Among the comments (both written and spoken) which last week enriched European current affairs, a certain number were like a switch, calling us to reflect and allow our imagination to wander (even beyond what is reasonable, some readers will say).
"The Danube was more polluted after NATO bombing" (Mrs Liliane Mara, Environment Minister in Romania, regarding pollution caused by the cyanide leak). Well done, Mrs Mara, for saying out loud what many people think but which no one in an official position dares say: Atlantic solidarity forbids them to. The destruction of bridges over the Danube and nearby rivers as well as the destruction of petroleum and chemical industries located on the banks of these rivers represented an ecological, economic and cultural disaster, the repercussions and traces of which will be seen for many years to come. All the countries of the region are suffering the painful consequences, far further away than Serbia. The Danube is not only the vital economic instrument for all these countries, but is also important for their history and their civilisation: myth and history are blended all along the river, which is a crossroad of races, traditions, cultures and religions … What did the young American aviators know about all this when they dropped their bombs? For them, the bridges on the Danube were simply "strategic targets".
The operation against Milosevic, of course, had the support of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and no-one challenges the principle. But the same cannot be said about the arrangements? Nothing will stop us thinking that the view of the river paralysed and the bridges destroyed played a role in strengthening the determination of several heads of government to give concrete substance to defence Europe and to bring about an immediate speeding up of negotiations in this connection. The princes that govern us must have had the feeling - more or less clearly, more or less consciously - that it is up to Europe to decide on the content and the modalities for operations of this kind, given the results: Milosevic is still in power, and, where yesterday the Serbs wanted to carry out ethnic cleansing by eliminating the Kosovars, today the Kosovars are trying to do the same thing to the Serbs, showing, according to Claude Imbert, that "the fairy tale of a mixed society of Serbs and Kosovars was above all an intellectual and then a diplomatic mirage".
"I believe Britain's hesitation over Europe was one of my country's greatest miscalculations of the post-War years" (Tony Blair in his speech on 23 February in Gent). Everything points to the British Prime Minister being sincere when he once more expressed this concept at a particularly significant occasion, as he replied, twelve years after the date, to the "Bruges speech" given by Mrs Thatcher (who, on 20 September 1988, had practically rejected the united Europe as it was taking shape). Tony Blair is no doubt convinced that Britain's place is in Europe and that its interest lies in contributing to this great enterprise from the inside in order to be able to influence it, to have its word to say. Unfortunately, for the most part, public opinion, the press and the administration do not share this view. The hostility felt, the instinctive antipathy shown towards anything supranational or which implies a transfer of sovereignty to common institutions, is as strong today as it was twelve years ago. That which, on the continent, is considered an enrichment and a victory over the demons of the past, which have steeped Europe in blood for centuries, is felt on the other side of the Channel as a renunciation, a loss of autonomy, regression. This is irrational behaviour, as, in fact, inevitable losses of sovereignty are accepted but only on condition that it is in the direction of the United States. The case of Echelon is symptomatic of this, even if the European Institutions (including the Parliament) will find it difficult to muster the courage to denounce it with the indignation that is required and to draw the appropriate consequences. In foreign policy, it is sometimes asked whether the United Kingdom is part of CFSP or of an Anglo-American preferential alliance. An example of the last case, which calls for reflection, was that of the end of the air embargo against Serbia. France had been proposing to lift the ban for at least two months and all the Community countries agreed (except the Netherlands), but London was obstinately opposed until Washington gave its go-ahead. That very day, Brussels, which had been discussing the matter for several weeks, learnt with astonishment by the press that … Mrs Albright and Robin Cook had together taken the decision to lift the embargo! The European project was, however, different on one point from the Anglo-American project - and the British waited for Washington's consensus even on this last detail before lifting their final reserve.
What will Tony Blair (and those who think like him) be able to do when confronted by the attitude of the British press? According to Boris Johnson, the influential commentator, England has to face an invasion every thousand years: the Romans under Julius Caesar in 42AD, the Normans in 1066, and now the "troops from Brussels". How can one drag into the heart of Europe a country that is so resentful of European integration? What will the weight of the businessmen and economic forces in general be as they seek to show where their country's interest lies?
"Italy will be the interpreter of the need for common security and defence policy to be included in the Treaty" (Massimo d'Alema said after his meeting of 24 February with Javier Solana). It was inevitable that, sooner or later, one of the fifteen governments would formally request that the provisions on CESDP (Common European Security and Defence Policy) be negotiated in the context of the Intergovernmental Conference underway, and Ambassador Fagiolo, Italian representative in the Seixas da Costa group, will then no doubt follow-up the announcement made by his prime minister. It is a known fact that some governments are opposed to this enlargement of the IGC agenda, for essentially tactical reasons: they feel that the ratification of the new Treaty resulting from the IGC would be compromised in their countries if the texts submitted to the parliament were too explicit on defence matters. But is it desirable that, yet again, Europe should try to move forward in an ambiguous way? Is it not indispensable to dissipate the fog and for each Member States to clearly indicate what they believe must be the magnitude and the objectives of European construction?
There is something embarrassing about all this. To take position would be tantamount to giving the impression that judgements are being made in favour of some and against others. But the different concepts of the united Europe are all perfectly legitimate. It is quite understandable that a country like Denmark should not have the ambition to directly influence the fate of the world. For political stances, it is enough to take part in the UN's deliberations; on military issues, to take part in NATO talks and then to come faithfully into line with the resulting decisions. It is, however, also just as understandable that other countries which, a few decades ago, determined world changes, should plan to reconquer, together, their past influence or at least have their word to say and give Europe back its active role. In both cases, one is just as good a European. How can one forget that Denmark saved Europe's honour the day when its king, and thousands and thousands of Danes after him, wore the yellow star that the Nazis had imposed on their Jewish compatriots? How can one forget that the Scandinavian countries are still the most generous when it comes to giving aid to the Third World?
Europe must give each country the possibility to behave in conformity with its ambitions, its history, its mentality, and its traditions. How? By looking to the solution of the "open avant-garde", which will not compel anyone to take part in forms of integration which do not correspond to his or her aspirations but which nonetheless allow the others to achieve what they consider necessary.
"I would ask you to locate me in Brussels for the mandate that the heads of state and government have entrusted me with, and nowhere else". (Romano Prodi in his response to an article in Le Monde which had announced his forthcoming return to national politics in Italy). Everyone comments on how they see the behaviour and the results of the European Commission and of its president. But attributing emphasised false intentions to the latter concerning his role and responsibilities in our view goes beyond the freedom of judgement. Finally, each and everyone behave in a way that is dictated by their professional conscience. Personally, I find there are other aspects which are embarrassing in the positions taken by the president of the Commission. In order to affirm his intentions of renewal, he decries what Europe has accomplished so far. It is fashionable to consider that Santer's Commission was not up to much (although there was Agenda 2000 …). But what about the Jean Monnet intuitions and method? And the Delors decade? In his concern to prove his determination to change, Romano Prodi speaks of "radically rethinking the building of Europe", to the point of declaring: "each Institution, beginning with the Commission on, must accept that its current form and even its long-term existence, may be reviewed".
The Commission, however, represents the most marked invention of the Community institutional system. Several hypotheses threaten it, including the prospect of finding itself weighed down and ineffective with 30 members. If even the president now starts to cast doubt on its future …
Ferdinando Riccardi.