An absurd criticism. Reading between the lines of the "declaration of Laeken on the future of the European Union"; approved by Heads of State and EU governments on 15 December, we discover the fruit of a long, and for the moment, tormented editorial task, of which three elements need to be highlighted.
Let's first of all remove the most inept kind of criticism made by certain sections of knowing commentators and important media pundits on the declaration. I am referring to the criticism made that the declaration fails to present a clear view of Europe's future or indicate in what direction Europe is moving. It is an absurd criticism because all action taken by the Convention, its spirit of innovation and authentic history is founded precisely on the basis of not leaving the responsibility of the Europe of tomorrow in the hands of the different Member States. Any attempt at providing a preliminary definition would have obliged these governments to reach a compromise based on the lowest common denominator. This would also have been the case for working out other areas that still remain rather shaky, as we have already seen in negotiations of the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice. The declaration of Laeken was expected to pose a number of questions and leave the Convention with the responsibility of providing the answers. If this were not the case, what would have been the point of mobilising all the different European institutions, national parliaments and governments in deciding upon what the accession of the candidate countries would actually mean, as well as promising that civil society would be broadened in the process? And why would Giscard d'Estaing have fought so hard to get the Presidency if it had not been out of a wish to concluded his political career in mapping out the new Europe for our children and grandchildren? Why would Jean-Luc Dehaene and Giuliano Amato have sough their respective vie presidencies? And why would Jacques Delors have declared that he was available and interested in taking the helm of this new European adventure?
We should be hoping somewhat that Delors still wants to get his voice heard. In his answer to the question of which person had most stood out during the Belgian Presidency, Peter Mors, a close collaborator of Guy Verhofstadt in the realm of European affairs, replied, "Jacques Delors in the Laeken Group". Mr Mors explained that it was still Delors who had the most incisive and innovating intuitions and who is always ahead on the different debates and which (as posterity has shown) become the basis for new developments.
I will just touch on the first part of the declaration, which aims at constituting an historical landmark and has rid itself of the negative excess of the initial project. The substantial success of European construction has been definitively recognised and the text no longer talks about the so-called "gulf" between Europe and public opinion. It is still true, however, the claim that, initial European construction consisted of "economic and technical co-operation, whereas in reality the essential point was the transfer of sovereignty towards supranational institutions that were being created and tough luck for those who drafted or approved this assertion. The part of the Laeken declaration on the future of Europe raises a number of questions in four key areas:
A. The sharing of competencies between the Union and Member States. The necessity of more efficiently applying the principle of subsidiarity is clearly laid down and shared by all but the conclusions to be drawn underlie the strong differences between Member States. The traps and stumbling blocks involved in this "sharing" are many. Some Member States see within this a means for eliminating, or at least radically reducing the common policies with which they have difficulty or cost them too much, namely the common agricultural policy and cohesion policy. These are two policies that must be re-examined and studies that could lead to their being amended have made significant progress. But for several Member States they are essential, an opinion shared by the Commission and the large majority at the European Parliament. Agriculture and regional policy are fields in which the temptation to reduce EU competencies are strong. For example, several German Länders are demanding greater autonomy in the granting and managing of public aid, the tutelage of Brussels is against this. In practice, this is an essential aspect of competition policy that is being opposed.
In the opposite sense, the possibility of the EU acquiring additional competencies in order to be up to meeting new challenges and developments is included in the declaration but which is accompanied by a strangely formulated sentence. "The question of knowing how to guarantee that the new sharing out of competencies does not lead to a secret enlargement of Union competencies or that it does not fall down in fields that deal with the exclusive competencies of Member States or if the case arises, of the regions." Why did the Summit employ the tem "secret enlargement"; as if the transfer of Union competencies was not an exclusive prerogative of Member States and national parliaments?
B. Simplifying Union instruments. This chapter includes several sensitive legal and institutional aspects of obvious importance, but which does not appear susceptible to impassion public opinion. It does not appear timely to go into any further details.
