An artificial link. It is essential to sever the artificial link, established by many political figures and commentators, between the work of the Convention relating to the development of the Common Foreign Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), on the one hand, and the stances of Member States over Iraq, on the other. The different attitudes of the Fifteen towards American intentions are all too often interpreted as proof of the failure of CFSP and, even worse, as symptom of the futility of efforts within the Convention to come out with a Union foreign policy. Such interpretations neglect some essential truths.
a) CFSP does not yet exist. There are some common stances among the Fifteen, sometimes rhetorical and unnecessary, sometimes effective and appropriate, on this or that specific issue, and, in addition to that, diplomatic effort at co-ordination made by Javier Solana and Chris Patten (with the limited powers at their disposal), which is far from being a European foreign policy;
b) the Convention does not deal with he contents of CFSP. It's a fact that a Constitution cannot and must not define any stance on Iraq, Zimbabwe or any other subject. It sets out the principles, powers and procedures;
c) the attitude consisting in denouncing the lack of a European foreign policy, and drawing from that arguments to reject the Convention's projects or to denigrate them, totally lacks coherence. The creation of a "European Foreign Secretary" and other measures being envisaged aim to provide the EU with instruments that, one day, will precisely make this policy being spoken about possible.
Certain recriminations regarding the current situation are vain, dangerous even.
Those who know that and say so. Valery Giscard d'Estaing declared: "The central problem is that of knowing if a mechanism can be put in place able to produce a common foreign policy. For now, this policy does not exist … What can we do? The best way to proceed is to introduce a federal element in the system. This element could be the Union's Foreign Secretary. That would be a great event for public opinion. The work of that Secretary in the years to come will have to be a work of impetus and research in the setting up of a common policy" (interview in the Figaro of 23 January). A few days later, he commented: "Our foreign policy still does not exist. Consequently, the behaviour of governments differs… This is due to historical and cultural reasons, as well as differences of interest. It's not an ideal situation. But I'm convinced that gradually, we'll find a common point" (interview with Die Zeit and La Repubblica of 30 January).
Jacques Delors, for his part, has developed fundamental considerations on the historical, cultural and other reasons that are behind the stances of European countries not coinciding, stressing that any rapprochement towards a genuine common foreign policy will be slow and gradual, and that, from the outset, only part of the current and future Member States will participate. In 2020, the EU could be made up of 35 countries. If it consolidates peace, stability, economic progress in such an area, while respecting national identities, it will be a historic success. But CFSP and ESDP (as well, moreover, as EMU) cannot be built among 35 in a predictable timeframe, and "differentiation" between States (which does not mean enhanced co-operation and even less so vanguard) will play its role.
Eulogy of what there is and what is being prepared. The preceding considerations do not mean that as we stand CFSP is unnecessary and ineffective: the existence of Mr. CFSP (Javier Solana) has provided a considerable "plus", and the creation of a European Secretary with a right of initiative would in itself represent further very significant progress. It would be fastidious to make a list of cases where the Fifteen have reached common positions and where Solana's action has been effective. But it must be stressed that even in the case of Iraq, where intra-European differences have come out into the open, it is European diplomacy that made it possible to "return the issue to the hands of the United Nations and the adoption of Resolution 1441" (see Mr. Solana's declaration in our bulletin of 31 January, p.5). All those who want a genuine European foreign policy backed by military capabilities that make it credible, so that Europe's voice it once again respected and heard in the world, must back the majority ideas within the Convention, while being aware that the real common policy will be a long haul. I'm not so sure that those today who deplore the lack of it would be prepared to willingly accept a common stance on Iraq if that did not correspond to their own convictions. (F.R.)