The European Council approved without debate the new agreement on the orderly withdrawal of the United Kingdom and the political declaration setting the framework for future relations, a dossier properly put together within a very short time frame, the result of the hard work of competent and courageous people: it therefore did not require an effort of collective intelligence. It devoted 5 minutes to the climate issue by announcing its orientations on the long-term strategy for December. It debated the multiannual financial framework for two and a half hours without succeeding in bringing national positions together. It discussed for almost 6 hours on the evening of 17 October the opening of EU accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania, recommended by the Commission since June 2018, which led to a complete disagreement.
According to official conclusions, “the European Council will return to the question of enlargement before the EU/Western Balkans Summit in Zagreb in May 2020”, meaning that it sees no urgency in deciding. “Historical error!”, said Presidents Juncker and Tusk (see EUROPE 12352/2). The good reasons for taking a positive decision have already been developed in this section (see EUROPE 12281/1).
With regard to Turkey, the leaders have endorsed the decisions taken by their ministers on 14 October condemning anti-Kurdish military action; all granting of arms export licences to Turkey has been suspended. From the evening of 14 October, the Turkish authorities proclaimed their willingness to reconsider their relations with the European Union (see EUROPE 12349/3). While the Erdoğan regime has long been incompatible with EU values and the ‘European way of life’, the European Council has been reluctant to seize the opportunity to withdraw Turkey's status as a candidate country. On the contrary, it has succeeded in disincentivising neighbouring countries that are making progress towards democracy and the rule of law and, in the medium term, in reducing the EU's influence and credit in the Balkan peninsula, to the benefit of other powers. The first effect of the leaders’ error: early parliamentary elections in North Macedonia.
It was almost forgotten: the European Council held an exchange of views with the President-elect of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. The objective was to compare her six strategic priorities with the four previously adopted by the European Council. While the Finnish Presidency presented a report, there is no known document from the von der Leyen team.
A certain unease has set in with the accredited press concerning this team (which the press conference on 10 September revealed), but it extends beyond them. The President-elect is known to trust only her small close guard, which is foreign to the operation of the institutions. The head of her cabinet (not yet constituted) is trying to impose Germans on all future commissioners. They are beginning to question the atmosphere of future collegiality. The perplexity regarding the competence of the head is also spreading to the senior officials of the big house. The transition from the Juncker Commission is lacking in warmth and creativity – a phenomenon that is likely to become more acute with the postponement of the installation of the new College. The fact that the President-elect chose to set up her private apartments on the thirteenth floor of the Berlaymont, which would have been an anecdotal innovation in a better context, is becoming an additional symbol of a ‘bunker reflex’. Rather than in the highly necessary internal organisation, all forces have been put in contact with the political groups in Parliament, in the hope of a comfortable majority in the final approval vote.
Sylvie Goulard's massive rejection was presented by France as a “political crisis”, which its President took personally (once upon a time, it would have been an affront to the King of France). Ms von der Leyen was publicly criticised by President Macron, as if she were responsible for the MEPs’ vote, and then summoned to the Elysée. But if there is a political crisis, it is in Romania, where the social democratic government has been overthrown in the process of identifying a new candidate Commissioner. Brussels and Strasbourg are barely hanging in expectation of white smoke in Bucharest and Paris. At the same time, group chairmen are being asked to batten down the hatches, which is not going well for MEPs, who are attached to their freedom of judgment and voting.
The new uncertainty about the effective date of the Brexit is having an impact on the institutions. Parliament has postponed the date of its vote to approve the withdrawal agreement. If a new deadline is granted to the United Kingdom, there are two things that could happen: either it is very short and qualified as technical (1-2 weeks), in which case London will be able to dispense with proposing a candidate Commissioner; or it is 3 months, as required by the House of Commons, and the opposite will happen. Four people will then have to be interviewed and validated (or not). Against a backdrop of XXL budgetary uncertainty, the contents and sizes of the portfolios will return to the debate.
Will the von der Leyen Commission take office on 1 December? In view of the above, time is not on the side of the barely-elected President.
Original version in French by Renaud Denuit