Between two sessions. A lot of things are happening between the two plenary sessions of the Convention. Between the June session and that of this week, positions are being taken and the most striking of developments, are, in my opinion, developing on the fringes of the Convention. This is both worrying and re-assuring. Worrying because of the risk that institutional change in Europe risks passing the Convention by and that the most innovating of ideas, the most imaginative directions and political positions escape it too. Re-assuring, because the positions expressed outside the Convention are so incompatible and patently contradictory that a forum where they can be discussed and tested out appears to be increasingly necessary, in view of outlining the choices and compromises and this forum is obviously the Convention and it's there for that purpose. This should be on the condition that the "listening phase" is considered over and that it is ready to progress to the debate on the options. While waiting, the debate on the rather large number of themes for reform have begun "outside the Convention", often in the wake of initiatives that are sometimes at a higher level and the reactions that they have provoked. Some examples
1. A Union President appointed for at least two and a half years, by the European Council. Peter Hain, British Minister for Europe and Member of the Convention had clarified matters on this subject with a speech, confirming that the President of the Union would dedicate him/herself to such a task full-time and that different Council groupings could be Chaired by Ministers from different countries in setting up a "Presidential team" for a period of two and a half years, which would meet regularly (see our bulletin of 29 June p 6). The idea of a Presidential team, of which the President would remain stable and the Vice Presidents would operate on a rotating basis, would have also been supported by Mr Aznar and by one of the smaller countries, Austria. But the reactions have been mainly negative from the other small counties (notably Mr Rasmussen, Acting President of the Council, Mr Lipponen and Mr Juncker), as well as from candidate countries, which have confirmed and even strengthened this feeling. These countries see in the figure of Union President, a shadow of a directory, believing that the President would automatically come from a large country. I don't know if this distrust stems from healthy realism or is a rather unjustified lack of confidence in those who came up with the idea. It think that some small countries have not considered the difference between a President who's in power for a long period at the European Council and who's an acting Head of Government and a full-time President who would step down from all national obligations. Small countries are right to distrust the first formula but much less the second. Let's not forget that Belgian, Jean Rey, the Dutchman, Sicco Mansholt and two citizens from the smallest country in the Union, Luxembourg, Gaston Thorn and Jacques Santer, have been Presidents of the Commission. There's nothing to stop Jean-Claude Juncker being appointed Union President tomorrow.
The maintaining of the current rotation-based six-monthly system was firmly rejected by Jacques Delors, Javier Solana, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Giuliano Amato (who described it as mad and completely ineffective). But opposing this system without suggesting an alternative (effectively keeping he status quo) would be unreasonable. According to Jacques Delors, a stable President of the European Council and President of the Commission could quite happily exist alongside each other, as the roles of the two institutions are different and complementary. The European Parliament Socialist group has already indicated that the rotation-based system of the Presidency should be revised but it has not as yet suggested how. The Convention should come up with something imaginative and courageous on this score.
2. Composition of the European Commission. Jacques Delors and Romano Prodi have concluded that the restricted Commission formula (number of European Commissioners less than the number of EU countries) is not politically possible because it would be difficult to affirm that the Commission represented the central axis of the EU institutional system and indicate at the same time that a considerable number of Member States would not have access to it (even if it is just on a provisional basis). No country wants to be excluded. If the Commission is wide-reaching, it should be radically reformed. That's why Romano Prodi launched his project to reorganise and rationalise the work of the Commission, a project that is neither perfect or definitive but which effectively opens up the debate (it can be implemented on the basis of the current treaties). Peter Hain has already declared that the principle of a Commissioner for each country should be maintained but without creating an additional portfolio for every new accession. The principle is clear but the method isn't: what will be the job of Commissioners without portfolio? The EP Socialist group has not declared what it thinks. It will not be easy for the Convention to define a logical project that is coherent, faithful to the "Community Method" and…acceptable to everyone.
