According to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, a “two-speed” Europe is inevitable. Negotiation on the financial perspectives for 2014-2020 is entering the crucial phase of determining the future of Europe (see this column the day before yesterday). There are already a number of results, however. The most significant relates to the two-speed Europe, or perhaps a Europe with more than two speeds. It is out of the question to rule out participation by any member state, it being more a matter of allowing those that so wish and that are able to do so to move forward along the road to integration. Jacques Delors' unequivocal stance on this is, I believe, a turning point. He has said that differentiation is not a weakness but a strength - if we had waited for unanimity, we would have had neither the Schengen Area nor single currency, and further progress would be blocked (see our EUROPE 10587). Valéry Giscard d'Estaing has taken a similar stance, which goes to show that this is not a matter pertaining to political affiliation, but rather a fair-minded conviction founded on the fact that true European integration is not everyone's aim, and that “differentiation” is the only way to allow those willing to press forward to do so.
VGE considers that the EU has reached this point because of the numbers involved. The Europe of the Maastricht Treaty involved 13 member states, while today there are more than twice that number and pressure is being applied for further enlargement. Under such conditions, the aims and the priorities cannot be the same. The eurozone countries plan to consolidate their structures (monthly meetings of heads of government, the establishment of a secretary general, etc) with a view to achieving a European political renaissance. This would result in the creation of “two separate Europes”:
(a) A Europe of the Greater European Area with 28 members, and the possibility of further enlargement still. Such a Europe would manage free trade, competition, international trade, etc. It would be a place of flexible coordination, without additional integration, as the United Kingdom and most of the new member states advocate.
(b) A Europe of eurozone nations, known as a united Europe. Such a Europe would set in place the machinery of a great modern power which, while respecting the identities and prerogatives of its members, would manage economic and diplomatic competences according to the federal model.
The “united Europe” should establish concrete relations with national parliaments. For example, its president could be elected by a Congress composed of MEPs from the countries of the united Europe and an equivalent number of national MPs. (Le Point of 5 April).
European Socialist Party? Why is the likelihood of a European Socialist Party not making headway? Jacques Delors had spoken of the prospect when presenting the manifesto “for a European Socialist alternative” launched by Harlem Désir (see this column in EUROPE 10587), but it does not seem realistic. I believe that it is the difference in approach towards joint management that separates the German Socialists from the Socialists in most of the other member states. In Germany, joint management of companies by management and workers is accepted and almost a tradition, whereas, elsewhere, worker trade unions rebuff the idea on principle. Arguments are put forward in defence of both positions. According to some, joint management stabilises the social order and allows the working class to take part in decision-making and also to benefit, if the company works well, from a share of the dividends. Others say joint management gives personnel decision-making responsibilities to the detriment of autonomy and freedom of action.
Adversaries of the idea also point out that joint management can take on a “patriotic” dimension, placing workers from different member states in competition, and thus creating trade union rivalry according to nationality. In Germany, in fact, joint management is a tradition that dates back to the Weimar Republic which, in the 1920s, launched the “Mitbestimmung”, and which, after its suppression by Nazism, was relaunched by Konrad Adenauer in the 1950s, before being confirmed in 1958 when the Social Democrat Party launched the “social market economy”. In 2008, German trade unions agreed to salary reductions in exchange for a commitment on the part of the employers not to relocate production - after which, salaries rose again.
The current divergence would not therefore be a matter of doctrine (yes or no to joint management), but it results from a difference of mentality, the conception of discipline and other national characteristics. In Germany, in 1987, the Saarland steel industry was saved by a foundation of investors, trade unions and political parties, deliberating with a 71% majority. Thus, the Indian group, Lakshmi Mittal, was not able to impose its views despite the fact that it held a majority stake.
One Belgian trade unionist has commented: “All systems have their advantages and their disadvantages. Germany's strength lies elsewhere - in its obsession for quality, high technical standards and staff training”. That is why, in some sectors, there is competition between member states. One might ask whether the EU's current direction should not lie in establishing a link at world level between the free movement of goods and respect of certain common disciplines and attitudes.
Cosmopolitan convictions. Daniel Cohn-Bendit has always considered himself to be as much French as he is German and, in an article in a Parisian daily, he chose to call himself a “cosmopolitan”, as he did in a German review when taking stock of his career. In his opinion, citizens do not understand to what extent their future now depends on European decisions, and especially on the EU's budget allocation for the period 2014-2020. He also states that “citizens are not aware of this, but the debate is underway and gives rise to fierce debate within European institutions and in intergovernmental discussions”. The future of all depends on it, he states, delivering the following message: “It is imperative to have a European stimulation budget for research and innovation, solidarity, and recasting of the common agricultural policy in the direction of healthier production that is more respectful of the environment and of farmers. For this, the EU must develop its own budgetary resources, especially through the establishment of a true financial transaction tax”. Cohn-Bendit, however, attributes the same importance to another possibility that he defined in an interview - the telephone resource. He explains: “A tax of 0.1% on each telephone call in Europe could bring in €50-80 billion annually, straight into Europe's coffers”. He concludes by saying that there is wriggle room for economic recovery but only “at the level of Europe, not at the level of the impoverished states that make up Europe!”
The public is not told of such possibilities. Instead they are told that the French president is threatening to suspend the free movement of persons in the Schengen Area when France “is absolutely not able to suspend its participation in Schengen, unless it leaves the Union” or if the presidential candidate, François Hollande, wants to renegotiate the treaty on budgetary discipline. Cohn-Bendit notes, however, that that is all well and good “But with whom? With what timetable? No-one knows, and probably he does not even know himself.”
The “cosmopolitan” concludes with regret that, for the first time, the presidential election in France comes within a confirmed and determining European landscape, but that people are not aware of that fact.
I would like to add that, in many other member states, even though there is no national presidential election in sight, the situation is the same when it comes to the public's ignorance of the stakes involved and of the influence that Europe holds.
(FR/transl.jl)