INTRODUCTION
As of 2014, the cohesion policy will have a complete makeover. Not only is a new programming period due to start, but also, and more importantly, the European solidarity mechanism is to be dusted off. Under the responsibility of Johannes Hahn, the European Commissioner in charge of regional policy, the cohesion policy and the many structural funds are being overhauled: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF).
Shortly after its budgetary proposal of €376 billion, making the cohesion policy the second-largest European budget after the Common Agriculture Policy, the European Commission presented a package of legislative measures in early autumn 2011, designed to breathe new life into, facilitate and optimise the structural funds and their absorption in the regions of Europe.
With its new investment policy vocabulary and emphasis on results, simplification and multi-level governance, is the Commission's procedure for the forthcoming cohesion policy a purely cosmetic operation, or is there genuinely a minor revolution underway? What will remain of the budget and its innovations once the texts have been put to the scrutiny of the Council and Parliament? The next few pages sum up the misgivings expressed by the stakeholders, with a right to reply of Regional Policy Commissioner Johannes Hahn.
THE MAJOR INNOVATIONS FOR 2014
The change of course will comprise greater focus on performance and results (hinting at an admission that the average absorption rate of 33% is really far too low). It will concentrate on the priorities of EU 2020 strategy . Eleven thematic areas have been included, but these are not too much of a departure from those of the Treaty of Lisbon. Most importantly, it will simplify procedures, by such means as carrying them out online. To this end, a single regulation, a kind of backbone to the forthcoming programming period, will combine all provisions which are common to the five funds in its first plank, going on to list those which are shared by the ERDF, ESF and Cohesion Fund alone. Specific rules will come in addition to this bible of cohesion.
Conditionality. What innovations does this key text of the structural funds contain? If the truth be known, many of them have caused problems in the negotiations, and so we will return to them in greater detail at a later date. The first section of the general regulation provides for a “partnership contract” to be concluded between the Commission and the member states, and also brings in the concept of conditionality, the intention of which is to provide an incentive for greater performance.
There are many of these conditions, stretched out along the whole length of the life-cycle of a programme paid for out of the structural funds. Some conditions are “ex ante”, a raft of very specific criteria which have to be fulfilled before the funds are even obtained, others are "ex post" and consist of milestones which have to be observed in order for a performance reserve to be unblocked, corresponding to 5% of each national allocation frozen as a performance incentive. Macroeconomic conditionality, which is by far the most controversial, is the sword of Damocles hanging over all structural funds. It provides for the payment of these to be fully or partially suspended if a national government shows poor budgetary management. The mechanism had already been established for the cohesion funds, but it has now been proposed that there be an extension to all funds. Other notable innovations include the possibility of coordinating several funds for a single project and increasing the EU's co-financing rate by 10 percentage points if a state proves to be in poor economic shape (in the best-case scenario, this would equate to European funding of 95%). For some months now, Greece has benefitted from a rise in its cofinancing rate under this programming period.
Eligibility. The second part of the general regulation applies to the ERDF, the ESF and the Cohesion Fund, but it includes a considerable number of exceptions and percentages. It brings in a new intermediate category of regions, still based on GDP (however, the use of this indicator is often controversial). The developing regions with a GDP below 75% of the European average, the transition regions with a GDP of between 75 and 90%, and the most-developed regions with GDP in excess of 90% of European average, are now included under this new system of division into categories. This division key is valid for the ESF and the ERDF; the Cohesion Fund still takes precedence for countries whose gross national income (GNI) is below 90% of the average of the 27. The total amount allocated under cohesion may not, however, exceed 2.5% of national GDP, representing a drop compared to the 3.8% cap in the current programme.
Thematic concentration. A desire to focus the funds on key themes comes out very clearly from the specific regulations. The list of priorities for the ERDF has been extended to 11 thematic areas which come under the heading of EU 2020 strategy (research, ICT, SMEs, low-carbon economy, adaptation to climate change, environment, sustainable transport, employment, social inclusion, education and the effectiveness of public administration). But the regions will not be entirely free to shop around here, the Commission being able to impose quotas depending on the categories of the regions in order to support energy efficiency and renewable energies, innovation and SMEs. Such partitioning should be 50% for the less developed regions but could climb to 80% for the richest regions. Additionally, 5% of the resources of the ERDF will be earmarked for the sustainable development of urban areas. There are also percentages for the ESF, which must earmark 20% to promoting social inclusion and fighting poverty. The thematic areas for the cohesion fund transport and the environment.
THE BIGGEST LOSERS FROM THE REFORM
With the Commission boasting that it has made proposals to simplify the cohesion policy, improve its results and lay emphasis on European added value, others are gritting their teeth. The way in which the Commission reviewed the European solidarity mechanism, which is now being sold as an investment mechanism, may leave more than one stakeholder behind. Here is an overview of those left out in the cold by the future cohesion policy.
Hungary and the Baltic States. The first countries to put their heads above the parapet after the Commission's proposals were published were Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Hungary. The subject of their grievance is the drop in their maximum level of structural funds to 2.5% of their GDP (compared to more than 3% under the current programme). They feel unfairly punished by a combination of two factors: firstly, a calculation method which is based on estimations of GDP, likely to be very low in their cases due to the crisis; and secondly, the fact that all countries, rich or poor, are subject to the same percentage. In a letter to the presidents of the European institutions in September 2011, these four countries argued that this provision would hit them the hardest, even though their absorption rate of the cohesion funds is above the EU average. They feel that the maximum contribution in the framework of the cohesion policy should not be linked to GDP because, they argue, the forecasts for this indicator are not particularly reliable and take no account of a State's absorption capacity. During negotiations at the Council, these four countries are hoping for compensation, or a differentiated maximum rate reflecting their current difficulties.
