The merits of European pressure. I recently had the opportunity to express, in this section, an opinion that might have surprised a certain number of readers, namely that the EU's influence in the field of external relations and foreign policy exceeds what is generally expected. To be clear: this opinion is not based in the list of "declarations" that the Presidency of the Council or the European Commission issue at the rate of two or three per week and which very often only have one aim: announce that the EU, is either indignant, according to the case, or that it protests against this or wants that. Very often, these nearly daily stances have a purely declamatory nature, and do not have more weight than the European Parliament's resolutions when they start to judge everything that is happening in the world, while in the knowledge that these hopes or indignation have not, in most cases, had any influence and go straight into the archives.
I am also aware that a true common European foreign policy is not for tomorrow and I see, as we all do, the difference between the true weight (of the United States) and the talk (of Europe) in most of the world's hot spots. Though at the same time I see that an area exists where Europe is more effective, determined and useful than the United States: progressively bringing a large number of countries down the path of democracy, freedom and the respect for human rights. Also, it is not necessary to underline the extent to which the development in this direction represent a vital element for the prevention of armed conflicts, in favour of other methods of conflict resolution.
Which are the countries on which European pressure is already effective and determining? The answer is obvious: the countries, which aspire to tighten their links with the EU.
The case of the accession candidate countries. The situations are obviously not all the same. The accession candidate countries represent the most blatant case, because the assessment of the degree of readiness is based both on the economic situation and the "political criteria". This two-fold condition is well known, but I am not sure that its importance is always assessed correctly. A certain number of candidate countries do not need the EU's pressure: in others, this pressure is vital. In its "strategy document for enlargement" from last autumn, the European Commission discussed this in some depth; but the media's attention was more concentrated on the country by country situations, than on the general introduction. The Commission wrote: "The benefits of enlargement are already visible. Stable democracies have emerged in Central and Eastern Europe. Their foundations are already so strong that we must not fear seeing them fall back into authoritarianism. This success is for a large part down to the citizens of these countries themselves (…) However, it is undeniable that this process was supported and encouraged by the prospect of integration into the European Union. The direction of reforms and the determination with which they are carried out results from the need to satisfy the accession criteria". Also, after having recalled that political stability in these countries is linked to democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and the protection of minorities, the Commission adds that stability "leads to a reduction of risks of troubles, ends the possible causes for conflicts, such as the issue of minorities and the border problems, and eliminates, through integration, the potential antagonisms".
The situation is even more evident for the accession candidate countries with which the negotiations have not yet begun, I mean Turkey. The "political conditions" for accession have a major influence over the reform programme recently passed on by Ankara to Brussels, and they reinforce in Turkey itself, the position of the political, trade union, intellectual, etc. forces, who fight for these reforms. Without the EU's pressure, this process would be longer and more uncertain.
Those who have not understood. The situation is different in the Balkans. My personal view is that the leaders and even public opinion in the countries of this area are still far from having understood the meaning and aims of European unity. The Communities have been created to put an end, for once and for all, to wars and conflicts, which for thousands of years, have ravaged our continent; the economic and financial power and the quest for well being do not represent the priority. Taking part in the building of a united Europe firstly means doing what the six founding countries of the EEC first did and then the other Member States.
When the Prime Minister of one of these countries expressed, after the Zagreb Summit last November, his disappointment because the "final declaration" insisted more on regional cooperation than on EU material aid, I asked myself: "has he not understood anything". This declaration (published in N°221 of our EUROPE/Documents series) was, on the contrary, precisely because it specifies what the countries concerned must undertake if they want to join the builders of the united Europe: it talks of "negotiated dispute settlement, respect for the rights of people part of minorities, respect for international obligations, long-lasting resolution of the issue of refugees and displaced persons, respect for the international borders of States". They must also conclude between themselves negotiations on the control and reduction of armaments at the regional level. The declaration explicitly foresees the overlapping of bilateral stabilisation and association agreements between the EU and these countries, on the one hand, and "regional cooperation conventions" that these same countries must conclude between themselves, on the other hand. These conventions must foresee: a political dialogue, a regional free trade area, close cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs (notably for the fight against organised crime, corruption, money laundering, illegal immigration, the trafficking of human beings and all other trafficking). The latest developments do not give the impression that these aims are shared by all of the authorities and peoples' of the area, this is the least we can say.
If the "Zagreb programme" is not achievable… If the programme included in the "Zagreb declaration" is achievable, it will require a strict compliance. If, on the contrary, it does not correspond to the hopes and aspirations of the countries and peoples' of the area, the countries concerned must say so. The EU on its side should have the courage to recognise that the policy followed until now is not viable and that the creation of long-lasting multiethnic countries is a "politically correct" illusion, a purely theoretical view, and to draw the consequences, as painful and wrenching as they may be. Though no country in the area must get the impression that the EU continues to finance the existence and functioning of artificial countries, where the people refuse to live together.
The Mediterranean countries and the candour. Compared to the EU, the situation in the Mediterranean region presents a few similarities with that of the Balkans (even when putting aside the Middle Eastern conflict). It is true that the southern shore of the Mediterranean does not aspire to acceded to the EU, and luckily there are no armed conflicts between them; but they have as aim to create with Europe a huge are of security and free trade… without following the same objectives between themselves. I am surprised when I read that Pascal Lamy confirmed the 2010 deadline for the completion of the Euro-Mediterranean free trade area, while he clearly knows that these terms means a homogenous and compact territory in which goods and services move freely. It does not mean that each individual Mediterranean country concludes a free trade agreement with the EU! How can the European Commission agree that the aims of Barcelona be diverted in such a way? What prevents from explicitly recalling the conditions of a true area of security and free trade? If the Commission and certain Mediterranean governments reach the conclusion that free trade does not correspond to the aims of cooperation, collaboration and friendship between the EU and the Mediterranean region (personally is am convinced that this is not the right path), they must have the courage and intellectual honesty to recognised it, instead of prolonging the "announcement effects" of a purely theoretical achievement.
Elsewhere, in other regions of the world, it would be excessive to talk of a determinant influence by European foreign policy. In the ACP States (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) a half century of association has not lead to their economic rise, nor to a clear move toward democracy and freedoms, and especially not to the end of conflicts or other disasters. For lack of radical changes in the African countries themselves, the external action - be it by the EU or the United States, or whoever - remains ineffective other than to alleviate the regular disasters. In Latin America and Asia, other influences dominate. There is a great deal to be said to give greater coherence to an open and unconventional debate over these issues. I intend to progressively do so if it emerges that the readers are interested. For the time being, I keep myself to recalling that the Commissioner for external relations, Chris Patten, when presenting to the press the European Commission Communication on conflict prevention (see bulletin of 12 April, p.3), had notably underlined the requirement for Europe to use best and more, in its foreign policy, its position as largest world aid donor to third countries and its economic power. Not in order to impose itself nor to crush others, but by loyalty to its principals.
(F.R.)