Three points are not acknowledged. Only part of the truth is being told. The "official speech" on the state of EU relations with the Mediterranean third countries is reticent and approximate, composed essentially of expressions of political will and hopes for the future - but nothing, or nearly nothing, is making any headway. It is true that "political will" is in itself a significant sign, an essential precondition for all effective action. From this point of view, the visits by President Prodi and the choice made by the European Commission to place Euro-Mediterranean relations among its top priorities are positive. But it is counter-productive to disguise or excessively tone down the reality of the situation. The reality of the situation is that:
- Each time a high level meeting sets itself the aim of rekindling the Barcelona Process - and there have been several such meetings - it fails, because of the deterioration in relations between Israel and the Arab States. Efforts for breaking the link between the peace process and the Barcelona Process are in vain, as the Arabs reject the presence of the Israelis or call for political stances that the Europeans refuse. The meeting held in Marseilles in November not only failed to reach an operational result but it did not even allow common conclusions to be adopted. Participants fell back on the Presidency conclusions, which were then challenged or rejected by the Arab side.
- There will not be a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area in 2010. This realisation involves, by definition, the free movement of goods and services throughout the united area. There is nothing of this kind between Mediterranean third countries. No trade, no exchange. There are the occasional regional projects here and there, limited to a group of countries, but nothing global, not even in intention. The aim of the governments is to gain access to the European market, which has nothing to do with the united Euro-Mediterranean area. So why should we be so surprised about the indifference European investors show for this region? No isolated market is sufficiently attractive, and investors will only arrive when a presence in any one country will mean access to the area as a whole.
- The economic and political progress of the Mediterranean third countries towards the conditions required for the correct functioning of a united area is insignificant or non-existent, albeit with rare exceptions. On the economic front, free trade under the present circumstances would quite simply mean the almost complete disappearance of small enterprise, replaced by a fabric that is just as tightly woven of small traders and distributors of imported products. At political level (human rights, freedom of the press, rule of law without military or religious governance), all progress is followed by a slide backwards that takes us back to the point of departure.
Given this situation, several attempts are being made to make the process regional. Instead of the wide and ideal area of Euro-Mediterranean free trade, there is a move towards regional groups (between the Maghreb countries for a start), which could strengthen their links with the Union more easily and … exclude Israel. But any spectacular rekindling of such links would only be possible once analysis has been made of the causes of the current failure and an answer has been found to the essential question: What do Europe and the Mediterranean countries want and are able to build together?
Italian ambassadors speak up. For the past few weeks we have had a tool that may encourage and facilitate reflection. It is a slim fifty-page volume setting out the experience gained by Italian ambassadors who have had direct responsibilities either in the Mediterranean third countries, or in the defining of the management of European or national policy toward these countries. The tradition of diplomatic reports on foreign countries is well-known in Italy, where the old reports of the Venetian Ambassadors at the Council of Ten are still being published. They were secret at the time, and were not published until several centuries later. Today, the "diplomatic dialogues" between Ambassadors are published just a few months after they take place and their publication is authorised (giving the source). Here is No 168 of these dialogues published by the "diplomatic studies circle" (the source is indicated, so our conscience is clear). It is the account of a debate that had brought together eleven ambassadors including Bruno Bottai, Piero Calamia, Maurizio Bucci, etc., the rapporteur being Giuseppe Jacoangeli. The importance of this text lies in the effort made to understand in detail the reasons why the Barcelona Process failed, over and beyond the political contingencies. Rapporteur Jacoangeli cites the "inability and the reticence of the Arab countries to adopt western models for production cycles, life-style, social structures and the form of government", and the inability to bring about their regional groups. At the . same time, he reproaches Europeans for their "inability to make proposals that are compatible with the political, social and religious context" of the other party. Furthermore, the arrival of illegal immigrants (in Sicily or in Spain, especially) create the fear that there will be "changes in the legal, social, trade union and educational orders". The experience of coexistence with Islamic immigration has up till now had the effect of "making the two cultures more distant from each other rather than bringing them closer", as immigrants find it difficult to give up behaviour that sometimes leads to "violations of our legal order". In other words, the grand declarations of principle on historic and cultural identity, which would facilitate contacts and cooperation, are for the most part just a myth.
