "big" countries, it is necessary; but for them to reach agreement, the role of the small countries is essential.
The inventive Alain Lamassoure. I also quoted in passing, the revolutionary hypothesis of Alain Lamassoure, for resolving one of the most difficult problems that the Convention has to deal with and which it has so far not tackled: how to prevent a single country's "no" vote from bringing down the whole edifice at the end of the Convention's work? For the "ratification" aspect, the "Penelope" working document of the Commission, elaborated an ingenious formula that would allow for the entry into force of the Constitution between the country that ratifies it, as soon as a certain number has been reached. But in the case of the IGC, there is no apparent legal device that would allow for the unanimity rule to be got round. Therefore, there is a two-fold risk: either the government announces that it will not approve the Convention's Constitution or it announces that its Parliament will not ratify it, due without doubt, to the numerous changes that will have been introduced. The most ambitious governments will therefore be subject to a kind of blackmail. Alain Lamassoure believes that the schema will consist in only inviting the governments that are prepared to agree on the results of the Convention, which will be considered as untouchable, just as the Acquis are untouchable, the result of broad consensus. The IGC will only have to debate the points that the Conventions has left open.
Does this idea hold together legally? The countries that aren't invited to the IGC will not take part in the replacing of the current treaties with the Constitutional treaty; the current treaties will in their regard still remain valid and confusion will be unavoidable. But the Lamassoure formula could constitute significant political pressure for orientating the Convention in the direction of the "Two-speed Europe" (see this section on 22 February), with mechanisms that will allow for their organised co-existence, which is already the case for the final phase of the Economic and monetary Union of the Euro.
"Confrontations", a precious contribution. Amongst the numerous contributions to the European Constitution, I would like to highlight that of the "Confrontations Association", for two reasons at least: a) its global character. Usually, the organisations representing civil society take a position on subjects that are linked to their activities, such as the environment, civil rights or general interest services, which is quite normal. But "confrontations" has elaborated a special issue in its "Options" series that outlines a "new, social, economic and cultural model" that covers all the aspects of the current and future activity of the EU; b) the different contributions are signed by Pascal Lamy, Alain Lamassoure, Pervenche Berès, Philippe Herzog (President of Confrontations", Bernard Marx (association economist) and other personalities, who, in some case are highly placed in European affairs.
It's not possible to summarise everything, but I will be able to come back to one or other of these issues.
(F.R.)