The idea of a common European defence dates back to the 1950s. Despite its many setbacks, it continues to enjoy popular support from the citizens of the EU, in every opinion poll on the subject. Recent events, throwing the high military risks we are running into sharp relief, have prompted the European leaders to start taking the project seriously once again: the ‘Strategic Compass’ was adopted by the European Council on 25 March. Will we have single defence to go with our single market and single currency? The first two projects were success stories, as they were based on the following ingredients: a simple idea that everybody could understand, a precise timetable and stages of completion, a binding legal framework, the involvement of all actors and large-scale communication efforts.
For many years, the very principle of integrated defence was blocked due to the philosophical hostility of at least one major member state, the United Kingdom. In 2017, things started to move. Brexit was happening, the world was becoming more dangerous, particularly in view of Russia’s conduct, the United States was being led by an unpredictable, Eurosceptic President who was obsessed by the idea that the Europeans were not putting enough money into NATO. The new President of the French Republic, who was elected to office that spring, publicly developed the idea of a European sovereignty, based on its own military power. He sought to create a strong Franco-German axis on this project, but Chancellor Merkel’s response was less than effusive; she went no further than to make the case for common projects. Even so, the European Defence Fund (EDF) was created – albeit with a tiny envelope.
In June 2017, the European Commission published an interesting reflection document on the future of European defence (COM(2017) 315 final), focusing on the ‘cost of non-Europe’ in military matters; extremely diverse range of weaponry systems (heavy combat tanks, destroyers and frigates, fighter aircraft), enormous differences in percentage of GDP earmarked for national defence, lack of coordination of public procurement and armaments production, etc. It set out three scenarios, from minimum integration to common defence and security, all presented on a graphic produced by the European Strategic Policy Centre, consisting of concentric circles, calling to mind a… compass. December saw the launch of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC) provided for by the Treaty of Lisbon, which would bring together 25 member states (all but Denmark, Malta and, of course, the United Kingdom). This cooperation would start with a list of 17 common projects, the completion of which would be financially supported by the EDF. These countries undertook, amongst other things, to increase their defence budgets in real terms, coordinate their capability development plans and to work together on cyber-security.
The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy at the time, Federica Mogherini, predicted that there would be no European army for at least 50 years and took great pains to stress that the EU was not intending to become a military power.
In the multi-annual financial framework 2021-2027, the EDF budget, for which the European Commission initially proposed 13 billion euros, was trimmed to less than eight billion by the European Council. Off-budget, the ‘European Peace Facility’, with an envelope of eight billion euros, was also created.
For years, several groups of countries have committed to various international missions, on a case-by-case basis; there are currently 11 civil missions and seven military ones underway throughout the world; of these, just one is being carried out in Europe (EUFOR Althea in Bosnia & Herzegovina). This is good news, but this does not constitute integrated European defence. As to whether this will ever come about, the EU has gone through contradictory prevailing trends, structurally.
There are six member states who are not in NATO (Ireland, Finland, Sweden, Austria, Cyprus and Malta): as these do not benefit from the Atlantic solidarity clause, it is very much in their interests to be able to rely on EU assistance in the event of armed aggression (article 42.7 TEU). Of the 21 countries who are members of both the EU and NATO, some are firmly of the opinion that this protection is adequate (Poland is a leading example of this), others want to create European sovereignty without leaving the Alliance (principally France), while Denmark is not involved in the common security and defence policy (Copenhagen obtained an exemption clause in 1992, but the referendum scheduled for 1 June may change that). Suffice it to say that reaching unanimity on the principle of a European defence union will be no mean feat.
To overcome this complexity whilst responding to the objective threats to which the EU cannot, as things stand, respond, we will need to move on from this policy of baby steps. In early 2020, a new High Representative, Josep Borrell, was hard at work. The Commission and the European External Action Service were called upon by the member states to prepare a summary document that was analytical, prospective and open-minded. This would be the ‘Strategic Compass’ of the EU (see EUROPE 12438/17).
Compasses point North and thence to all the other cardinal points, to assist with navigation and other travel, maintain a course, reach a destination. The objective ‘strategic’ (used ad infinitum by business and the European institutional system, where there are strategies by the truckload), should be interpreted here in its original sense: concerning war. Etymologically, the Greek strategos was the head of the army.
The work began with a broad consultation of the national intelligence services to identify the threats facing the EU. Over the course of the year, various suggestions were provided to feed into the Compass: crisis management, battle groups, capability-building, the resilience of the EU, external partnerships, EU/NATO cooperation, etc. At a hearing before the European Parliament in September, General Graziano, the President of the Military Committee of the EU, complained about several recurring shortcomings: national or pro-US reflexes in public tenders, under-use of the PCS structure, dependence on external suppliers, insufficient funding of the EDF, lack of trust between member states, etc. (see EUROPE 12555/18). In November, it emerged that of the 47 projects of the PSC, 12 had been completed. The European Defence Agency (EDA), created in 2004 to improve capability and collaboration, but long in vegetative state, saw its missions bolstered in 2017; it started to produce annual reports that would be taken into account.
From January 2021, the European Parliament began to encourage preparations for the Strategic Compass. In February, the foreign affairs ministers noted that the work was making slow progress, due to the usual divisions between the Atlantists and those in favour of a strategically autonomous EU, but the European Council agreed on reinforcing the civil and military operational engagement of the EU, its industrial and technological defence base and its cyber-security. The Secretary General of NATO gave his blessing to this consolidation of the EU, which goes hand in hand with that of the transatlantic axis (see EUROPE 12667/1).
In May, by request of 14 member states, the idea of a ‘force of first entry’ was retained by Josep Borrell, while the EU battle groups have never been used (see EUROPE 12714/5). In July, answering MEPs calling for the end of unanimity voting at the Council on foreign affairs issues, he stated that this would be impossible (see EUROPE 12763/26). (To be continued)
Renaud Denuit