The situation is clearer but not necessarily easier. Suddenly, the panorama of Europe has changed. What seemed hazy has now become clearer, and positions are more obvious. Support for "Community" solutions for the future of European construction has become stronger and, above all, more widely shared. But we are not saying that everything has become easier. On the contrary, this new clarity could itself exacerbate oppositions and differences. And yet this situation seems preferable by far to a Union bogged down in a sort of vagueness and murkiness, in which it could lose its personality and its ambitions almost without noticing it.
What makes us speak of clarification? There are many and, we believe, significant elements that make us do so. Let us cite them at random. Germany's return to a position at the leading edge, an evolution that will be heavy in consequences. Romano Prod's speech in Strasbourg in favour of the "Community method" and the Commission's irreplaceable role. The Danish people's refusal of single currency. The new joint document between Germany and Italy on "strengthened integration", which comes just a few weeks after the Schröder-Amato declaration. The common memorandum of the three Benelux countries on the IGC and the future of the European Union, a logical follow-up to the speech by Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt.
Germany has found its ability to propose and take initiatives. The new German political generation seems to have gone beyond the period of wavering which was perhaps inevitable at the time when the "great" former leaders left the scene. An attentive observer (and actor of the Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reform) tells us that Germany has regained its "ability to make proposals and to take initiatives". It has taken leading positions not only on enhanced cooperation but also on majority vote, and today seems far from its "nervous" attitude in the last stage of negotiations on the Amsterdam Treaty.
The fact that Germany's new "proposal ability" is expressed not only by the attitude in the work of the work of the IGC but also by joint documents with Italy is in itself doubly significant: because of the identity of orientation with the country which has always been (with Belgium) the first defender of the "Community method" and therefore mistrustful towards the intergovernmental method, and because of the impression that, in reality, these documents also largely reflect France's position. The role of the president-in-office prohibits the French delegation from subscribing to joint documents with other delegations, as it must take everyone's position into account. But many elements, and the political reestablishment of the Franco-German couple as an engine for integration, allow one to think that France could essentially align itself on Germany and Italy.
Why have recent texts so much importance? The Schröder/Amato text (published in the form of an article jointly signed in the German and Italian press) defines the meaning of the "enhanced cooperation" as an instrument for additional and progressive integration, and clearly points out the "indispensable objectives" of the Treaty of Nice and sketches out the road to be taken from hereon. "A broad public debate" on the constitutional organisation of the future Europe would result in 2004 in a wide Conference. But, we must be careful, the text does not speak (and this is certainly not by chance) of an "Intergovernmental Conference" but a Conference without adjectives pertaining to it, which leaves the way open to every solution, all the more as last week in Strasbourg Mr Moscovici cited the "Convention" where the Charger of Fundamental Rights was born as a possible example for tomorrow. Could the eternal and often disappointing IGC formula now be outgrown?
Welcoming the notion of vanguard in the official IGC texts. The text signed by the two heads of government takes on full importance in the light of the official Italian-German document which was recently submitted to the IGC Secretariat and which, to begin with, explicitly points out that the aim of "enhanced cooperation" is "strengthened integration", rejecting the "proliferation of parallel initiatives in which, as the case may be, diversified groups of Member States would take part". So put to one side is the hypothesis of an "à la carte" Europe replaced by the aim of "forming an open and operational vanguard". We thus have the concept of a vanguard making its entry into the official documents of the IGC, accompanied by the suppression of the "right of veto" and of extension to all pillars of the Treaty.
The evolution of strengthened cooperation therefore becomes radical. Introduced in a timid and impractical manner in the Treaty of Amsterdam - "current circumstances", states the Italian-German document, "prevent the use of this instrument in practice" - it is now increasingly identified with the vanguard of Jacques Delors, in the spirit of Germany and Italy (and of France, although it does not appear in the official texts of the IGC) and in that of the Benelux countries.
Benelux in front line. The Benelux Memorandum of 29 September represents the first explicit and formal defence at the level of heads of government of the "Community method, which guaranteed the success of the integration process and must in future remain at the heart of the European Union". In the opposite direction to the new intergovernmental tendency, the "Benelux countries believe that, in time, the current intergovernmental cooperation should be brought as much as possible within Community competence". The three countries also place emphasis on other viewpoints: the Commission president should, in time, be elected by direct or indirect suffrage; there should be revision of the position of the High Representative who must "hold a seat not only within the Council meetings but also at the Commission". The Commission's exclusive right of initiative must be maintained. And, to come back to enhanced cooperation, the Benelux memorandum also calls for the abolition of the right of veto: - no Member States should be able to oppose "cooperation" if eight or more Member States are in favour of it.
We therefore have a group of countries that are almost in agreement on an essential element of reform. If we count them - France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg - that makes six. They are exactly the six founders of the European Community. Can one believe this is just coincidence?
This historical and geographical identity does not have any exclusive nature. On the contrary, all the documents cited insist on the open nature of the vanguard, whose aim it is to simply avoid, in future, that the train of the enlarged Union be forced to move at the rate of the slowest carriage, which would quite simply mean not moving forward at all. The Danish referendum confirmed that, if Europe had always respected such a criterion, it would not even have its currency today. And all points to the fact that public opinion in the United Kingdom and in Sweden is similar to that in Denmark, and identical situations will inevitably exist in one if not more of the new members. It is therefore fundamental for the principle of vanguard to be felt more or less uniformly in at least six capitals at the present time, and that it be codified in the Treaty of Nice, in the interest of all, even of those who, in an initial phase, will refuse to take part.
Not all countries have to have the same conception of Europe or the same aspirations. How can one make all the current and future members of the Union understand that not all the peoples - and this is fully legitimate - have the same aspirations regarding European integration? That they do not have the same imperative reasons for consolidating this integration and extending it to new areas, such as defence and security? We are no more or less "European" because of the differences of choice we make, which depend on history, traditions, geographical or political situations, the time and the circumstances. We are all free to make our own choices. No people is forced to go further than it wants, but neither does any people have the right to hamper the initiatives of those who have other ambitions and demands.
Unfortunately, this concept is, at first sight, so simple and justified that it is not understood by all, and it is to be feared that the new impetus with which one group of Member Sates demands the notion of vanguard to be recognised in practice, in order to avoid the risks of inertia and future deadlock, will cause additional difficulties in negotiations on reform. As we said at the beginning of this commentary, the fact that the situation has become clearer does not mean it has become any easier. On the contrary.
Similar situations of "difficult clarity" are also to be found in other aspects of the reform, mainly concerning the future composition of the European Commission (where the positions of six Member States do not coincide at all) and its links with the "Community method" and with the extension of majority vote. We shall be back under this same heading tomorrow with a few considerations in this connection.
Ferdinando Riccardi