The place of "civil society". Three aspects of the European Commission's White Paper on "European governance" led to some concerns within the European Parliament, and Romano Prodi tried to be reassuring in Strasbourg this week (see our bulletin of 3 October, pp. 8/9). The first aspect concerns the insufficiency of parliamentary control over the Commission's "executive role". The second relates to the fear that the Commission's thrust in favour of self-regulation of certain economic sectors may weaken the role of the legislative authority. The third refers to the impression, felt by certain MEPs, that the Commission is seeking to give too much importance to consultations with "civil society" and dialogue with NGOs, to the detriment of its relationship with the people's elected representatives and democratic institutions.
I shall not insist on this last point, as it was sufficiently debated following the sensational interview of EU Council President Louis Michel (this section has dealt with that on four occasions); the respective roles of representatives of civil society and politicians now seem clear. The Commission's President was, after many others, quite explicit: "we have never proposed nor will we ever propose replacing the role of Parliament or other democratically elected institutions by forms of spontaneous fora of organised civil society, which we call non-governmental organisations. These associations play an important role in raising the awareness and integration of our society and, whence, we want to take advantage of being able to collaborate with them. This collaboration (…) is today performed in an opaque and confused manner. We must tidy up current practices." The Commission is thus seeking a more transparent, better structured process, enabling it to improve the way it exercises its right of initiative; but "whatever, the treaty does not change and all decisions will continue to be taken by institutions according to the democratic rules in force".
Regarding self-regulation and regulatory agencies, Romano Prodi stipulated that principle and guarantees would anyway have to be established by legislative acts, in which Parliament will participate in full; furthermore, for the first time, the Commission proposes that the EP be associated in the "complex process of executing the open co-ordination method" between Member States. The Commission's intent is not to diminish but bolster Parliament's role.
States may not be sidelined. The other contentious issue, which touches upon "European governance", deserves some additional considerations. To be honest, some aspects of Romano Prodi's reasoning leave me perplexed. I obviously agree with the move aimed at handing Parliament "fundamental responsibilities concerning controlling the implementation of EU policies", well beyond its role as co-legislator. Less so when the Commission President states: "the Council must perform the role of legislator which is its own and not transform itself into an executor". He then adds: "The White Paper returns to the Commission the role of policy execution", whereas the Council and Parliament will in the same way have to control the action of the executive. If I understand correctly, the Commission alone would assume the role of executive power, currently shared with the Council. Two days ago, in the same section, I qualified this move as "dangerous dream". Why? Because, in my opinion, it is unthinkable that the legitimate representatives of the Member States should not also be associated with the executive power. The EU needs this. Who, if not the European Council, would have been able to define with authority and credibility the EU's stance faced with terrorism, define solidarity with the United States, approve the "conclusions" of the 14th and 21st of September (commented on in this section of 21 and 27 September)? How to imagine that the Summit with Russia could take place without the President of the European Council and Mr. Solana? These are not however legislative activities. There is an alternative to the direct involvement of the Fifteen in the activity of the EU executive: it would consist in handing the Commission solely the management of the large market and certain common policies, and leave the other essential decisions (economic government, definition of the future budgetary framework, reform of the Cap, financing of the cohesion policy, etc.) to intergovernmental procedures, with the Commission in a corner. The aim is, on the contrary, to gradually return all policies - including the Cfsp and Esdp and the creation of an area of freedom and security - to the institutions and normal procedures; which is only imaginable if the representatives of States participate fully in the executive authority. Otherwise, essential issues will remain intergovernmental, to the detriment of the Community method. (F.R.)