The rapporteur believes that "the peoples and the governments on the southern shores of the Mediterranean have not yet managed to establish the model that, in the respect of traditions, will be able to guarantee the economic and development conditions needed to face up to the West and meet the growing needs of their societies, whose expectations have been let down". By way of conclusion, Ambassador Jacoangeli considers Europe should resume the initiative for a new "Charter of Barcelona" founded on experience and cooperation and no longer on assistance, renouncing the idea of imposing cultural hegemony as "all cultures are valid, if they share the values of democracy and respect human dignity".
Causes of failure. The ensuing debate was just as frank as the introductory report. Ambassador Badini (currently in charge of Italy's relations with the region considered) noted that the EU public opinion is unaware of Euro-Mediterranean partnership and that it has never been and is not now able to foresee tension in the region. In the hands of the Commission, the process has become more "bureacratic, with a plethora of meetings that have never had and do not now have a main theme and consequently only have a negligible impact on reality". Above all, "cultural dialogue" is pathetic as it is limited to "the enhancement of historical and cultural sites" instead of looking at culture as a "key factor for understanding and hence for tolerance". Fairs, exhibitions, concerts, archaeological research: all that is fine but has nothing to do with the dialogue hoped for. Politically, Barcelona has remained a "hostage of the peace process". Economically, European investments are not increasing due to the lack of investor confidence. Commercially, all the Mediterranean countries want to export the same products to the same destination (the European market), without making any effort to explore forms of complementarity between them. Also, the "Charter for Stability and Peace" project has, in order to satisfy everyone, become an "encyclopaedic document that avoids all the knotty questions and loses itself in a series of principles (…) which endeavour to reconcile the demands of all parties, without priority objectives, without indicating a credible road to follow". The Mediterranean third parties place emphasis on "economic security", and the EU countries on the democratisation process and therefore on respect of human rights and collective freedom". The result has been a practically "unusable" draft document (which in fact has not been approved).
And yet there are so many concrete things that could be done! Ambassador Calamia stressed that regional cooperation would be indispensable, and could be effective, for water, energy, transport and the environment … Ambassador Ferraris, on the other hand, feels the difficulties evoked by Jacoangeli and Badini cannot be overcome by economic means, in the absence of choice by the Arab world of a "political model" that marries the safeguarding of its culture and its way of life with effectiveness. There is no sign of a move along these lines, says Ambassador Castaldo, who notes that the "arabisation" of education (a process that is in itself justifiable) has brought with it a loss of quality. He fells confident there will be "resumed Islamic reflection on more concrete bases", but doubts that the assimilation of Muslim immigrants is possible if they continue to consider "as legal, if not required by religious practices, what, in our society, would be a crime", and if the Imams continue to encourage them to do this. It is an "attack on the foundations of the State (…) those who refused assimilation must go back to where they came from, and possibly only return here as seasonal workers". Ambassador Fontana Giusti recalled that the Muslim tradition was formerly liberal. He insisted on two points: a) the countries of emigration are losing their young people, "the most dynamic section of their population", which is a "worrying problem" for them; b) our countries must not accept "excessive demands" from Islamic Councils that would contribute to the "constitution of groups that are ever more separate and difficult to assimilate into our society". The insistence of the ambassadors on immigration-related problems can be explained by the fact that such issues hinder cooperation between our countries and the countries of origin, and hence the Barcelona Process in itself.
None of these remarks prevented Ambassador Bottai from considering that it is necessary to insist on the "Barcelona Process road". Even Ambassador Jacoangeli felt that, in Barcelona, the problems had been "put correctly". Tomorrow, we shall attempt to come to several conclusions on the disillusionment that has come about and on the mass of considerations evoked by the ambassadors. (F.R.)