If one were to sum up, in a few short sentences, the main events of the year, one’s thoughts automatically leap to the migrants who met their deaths in the Mediterranean, or who are stuck in camps where the conditions are barely enough to keep them alive, or wandering from place to place waiting to be granted a status or to find the opportunity to travel illegally to the hoped-for country (see EUROPE 12378/7). To boats groaning with survivors looking for a European port that is prepared to take them and the protracted negotiations between a handful of governments on how they are to be shared out. To the political exploitation of this human misery to the good citizens, to win seats. As in previous years, this situation continues to be the great moral and political failure of the European Union (see EUROPE 12381/3).
From the general point of view of the governance of the EU, 2019 has been a year of renewals. The turnout rate in the European elections rose by an unexpected degree; this bolstering of its legitimacy is, without question, the greatest victory of the Parliament (see EUROPE 12359/3). The bluster of populist leaders foretold a turning tide, a return to a Europe of nations, a stranglehold on the System, but this turned out to be nothing but empty words. The Parliament organised itself with efficiency, but its new legitimacy didn’t help it to keep its word when it announced to the world that it would not endorse any candidate for the Presidency of the Commission who was not a Spitzenkandidat. Having failed to agree on a name, the EP left a few casualties in its wake before giving the von der Leyen Commission a healthy majority; in the context, this was in the general interest. The new Members of the European Parliament hit their stride with the ongoing dossiers, particularly in the framework of trialogue sessions. The merit of the new assembly will be measured by its ongoing legislative work, the relevance of its initiatives, the strength of its commitment to the defence of the rule of law (the case of Malta, the agenda of this week’s plenary session having been obscured at the European Council is a case in point) (see EUROPE 12390/7, 12390/15) and the latitude it will give the Conference on the Future of Europe, which is expected to be ‘disruptive’ rather than an echo chamber of platitudes.
There was also a renewal at the head of the European Council. Two major events would provide the backdrop to the first meeting chaired by Charles Michel. The first was the landslide victory of Boris Johnson in the general elections in the UK (see EUROPE 12390/1). It has dashed the hopes of everyone on the continent who still hoped that Brexit would just be endlessly delayed and ultimately never take place; Donald Tusk unambiguously belonged to this camp. A change of direction: as the parliamentary vote on the withdrawal agreement is considered to be a done deal, engagement in the negotiation of the future trade deal is now needed. This brings with it two challenges: to make this the matrix of the closest possible multi-dimensional relationship with the EU’s powerful neighbour and to stick to the timetable (end of 2020). The other event was the end of the tradition of consensus at the European Council: despite the Polish reservation (which will, it is hoped, be lifted in June) (see EUROPE 12389/1), the objective of climate neutrality for the EU by 2050 is officially being presented as a common agreement. The message is obviously also intended for COP 25 (the disappointing results of which have since come to light) and the European Commission, which receives a shot in the arm for its draft Green Deal (see EUROPE 12388/1).
Having taken up its duties a month late, the new Commission is clearly in a great hurry. On 11 December, the President was canny enough to give the MEPs the first view of the Green Deal, on the eve of the European Council meeting. There is manifest support on both sides for the roadmap and the 50 actions it comprises, although the Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL groups have called for further improvements (see EUROPE 12388/2). It is also worthy of note that the new Commissioners have, in most cases, adapted quickly to their responsibilities, especially the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. An enormous amount of legislative work will be required to seal the Green Deal and it already looks likely that the idea of repealing the existing legislation for each new proposal, as announced by the President-elect in July, will be quickly dropped and forgotten about. As for the budgetary dimension, this is obviously tied into the post-2020 multi-annual financial framework, particularly as regards the Just Transition Fund.
But the MFF negotiations have descended into chaos (see EUROPE 12389/2). The Finnish Presidency’s compromise proposal merely made tensions worse, causing outrage among the Cohesion countries and creating new concerns for the future funding of research, education, culture, space, etc. The Juncker Commission’s initial proposal already lacked ambition in view of the level of the challenges at hand and its proposals for new own resources had the support of the Parliament only. It will be for the Croatian Presidency of the Council and, even more so, the President of the European Council to change approach if there is to be any hope of concluding in the first half of 2020. Calculating the net profit or net contribution is not only very narrow and reductive in view of all the economic parameters, it is also politically sterile. Should the von der Leyen Commission, starting this dossier again from scratch, produce a new proposal that reflects its strategic priorities, which have the support of the EP and the European Council, and which are a clear departure from the 2018 version?
Renaud Denuit