C. More democracy, transparency and efficiency. Covering institutional reform, this chapter poses some fundamental questions: the authority and efficiency of the Commission, the role of the European Parliament, the role and how the Council functions, the role of national parliaments, the efficiency of the decision-making process. The subsequent answers will determine the work of the Convention. A number of national and European political forces, as well as a number of individuals have taken a first stand on one or other of these subjects and it is not exaggerated to say that this has provoked a certain cacophony. This is the second largest area after that of subsidiarity, where member States have very clear differences.
D. The Road towards a Constitution: The word "Constitution" figures in the declaration: it's the end of a taboo (although some people would have preferred the term "Constitutional Treaty"). Going beyond terminology; the questions that arise in this chapter are fundamental, even if the Summit gave a lot of attention to ensuring that they were formulated in a neutral way, without wishing to influence the answers. What should be done with the division of the Treaty into three pillars? Should a distinction be made between the basic treaty and other provisions of the current treaties? Would this lead to a distinction between the amendment and ratification procedures for the basic treaty and other provisions of the treaties? If I am not hallucinating, this last issue opens up the possibility of a structured and institutional European avant-garde. In effect, if the response of the Convention is positive, there will be two or more treaties in the future: the first will contain the basic principles of the EU, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights and all the Union member States would be involved in it; the second treaty could just link together a certain number of countries - those which would have ratified it. The ratification procedure would effectively be different. In other words; the second treaty would enter into force the moment a certain number of countries (still to be worked out) ratified it.
Defend the Convention from Continuous Blackmail: We are able to deduce the potentially revolutionary significance of carefully chosen words that we hardly notice, when we examine the ratification procedures. The avant-garde would not be created on the initiative of countries that wished to go forward to the detriment of excluding other countries, but rather by the self-exclusion of countries that refused to ratify a supplementary treaty. New ratification procedures could only obviously exist in the abandoning of the rule by which a single country can say "no", one single parliament can scupper a whole project (in a way that the Treaty of Nice is threatened). If the Convention is aware of what is at stake, why doesn't Mr Giscard d'Estaing, who concocted the formula Europe/European area/power? It could get rid of a danger that threatens to put a spanner in the spokes of the Convention's work - get rid of the continuous blackmail by one or other of its members, the government or parliaments which are prepared to go to the most audacious lengths by declaring that they refuse to accept the decisions that have been reached. Thus the rule would be put into practice, a rule that has often been formulated but rarely applied and which no country in the Union has been obliged to participate in developing it but which would not stop the others from carrying it out.
Three guidelines for fundamental conduct. This rapid overview of the declaration of Laeken leads me to a number of provisional considerations, that in my opinion should help guide the work of the Convention. The first is that the Convention could if it has the political courage and willpower, forget the "issues of Nice", which had been wretchedly redrafted by a half-hearted Summit, and outline a global view of Europe's future. This is also what the Convention's President, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing believes is the job of the Convention, and in his words, must "invent Europe of the new century, a Europe that is straightforward, accessible and able to inspire dreams". This is also how the Louis Michel, who has just left the office of President of the EU Council sees it and who in practice requested the Convention to re-examine what had been decided at Nice in what concerns the composition of the European Commission (see this section in yesterday' edition of EUROPE).
Second consideration: behind the "questions" of the Laeken declaration lie a number of deep differences between Member States that do not have the same conception of a united Europe and who do not have the same goals. The Convention must take this into consideration and be ready to abandon the dream of a text adopted by "consensus". Its rules of behaviour must in my opinion be the following: an honest indication of the minority positions is preferable to compromises of the lowest common denominator that immediately diminish the goals of a future Europe. The third consideration refers to the sensitive issue referred to above; the Convention must accept he danger of putting forward a project that one or other Member State judge unacceptable, rather than abandoning a model for Europe it considers desirable. The convention must therefore take into consideration, if necessary, the formula of the two Treaties, one of them containing all the basic principles and the Community acquis, the other applicable one a sufficient number of countries have ratified it. (F.R.)