Scientific research made its debut in the European Communities through various aspects of energy. It went on to become a competence in its own right for reasons of industrial competitiveness (the ‘Japanese challenge’). Finally, it has maximised its potential – from the biological to the spatial – by absorbing major societal concerns (health, transport, climate, etc.).
In its initial period, it concerned traditional energies (art. 50 & 55 ECSC) and what was deemed to be a future-proof source, civil nuclear power (art. 5 et. seq. EAEC). The Joint Research Centre came into being, was deployed and started to branch out. In parallel, inter-governmental initiatives generated quality institutions such as CERN in 1954, the EMBL and the European Science Foundation in 1973, the European Space Agency in 1975.
The 1980s saw the blossoming of the second phase, with the first multi-annual framework programmes, focused on the nascent information and communication technologies, the inclusion, in 1987, of the technological research and development programme in primary law through the Single European Act (Title VI) and the inauguration of the JET laboratory for experimental research into controlled thermonuclear fusion.
Since the Treaty on European Union (1993) and, to an even greater extent, the Lisbon Strategy (2000), research and development policy, with the support of the co-decision procedure, has shot up to third place in the general budget. It is reflected in, amongst other things, increased support for the mobility of researchers, by means of the Marie Sklodovska-Curie bursaries and the promotion of a European Research Area; through the framework agreement between the EU and the European Space Agency; through the international agreement on building the ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) on the Cadarache site in France; through the creation of a European Research Council (ERC), made up of eminent scientists, selecting and supporting the most promising fundamental research projects; through the creation of a European Institute for Innovation and Technology (EIT) in Budapest; through the many public-private partnerships for joint technology initiatives in the fields of aeronautics, medicine, nanotechnology, and the list goes on.
Although 80% of research in the EU is still financed at national level, the sector has become more ‘Europeanised’ and the successive framework programmes have proven their worth, to the extent that they have acquired a status of self-evidence that is broadly accepted. As a sign of confidence on the part of the budgetary authority, their terms have grown ever longer, reaching seven years from 2007 onwards. With an envelope of €53 billion, the seventh framework programme (FP7) was testimony to the unstoppable rise of this EU policy.
As for its successor, ‘Horizon 2020’, this continued the trend with €77 billion (although the Commission proposed 80 and the Parliament called for 100). In any event, it has grown into the largest public research and innovation programme anywhere in the world. It is a manifestation of a political will to increase the transformation of scientific and technical discovery into operational products to be brought to market.
In Europe, there are far too many innovative ideas languishing in the ‘Valley of Death’; in other words, those which, after demonstration, do not make the cut to be built and sold, a phenomenon that is far less common in the United States and Japan. This also has the result of a loss of competitiveness for European industries, including small businesses and young businesses.
Fully aware of what is at stake, the Commission is therefore now proposing to create a European Innovation Council (EIC), made up of entrepreneurs, business leaders, investors and researchers, tasked with identifying radical innovations with the capacity to create markets, as well as to support and accelerate their journey to market and expansion. Like the ERC, the EIC would be financed under the future framework programme 2021-2017, dubbed ‘Horizon Europe’ (see EUROPE 12183).
Incidentally, the initial target of spending 3% of GDP on research and innovation, at the level of each member state as well as at Union level, has yet to be met. Too many high-calibre young people have an image of researchers as ‘saddos’ and do not aspire to join them. Despite the watchword of ‘open science’ and many efforts to popularise it, our societies do not realise – or underestimate – the economic and social importance of this sector. In certain demographic groups, there is also a certain suspicion, or even outright rejection, of science itself and many of its applications.
Despite their success and the value they are acknowledged to have added, the framework programmes themselves are not immune to criticism. In their execution, which is governed by highly exacting criteria, useful proposals are still being rejected in high numbers: the success rate has been put at 13%; some candidates are put off by the administrative cost of putting together a file, or fail to understand all the information required or the assessment criteria. The southern EU countries and, to an even greater extent, the eastern ones, feel that they are under-represented among beneficiaries, a list that is headed by the United Kingdom: more than 95% of all subsidies have gone to countries that were EU member states before 2004. To prevent future disappointment, the resources available must be increased and the procedures streamlined; there should be more different acceptable management models and the efforts to provide information and explanations must be stepped up.
All of this in a world that is changing quickly, with the US and Japan consolidating their performance, but with added competition from emerging countries, starting with China. (To be continued).
Renaud Denuit