The European Union took effect with the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht in November 1993. The next year, it signed a bilateral cooperation and partnership agreement with Ukraine, then a young Slavic Republic, which had declared independence as early as July 1990, before the official dissolution of the USSR in December 1991. In a referendum held that same month, 91% of Ukrainians had voted in favour of independence, which took the form of a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional court and a President elected by direct universal suffrage. The process was not, then, a particularly long drawn-out one.
Like Belarus, Ukraine had had a seat at the United Nations since 1946: in both cases, this was the sign of a specific status, whilst giving the USSR two extra votes in the General Assembly. In 1954, Crimea was transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which was about to experience a relatively happy period in the post-Stalinist condition: set up as a model, it saw one of its children, Leonid Brezhnev, hold supreme power from 1964 to 1982. Even so, it retained a strong national sentiment, which began to make itself felt from 1989 thanks to Gorbachev-style liberalisation.
This patriotism had its roots in a chaotic and tragic history. After the long domination of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, an autonomous Cossack state was created in the 17th century, before breaking apart. Some of the territory was absorbed by the tsarist Empire, the rest by Austro-Hungary. The Russian side spoke of ‘little Russia’ or ‘new Russia’. During the 19th century, the use of the word ‘Ukraine’ (meaning ‘on the border’) coincided with rapid cultural developments.
Prompted by the October Revolution, the country acquired independence in 1917. This did not last long, as the Bolshevik regime, fearing foreign influences, sent in the Red Army: at the end of 1922, Ukraine was one of the Soviet Socialist Republics. The artificial famine of the early 1930s (Holomodor), caused deliberately by the central powers to weaken the Ukrainian peasantry and sense of nationalism, which were considered retrograde, left indelible traces: 4 million dead, according to an average of estimates.
When the German soldiers arrived in 1941, they were initially welcomed as liberators from the Stalinist yoke and then were met by tremendously brave resistance. Even so, certain citizens collaborated with the SS in the destruction of the local Jewish population. The Red Army took over again in 1944. All in all, the Second World War is believed to have cost the lives of 8 million Ukrainians.
In 1998, the above-mentioned partnership agreement entered into force. There was no question of Ukraine’s accession either to the EU or the Atlantic Alliance. The next year, however, despite a verbal promise made to Gorbachev in 1990 that the organisation would take only the DDR (in the framework of German reunification) and not extend any further east, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined NATO. Others would follow.
The Ukrainian language, which is divided into several ‘dialects’, was unified in the late 19th century by the University of Lviv; this was the version officially adopted upon independence in 1991, breaking away from the official form imposed by the USSR, which was the variant closest to Russian. A census held in 2001 aimed to identify ‘nationalities’, a term which in the West corresponds to the word ‘ethnicity’. The result showed more than 77% of citizens considered themselves ‘Ukrainian’ and more than 17% as ‘Russian’, plus myriad small minorities. Linguistically speaking, Russian speakers tended to live in the east and south of the country (areas already held by the Empire) and Ukrainian speakers in the whole of the West (once influenced by Poland and Austria-Hungary). Although Russian was recognised as one of the 13 minority languages and is understood by much of the total population, the conditions for tension were met. The ravages of corruption and the extremely high number of political parties, with highly variable survival rates, would do the rest.
As far as Moscow was concerned, the head of the Ukrainian state had to be somebody sympathetic to Russia. Leonid Koutchma, the head of government since 1992, balanced out the first President of the new Republic, Leonid Kravchuk, who was interested in seeking a balance between Russia and the West, despite being a former President of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. However, he was beaten in the 1994 presidential elections by Koutchma, who would remain in power until 2005. His long reign was marked by considerable Russophilia, but he was accused of having links to Mafia groups and involvement in the murder of a journalist. Up to this point, all was quiet in the Kremlin.
The elections of 2004, which were won once again by a pro-Russian, Viktor Yanukovych, were surrounded by suspicions of fraud and there was a series of popular protests described as the Orange Revolution. The results of the election were cancelled, people went back to the polls in December and his rival, Viktor Yuschenko, was victorious. Yuschenko had earlier been targeted by an attempted assassination by dioxin poisoning and the Russian secret services were suspected (at the time, Putin had been President for more than four years). In any event, this was the first time that there had been a Ukrainian President who looked upon the European Union and NATO with a favourable eye.
It was during this presidential term of office that the European Union really reached out to Ukraine. Despite its less than stable domestic politics and cases of corruption, this Republic with a tragic past deserved sympathy. In a resolution dated 2008, the European Parliament recognised the Holodomor, or extermination by famine, as an ‘appalling crime against the Ukrainian people, and against humanity’.
In 2009, the EU initiated the Eastern partnership, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus (the last of which dropped out in 2021). This partnership was a key instrument in its neighbourhood policy. The aim was to reinforce political and economic relations with these countries by means of several association agreements aiming to promote contact with stability, to spread values, such as the rule of law and gender equality, and to extend a friendship on which Moscow would no longer have the monopoly. Because of its size, geopolitical location, economy and history, much of it European, Ukraine was undoubtedly the key player in the partnership.
The year 2010 saw a change at the top of the Ukrainian state: the unsuccessful candidate in 2004, Viktor Yanukovych, won the presidential elections. The scales tipped back in favour of Russian interests. The Kharkov agreements, signed on 21 April, symbolised this closer relationship: the lease of the Russian military base of Sebastopol, a Ukrainian city under special status since 1992, was extended until 2042, in exchange for reductions in prices of gas supplied to Ukraine. At the same time, however, negotiations for the EU/Ukraine association agreement continued, while in Kyiv, the regime departed on an ever tougher line, up to the point of imprisoning opposition figures. In 2012, Russian was proclaimed the official language.
The European Union placed conditions on the final signature of the agreement: reforms to improve democracy, justice and the rule of law. Moscow described the project as unfriendly. Following a great deal of pressure brought to bear by Russia, the President, in step with his government, announced on 21 November 2013 that he would not sign the association agreement with the EU (see EUROPE 10968/37). This had explosive ramifications among the population, with major pro-European demonstrations. These were violently repressed by the authorities, which only made the mood of protest stronger. The movement radicalised up to February 2014, with clashes leaving more than 80 dead: a true revolution, known by the name Euromaïdan (‘European Square’, corresponding to the main square of Kyiv), was underway. President Yanukovych fled Kyiv on 21 February and the Parliament voted to oust him. Yet the movement was fiercely challenged in the south-east of the country, which saw pro-Russian demonstrations.
Still in February 2014, hooded men and military soldiers flooded into Crimea and Sebastopol. On 6 March, the Parliament of Crimea voted unanimously in favour of a motion calling to be annexed to Russia. On the 11th of that month, the independence of the autonomous Republic of Crimea (covering Crimea and Sebastopol) was proclaimed and, five days later, the local population voted by an overwhelming majority to be transferred to Russia, in a referendum that was swiftly challenged by the international community. Putin’s troops secured the sites.
The European Union protested volubly and, between March and September, adopted sanctions targeting some 40 individuals and many entities (banks, oil companies, weapons manufacturers, transport companies, etc...) (see EUROPE 11133/2). No military intervention from the West was ever under consideration. As far as Ukraine’s defence was concerned, then, the EU was only able to offer one kind of ‘arms’… (to be continued).
Renaud Denuit