Let us take a bit more perspective. To inaugurate the new formula of this section, let us start with a non-conformist assertion: the year 2000 was a good year, or at least a very important year, for Europe. Despite the semi-failure of the Nice Summit. Despite the criticisms often exacerbated and sometimes justified against the princes that govern it. Despite the deceptions provoked by some bitter failures .
Let us take, if you would not mind, a little distance. What will the future historians retain from the European year 2000? The establishment of the instruments of European security and defence, a turning in the history of continental integration. The at last tangible progress towards the European area of freedoms, security and justice, long-lasting work of which the first pillars are not set. The proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights for Europeans. The affirmation of the Euro, which enters into a positions of strength in the year leading up to its circulation. The re-launching of negotiations on the enlargement of the EU towards Central and Eastern Europe, thus the true unification of the continent after a half century of division that at times seemed permanent. The creation of a procedure that will submit each Member States (present and future) to the judgement of its peers over the respect of the fundamental principals of the EU. Plus a few economic results such as the agreement on the statutes of European companies and the Social Agenda for the next five years.
The point of view of Sénèque (and Delors, of Schoutheete and Bourlanges). It is not all. What was decided by the Heads of Government over the post Nice and added to the list of "historic" progress of the year that has just ended. At first glance, it is not only procedure; in fact, it is the thought process on the future Europe that is finally relaunched no longer by the sporadic personal initiatives, but on the institutional level, with a timetable, stages, and procedures. A few years ago, the pressing invitation by Jacques Delors to questions over "what we want to do together" was welcomed by the icy silences or all the more by a polite indifferences in the name of pragmatism ("let us continue, we will see where it finishes") which hide with difficulty the refusal to discuss new targets. The history of this refusal, persistent and obstinate, is described and commented upon in the book by Philippe de Schoutheete "A Europe for all" (now available in various languages), with the demonstration of a blockage, to which he condemned Europe, under the heading of Sénèque: "Ignoranti quem portus petat nullus ventus suus est". It is significant that today, even the quotation is reproduced by the European Parliament. Jean Louis Bourlanges, who translated it thus "there is no favourable wind to he who does not know where his port is" (1). To benefit from the favourable wind, It is necessary to know where we want to go. Which reassures, and gives all the meaning to the decisions of procedure in Nice, and which at the same time "enhanced cooperation" becomes practicable, without possible veto: in case of a failure or a disagreement over what the Europeans want to do together, the door is open to the vanguard, guarantee and great hopes for all: each country will be able to take part in the type of integration it prefers, in the form of Europe that best corresponds to the aspirations, traditions and the culture of its people.
The challengers from Seattle should understand… As promising as the thoughts appear and the start of action towards a more fair and balanced "global governance", both on the financial and monetary level (reform of the IMF, negotiations in the fight against tax evasion and international organised crime). The guidelines from Pascal Lamy on this issue, combined with those of Franz Fischler for agricultural trade and of Mario Monti for the rules governing competition, are not yet correctly perceived ("the challengers from Seattle" have not understood anything of the directions of the efforts made by Brussels), but draw development that could influence the world markets, on condition, of course, that Europe is also heard for the "environment" aspect).
European Commission everything is to be redone. We can see it, in this global view what is positive in the assessment of the year 2000, the institutional reform decided in Nice has no place. We have expressed the opinion that we must accept the results of Nice because it is impossible to gain more for the time being. Though this resigned acceptance does not absolutely mean approval. We await with great interest the conclusions to be reached by the European Parliament's Constitutional Committee. On the basis of the elements available, the formula of the "resigned acceptance" seems to us to be the only reasonable one in order to protect what is more or less directly linked to the Nice Summit and what will be swept away in case of a rejection of the new Treaty. At the same time, the institutional reform includes some positive elements or at least useful (extension of the qualified majority vote, controls on the risks of "serious violations" of the fundamental principals, designation by majority of the Commission President and Mr CFSP), but on the two fundamental points - functioning of the Council, formation of the European Commission - the result is concerning. How will function, with the use, the mechanisms of voting defined after Byzantine calculations (and which have shown themselves to be partly correct)? The sensibilities and certain irrational fears have played a disproportionate role: why imagine that the "small countries" aspire to form coalitions against the "large", ok to block such or such future decision? What an absurd scenario! I rather see several small countries (starting with the smallest, Luxembourg) supporting the initiatives that allow to move forward towards the united Europe. The EU does not leave greatened by the Nice calculations. As for the future Commission as it was drawn-up by the Heads of Government…. Luckily,, nothing has been defined on this issue. Let us stay, for the moment, with reaffirming that, for this aspect, everything must be redone, if we want to avoid the collapse of the "Community method".
Conclusion: the results of Nice have not understood anything and allow to continue down the road. The heretical assertion on the assessment for the year 2000 is especially a message of confidence in this "Europe of ancient parapets" of which dreamt the "bateau ivre" of Rimbaud after having covered the rivers and oceans of the world.
F.R.
(1) The Latin concision is a lost secret. After the translation effort that enables to understand a maxim, to grasp the meaning, we must always return to the original text. There exists for the cited phrase by Sénèque a translation by Montaigne (which was indicated by Ambassador de Schoutheete himself), but it is not simple. Sometimes we get the impression that the masters dialogue above our heads and understand each other amongst themselves. However here it is regardless, this translation by: "No wind does for he who does not have a destination port" ("Nul vent fait pour celuy qui n'a point de port destiné"). The translation in the book "A Europe for all" says: "he who ignores towards which port he is heading never finds a favourable wind". We have kept that of Mr Bourlanges, even if the verb "petat" expresses a desired nuance, of a search for an aim, that is lost.
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Oh, the pretty reforms… The journalists accredited with the European institutions have received, at the end of December, a "memo" indicating the way in which the European Commission intends to allocate, between its Directorates General, the 400 new posts authorised by the Budgetary Authority - Parliament and Council - and the 320 posts made available by internal redeployment (consisting of maximising the use of the "human resources" available). Very well, for the operation itself and for the transparency in which it has been cloaked. However with a nuance: the information is partially incomprehensible. The Directorates General have in fact indicated through clear rules in a few cases (trade, external relations, agriculture, etc), mysterious in others sg, sj, eac, scr, scic, sdt… being the first ever reform decided by the Commission during its taking on of functions: in a concern for clarity, the Directorates General are no longer indicated by the hard to understand numbers for public opinion. Finished, are the DG II, the DGIV, even if these denominations had become nearly legendary for the press circles (and it was then for the journalists to explain, for public opinion, what this meant).
In practice, in a logical desire for simplification, in order not to repeat each time the complete denomination of the Directorate General (or DG), have been introduced the abbreviations cited. Shame that this new system is less clear than the former.
But it acts of innovation the Council has done better, much better. Incapable of achieving the true necessary reforms, it was sensitive to the criticism covering the excessive numbers of specialised formations, and it has radically reduced them. For the façade. For example, the former Internal Market, Consumer and Tourism Councils have been regrouped into a single Council that is called… "Internal Market, Consumer and Tourism Council". Though this regrouped and rationalised Council keeps three Presidents: During its last session (30 November), the Internal Market part was chaired by Mr Moscovici, the Consumer part by Mr Patriat and the Tourism part by Mrs Demessine. Thus everything becomes more complicated, as each part has its timetable; the debates of the first are interrupted even if they are not over, to leave room for the next part. The time available to be allocated, it seems, without hierarchy between the importance of the issues. It seems it is a simplification.