The British want to stay in the EU on their own terms. David Cameron's conception of his country's participation in the EU is now clear - the United Kingdom intends to remain in the EU but wants to choose the areas and modalities for its participation itself (see EUROPE 10758). The justification for this freedom of choice is cunning and skilful - given that other member states decided among them to create the euro, thus modifying the nature of the organisation to which we British belong, we, in turn, have the right to call for modifications and derogations.
Cameron at the same time discarded the idea, formulated in particular by Jacques Delors, of leaving the EU and concluding a free trade agreement with it, because this would mean being part of a common market without participating in the definition of the rules on how it works. Mark Boleat from the City Corporation has been more explicit - “Aspiring to become Norway or Switzerland is ridiculous” - pointing out that there are 160 European financial institutions in the City. Their repatriation to their countries of origin would be disastrous - Frankfurt would be well-placed to welcome them, and the American and Asian banks might be tempted to relocate to the Continent. A letter from the City published in Le Monde affirms that “the end of the Community adventure risks undermining the traditional advantages of the British capital”, and the American president has also asked the United Kingdom not to leave the EU.
The time limits demanded by London are moreover very long, with a national referendum in 2015, while in the meantime, the UK would keep the rebate obtained by Mrs Thatcher from the funding of EU spending.
A successful but unrealistic operation in Greece. Operation Greece has achieved its objective - re-establishing a degree of confidence in Greece's remaining in the eurozone. Even the punctilious rating agencies seem to believe it. Since my opinion has no influence whatsoever on the way events unfurl, I will permit myself to give it - I don't believe a word of it. I don't believe that Greece is capable of respecting the commitments to which it has agreed in order to bring down its deficit as planned. It has failed until now and nothing points to the situation having really changed. Support at the national parliament has been reduced and public opinion rejects the sacrifices imposed on it. And when a document appeared with the list of those who have transferred their money to Switzerland, it remains secret - a legal battle is under way to see if it can be made public! It is obvious that the rules and laws on this must be respected but for those of us who are outside observers, what matters is to know if the list is true. Right now it remains secret. At the same time, the local press points out that the capital requirements of the four big Greek banks have been underestimated - a few billion extra euro need to be added. We know as well that the announced reforms are for the most part running late.
It is clear that if the EU considered it opportune to prolong the deadline planned for the recovery of Greece's finances it had its reasons, which can be summed up in one sentence: the swift exit of Greece from the eurozone would lead to very serious consequences, and that new support is needed even if this is heavy for the member states that have to bear the brunt of it. One has to hope that these reasons do not essentially reside in the interests of the world of finance because I consider that the astronomical interest rates on buying Greek treasury bonds can only be justified if the implicit risks are also accepted. If they are not accepted, we belong to the category of usurers that Dante placed in Hell.
At the same time, we are learning that the eurozone has just finalised new rules for the sovereign debt market in general, with the aim of avoiding the risk of messy defaults of one of its members in the future. The new rules set a negotiation framework between a defaulting state and its creditors, aiming to restructure the debt. This system, known as CAC (collective action clause), already exists in the emerging countries as a result of the defaults of Mexico (1997) and Argentina (2001).
Is it necessary to repeat yet again that the possible exit of Greece from the eurozone would not in the slightest mean that it “would leave Europe”, as is all too often stated through ignorance or mischievousness? Of course Greece would remain in the EU, with all the support that comes with it (budgetary and also EIB funding, full participation in the common policies, and so on and so forth). This could mean the country's economic and social recovery, without the constraints of and links to the eurozone which do not suit this country and weigh heavily on the other member states. (FR/transl.fl)