The man known as Europe’s last dictator, or the Belarusian Stalin, is a close neighbour of ours; his country shares borders with three member states of the European Union: Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. The Union, it is true, has a neighbourhood policy and money to spend on it, but Belarus has long been the black sheep of the Eastern Partnership; it is also the bête noire of the Council of Europe, whose doors remain closed to it. It is the only country in Europe that still has the death penalty on its statutes.
Things seemed to be getting off to a good start when the country’s independence was internationally recognised in 1991: the EU extended friendship. However, the country soon run out of democratic steam. After careers in the army and in agriculture, Alexander Lukashenko was elected to Parliament, making a name for himself on an anti-corruption ticket, going as far as toppling the President of the Parliament. In the presidential elections of 1994, which were fought between six candidates, he was the surprise winner, gaining 45% in the first round and 80% in the second. He then took up a position that he has held ever since. In November 1996, having narrowly avoided a motion of no-confidence, he held a referendum to modify the constitution in his favour (extended term in office, outrageous prerogatives, including that of closing the Parliament); following a campaign to sabotage the opposition’s ability to express its side, more than 70% voted yes; the EU refused to recognise the legitimacy of the vote. The dictatorship made rapid progress: all hostile MPs arrested, Parliament reconstituted, with pro-Lukashenko politicians taking all seats, and the same for the constitutional court. The political police was reinforced and opposition media suppressed. In an interview with the German daily newspaper Handeslblatt in November 1995, the President named Hitler as a role model.
Re-elected, unsurprisingly, in 2001, 2006 and 2010 with results in the order of 80% (obviously challenged by observers), Lukashenko mercilessly clamped down on protests and had hundreds of opponents arrested. The first international sanctions were handed down in 2011 (freezing of assets, visa bans). Despite being re-elected under the same dubious circumstances in November 2015, the dictator saw almost all the sanctions lifted by decision of the Council of the EU in February 2016 (see EUROPE 11490/2), probably in return for his role in the appeasement of the Ukrainian conflict (Minsk agreement). When the results of the general elections of November 2019 were vociferously contested by the opposition, which was not represented in Parliament, the President announced that he would stand again in August 2020.
And we all know what happened next: troublesome candidates excluded or arrested, impromptu replacement of Sergei Tikhanovsky with his wife, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, who won 10.9% of the vote and fled to Lithuania, where she would become the figurehead of a multi-form opposition. Week on week, many Belarusian cities saw major demonstrations, which were violently put down. The Western public was finally to discover the criminality of the regime and the extent of the popular protest – carried out largely by women, whom the dictator despises. Lukashenko is equally outspoken about his anti-Semitism and homophobia and describes protesters as “rats” (among other things).
Bans on gatherings or leaving the country, imprisonment, ill-treatment, torture and attacks on the freedom of the media re-established the order desired by the regime, yet the people have not submitted. On top of this comes the repression of the country’s Polish minority. Belarus disappeared from the international headlines until the episode of the forced landing of the Ryanair aircraft purely in order to arrest the journalist and opposition figure Roman Protasevich and his partner: on top of everything, the dictator was an international gangster acting in European airspace. The young man was last seen on a video on 14 June, surrounded by officials from the regime in a “press conference”, to declare that he was in good health and being treated well. His girlfriend has never been seen on film, so that we can only imagine the type of pressure being brought to bear on the prisoner. This kind of film-making reflects the cynicism of the regime.
The European Parliament has long demonstrated consistency on the subject of Belarus. In the framework of the Eastern Partnership, it refused to allow Belarusian members of Parliament to take part in the Euronest Parliamentary assembly. In 2020, it invited Svetlana Tikhanovskaya to speak, then awarded the Sakharov Prize to the Belarusian democratic opposition. It has agreed many resolutions: the last of these, which was approved on 10 June by an overwhelming majority (626 votes in favour), takes an extremely tough line and is well worth reading in full (see EUROPE 12738/5). Equally worth a read is the Commission plan for economic aid of three billion euros, which will be implemented if Belarus chooses democracy (see EUROPE 12729/14). The Commission and Parliament are firmly agreed on the need to support and encourage civil society.
Since the presidential elections of August 2020, the European Council has refused to recognise any legitimacy for Lukashenko and agreed on “conventional” sanctions, which have mushroomed (up to 88 people and seven entities affected). But the act of piracy was indeed a wake-up call. On 24 May, the institution took position in favour of banning Belarusian airlines from flying over the EU and landing in our airports, alongside additional sanctions (see EUROPE B 12725A1).
The foreign affairs ministers are to meet on 21 June. If they take the same line as the European Council, they will adopt additional personal sanctions, on the basis of the agreement reached on Monday at the level of the ambassadors of the member states (see EUROPE 12742/13), but also economic and sectorial sanctions, as recommended by High Representative Josep Borrell on 27 May (see EUROPE 12728/15). They will also agree with Svetlana Tikhanovskaya who, the day before, announced that the sanctions in place against the regime were not working and provided an update on the situation in her country (see EUROPE 12727/16).
If the dictator is to fall, it will require a number of factors converging. Firstly, the international community must decide to hold a high-level conference on the case of Belarus. Then, certain dignitaries of the regime must be asked to make a mathematical decision: is anything more likely to speed the despot on his way to retirement than having to decide between the disadvantages of sanctions and the economic benefits of the European transition plan?; lastly, Russia would have to decide that its interests lie in stabilising the country with a more presentable President at its helm. These three stars are unlikely to come into alignment overnight, but that does not mean that it is not worth working on it.
Renaud Denuit