In all the resolutions voted on at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), it is worth noting that very few African countries voted in favour, which conveys a poor idea of the solidarity of the Europe-Africa partnership. Many observers believe that Russian propaganda has fallen on fertile soil in Africa, or, quite simply, that formerly colonised peoples feel unconcerned by the war in Ukraine, which they see as the West’s problem.
The most shocking thing is the fact that between the resolution of 2 March 2022 and the resolution of 12 October, evidence of mass murders of civilians, rape, torture, child kidnappings etc... piled up; by the end of August, 29,000 war crimes had been identified by an investigation carried out by the International Criminal Court. Yet this horrifying situation seems to have left the governments of many UN member countries unmoved. Their behaviour could be construed as encouragement to the Kremlin to continue on the murderous course it has chosen. Indeed, there comes a point when a vote of abstention or failing to cast one at all is tantamount to overt complicity.
To sum up, Putin still has many sympathisers on the American continent (Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela) and even more in Asia and Africa. China is clearly feeling a little awkward over this conflict, having no interest in getting involved in it. The same applies to the republics of Central Asia, from which Putin was apparently expecting reinforcements.
Armenia and Azerbaijan attended the inauguration of the recently formed European Political Community (see EUROPE 13037/1), with the portrait of participants clearly constituting an anti-Putin/Lukashenko media operation, but neither country has adopted any sanctions against Russia. Armenia continues to be economically dependent on Russia; it supported the Donbass pro-independence uprising and, instead of condemning the invasion of Ukraine, sent Russia military aircraft in March. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, has expressed its solidarity with Ukraine, even though it signed a cooperation agreement with Moscow in February 2022. In the conflict between the two countries, Russia has long played the role of referee or mediator, but the European Union could take over from it if it manages to untangle a Gordian knot: the Azerbaijanis are supported by Turkey, Israel and Hungary, while the Armenians enjoy the sympathy of Iran (pro-Russia), France and the United States.
Turkey is another country that has yet to adopt any sanctions against Russia, but it voted with the West at the UNGA. Whilst remaining faithful to NATO, President Erdoğan has positioned himself as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine. In the spring, he welcomed delegations from the two warring parties to his country for short-lived peace negotiations and, alongside the UN, played a key role in the agreement of 12 July allowing Ukrainian cereals exports to leave the country. Since then, he has met Putin several times, but with no specific results. He is at pains to contain Russian expansionism in the Black Sea region, but is still dependent on its hydrocarbons. As the leader of the longest-standing candidate for EU accession, Erdoğan is taking no steps towards the EU and its relations with Greece remain lamentable. His ambiguity, plus the conflict in the Aegean Sea, suits Putin very well.
And what of the situation on the European continent? Serbia is playing a bizarre double game. It entered into a military alliance pact with Russia in May 2013, even though it had been granted EU accession candidate status one year earlier. Russia picked up much of the bill for the modernisation of the country, which Putin has visited many times. Unlike other countries of the Western Balkans, Belgrade is not applying any European sanction measures against the Russian state (see EUROPE 13041/13). September’s signature of an agreement on the continuation of consultations between the foreign affairs ministers of the two countries was roundly condemned by the Commission (Euractiv, 27 September). More recently, the EU home affairs ministers have expressed concern at the effects of Serbian visa liberalisation for third country nationals, which has triggered a sharp rise in asylum requests, particularly in Austria and Hungary (see EUROPE 13043/1). It is too soon to say for certain that this has Moscow’s fingerprints all over it, but it wouldn’t be the first time that the idea of weakening the EU, in the current context, by destabilising the Balkans region, has been imputed to the Russian leader. What we can say for certain, however, is that Serbia has not lined up behind the EU external policy, either on Ukraine or migration.
Within the EU family itself, the case of Hungary is problematic. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has never made any secret of his close friendship with Putin. When the war broke out, he considered himself at one time a mediator figure. He welcomed Ukrainian refugees into his country, but refused to allow Western arms en route for Kyiv to transit through it. When the Council recently adopted the military assistance mission for Ukraine, the Hungarian minister of state abstained (see EUROPE 13044/10). The way Budapest has applied the sanctions agreed unanimously by the Twenty-Seven has been somewhat by interpretation. It has not implemented the embargo on Russian oil and gas; quite the reverse, in fact, as Orbán signed an additional contract with Gazprom in September. He had barely got back home from the last European Council when he decided to hold a national consultation on the sanctions agreed by the EU, accusing ‘Brussels’ of “opening fire on Hungary” and orchestrating a campaign featuring billboards with the slogan “Brussels’ sanctions are destroying us!”. This extraordinary lack of loyalty makes Orbán an out-and-out ally of the Russian aggression.
Finally, it has no secret that Putin has long treated Europhobic far-right leaders favourably, in Austria and France in particular. This continues.
The new Italian government features Matteo Salvini as deputy prime minister in charge of infrastructure and transport. Openly pro-Putin, he was accused of having held secret talks with the dictator in spring of this year; as recently as September, he launched into a diatribe against European sanctions. As for Silvio Berlusconi, the leader of Forza Italia, a member of the new coalition, he sees Zelinskyy as the warmonger and said just a few days ago: “I have reconnected with President Putin – a little, a lot. He sent me 20 bottles of vodka and a really sweet letter for my birthday. I responded with 20 bottles of Lambrusco and a letter as sweet. He said that of his five true friends, I am the number one”. His comments caused consternation in political circles, starting with Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who supports the Ukrainian people and the Western policy on the matter.
It is, incidentally, not only on the far right that a fondness for Putin can be found. Readers may recall the verbal acrobatics of the ‘Leader maximo’ of the French Left, Jean-Luc Mélenchon. They may also have come across a lengthy and bewildering article in the October edition of the serious French monthly publication Le Monde diplomatique entitled “Ukraine and its false friends”. Why bewildering? Because, dear readers, make no mistake about it, Ukraine’s “false friends” are none other than the 27 member states of the European Union. Yes – with the association agreement that entered into force in 2017, dubbed a “voluntary annexation treaty” or a “colonial-type” instrument, they sowed the seed of the war. And also because President Zelenskyy is presented as some kind of puppet figure for big business. There’s no criticism of Russia, you understand. Journalistically, it might be more to the point to ask the Ukrainian people who they think their true friends are out of all countries in the world.
Finally, we come briefly to the rubbish being spouted on social media, of the “all they have to do is…” kind. The warmongering European elites have no idea: all they have to do – it’s so damned obvious! – is to start immediate negotiations with Russia by sitting down around a table and peace will return (and with it, our cushy lifestyle).
Throughout the world and in Europe, Putin still has accomplices but, despite the evidence of his countless war crimes and with the worst quite possibly still to come, he still has a lot of objective allies. Many “true friends”.
Renaud Denuit