3. Election of the Commission President. European Socialist Parliamentarians have already indicated that they support a European election, having announced a clear position on this question at the end of last August. The Chancellor's representative at the Convention was expecting a formal initiative in this area and indicated that he was counting on the support of 40 Convention Members. This support is understandable, as the idea of conferring responsibility to the European Parliament for electing the President of the Commission might initially appear rather seductive, as it would go in the direction of increased democratisation in the European institutions. But the objections voiced by Jacques Delors carry more weight because they are based on a clear idea (developed through many years of personal experience) of the relations between the Parliament and Commission and on direct knowledge and a little scepticism of Parliamentary customs, of how European political parties work and the relationship between rival political organisations that are bidding for the votes of their electorates (see this section 4 July, point 3). Members would be mistaken if they ignored the arguments of Jacques Delors.
4. Could the Commission Chair the Councils? This formula might initially appear strange but could provide some advantages over the rotation-based Presidential system if other (like that of a President appointed for a long tenure) fail. It appears to have received the support of the Vice President of the Convention Giuliano Amato. But it has not been at all applauded by the European Commissioner for institutional reform, Michel Barnier (amongst others). These reservations are founded on the difference between the role of the President of the Council (who has to find compromises and smooth out differences between Member States in order to reach decisions) and the role of the Commission, which has to defend its projects and proposals founded on the European interest. Balance between the institutions requires that the Community Method as well as the total autonomy of the Commission in exercising the right of initiative would be partly compromised by a too strict a link with a fraction of the EP.
Subjects pending. I could mention some other institutional themes that are emerging but for which no formal proposals have yet been put forward or have been discussed in public such as, where the Charter of Fundamental Rights fits into the Treaty (civil society organisations are in favour of including the Charter in the Treaty); expanding majority qualified voting; the role of national Parliaments in the institutional balance (the trend to reserve a place for them is quite clear but the hypothesis of an additional European Chamber has been generally ruled out). The idea of transforming the Ministerial Council of the EU into a second Parliamentary Chamber and to make the Commission into the "government of Europe" is mostly considered unrealistic and unreasonable (the Commission itself is not even calling for it) but it is a formula that continues to have the support of certain political forces in Germany (it's directly inspired by the federal system in Germany) and the sympathy of the European Popular Party (which, nonetheless, has not yet given its definitive position).
An unjustified worry. Last Saturday in Paris (addressing the European Movement - France), Alain Lamassoure raised a fundamental question, which has hitherto been completely ignored in official channels: how to ensure that all work currently in course is not put in jeopardy by the refusal of ratification by one Parliament or other or by a referendum that votes against it. This is no just theorising, recent history bears it out. Mr Lamassoure pointed out that it would, all the same, be a bit much that a rejection in Slovenia or Latvia (countries cited purely at random) could prevent Germany, France or Italy from accomplishing their aims and aspirations. Mr Lamassoure believed that the solution would be found in a different associative system that was both effective and viable. He explained that countries that refused to subscribe to the new treaty should receive the guarantee that the way is open to them for close association with the EU in achieving their aims and carrying out the level of integration they want. He did not rule out that this "fall-back solution" could be used to solve other delicate problems (Turkey, Ukraine, certain Baltic countries at least on a provisional basis). It is, however, unacceptable that the future of the constitutional treaty should hang in the balance because of the whims of one particular Parliament or other that does not share European traditions, or because of public opinion changes due to the domestic situation.
All this involves one of the themes of the Convention: institutional matters. There are plenty of others concerning for example, a) Union finance; b) "Three Pillars" and governance (Community, inter-governmental and mixed); c) Limits and the role of economic co-operation between Member States; d) Possible power sharing between the Union and Member States (with or without lists). To my knowledge, the document of Robert Toulemon (well-known among our readers) and only Jacques Delors up to then, has established a comprehensive and coherent project for an enlarged Europe. We'll be returning to this issue
(F.R.)