Outermost regions. Already lagging behind in general, the outermost regions (OR), which are spread across the globe, will not come out well from 2014 onwards. Johannes Hahn, the commissioner with responsibility for regional development, acknowledges this, saying: “There is a change but, if you count everything together, the decrease is very low. The worry is about the reduction of the special allocation" (Ed: provided by the Treaty to compensate for the structural handicaps of the OR), but we propose to compensate almost everything by introducing much a higher amount for cross-border cooperation”. But Carlos César, the President of the Conference of the OR and of the Region of the Azores, does not see things in the same light. He estimates that the annual assistance paid out per head of population would drop from 35 to 20 euro. “We cannot find any justification for these major cuts”, he said. He is firmly opposed to the compensation referred to by Commissioner Hahn: “There cannot be any compromise between two instruments with completely different goals, priorities and objectives. The special allocation is provided in order to compensate for the permanent and structural handicaps of the OR, such as their distance and isolation; the reduction of this is by no means 'compensated for' by financing which is designed to promote territorial cooperation with the neighbour countries”, Carlos César told Agence Europe.
Connecting Europe Facility. Among the others to lose out from the forthcoming incarnation of the cohesion policy are the beneficiary countries of the cohesion policy in general. In fact, a recent financial instrument proposed by the European Commission may prevent them from using the money from the cohesion funds as they see fit. This is the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), which aims to tackle the cross-border dimesnion of the telecommunication, energy and transport networks. A proportion of the cohesion fund would feed into investments in the last of these areas in particular. There are plans that of the €68.7 billion earmarked for the Cohesion Fund, 10 billion will be redirected into the Connecting Europe Facility in the field of transport, which would increase the sum allocated to transport to €31.7 billion.
Although the Commission's intentions are laudable, Slovenia and the group of so-called Visegrad countries feel that they lose out from this and oppose it. These are four countries of central Europe which are the great beneficiaries of cohesion out of all the new member states: Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, the last of these being the most outspoken in its opposition. These cohesion beneficiary countries likened it to being obliged to invest in cross-border transport infrastructure, projects which are not necessarily among their immediate priorities, particularly as the management of these projects would be centralised, in the hands of the executive agency of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T EA), in Brussels. A tug-of-war is in the offing between European Transport Commissioner Siim Kallas and those of the cohesion countries reluctant to lose out on not just part of their budget, but also their own sovereignty over the choice of projects. Nonetheless, the Transport Commissioner has already spoken in very clear terms on the subject, and is by no means prepared to give up this budgetary line which, he feels, would improve connections between the East and West of Europe. He bitterly regrets the fact that the cohesion countries are misinterpreting the procedure of the Visegrad countries and Slovenia - while “this separate line of the budget was established for their benefit: to help them to overcome their problems in establishing complex cross-border railway projects and funding these major projects with the same high rate of co-funding”, said the commissiosner early February during a confrerence on the subject organised by the European Policy Centre think tank. He is therefore resisting all pressure from the member states for the 10 billion to be redirected and fed into the national budgets of the cohesion countries. In Commission circles, there are murmurs that if the 10 billion did not go to the CEF, it would simply be removed from the cohesion budget, which means that it is very much in the interests of the cohesion beneficiary countries to be satisfied with this option.
THE MAJOR CHALLENGES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
Presenting legislative proposals for reform, the Commission ran the risk of having its suggestions rejected. The reactions to the Commission's proposals for the cohesion policy show this very clearly: Commissioner Hahn has had to deal with strong opposition from the European Parliament, Council and the stakeholders, such as the Committee of the Regions and representatives of the local authorities.
The spectre of macroeconomic conditionality. The most virulent criticism has focused on macroeconomic conditionality. This constant threat of having funds suspended is supposed to encourage countries to toe the line and not to play with fire in terms of expenditure. Hungary has been in the news recently as the first to suffer sanctioins as a result of this type of conditionality, which currently only applies to cohesion funding. However, many, led by the Parliament and a handful of member states, feel it would be unfair to apply this rule to structural funds, as the local authorities could end up being penalised for mistakes made by national governments, with the risk of hitting struggling regions even harder. Moreover, there are fears that the application of macroeconomic conditionality could lead to a vicious circle, because the freezing of the funds would force the national governments to reimburse the beneficiaries from own resources, widening budgetary imbalances even further. But two countries with muscle are behind this mechanism: France and Germany. It is going to be hard, therefore, to stop this rule. At this stage, one of the alternative solutions put forward by ten member states would be that calls are made, during the negotiations, for macroeconomic conditionality to apply to all European funds, not just to the structural funds. Those backing this suggestion are Italy, Portugal, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria and Malta.
Ring-fencing versus flexibility. Very little criticism has been made of the choice of the 11 priority themes. This thematic concentration should be made more flexible even so, according to some stakeholders. On all sides, there is a genuine will for greater flexibility when choosing to fund projects which correspond to these themes. The putting together of priorities should above all be decided upon on the basis of the needs and specific natures of the regions. What has been considerably less well received is the ring-fencing which chops up the cohesion expenditure into percentages by sector and by type of region (a mixture of energy efficiency, innovation and support for SMEs to a level of 80% for the most-developed regions, 50% for the regions in transition and 20% for the least-developed regions). Here again, the Commission could have shown greater flexibility in its proposals, in order to afford the member states and the regions a greater degree of leeway - and especially to be consistent with its desire to achieve results . The richer countries are leading the complaints against the ring-fencing, because these are the ones which will have the least freedom due to the high predefined percentages and the three priorities decided upon.
What will happen to the partnership contracts? The new concept of partnership contract has also raised many questions, but mainly from the local authorities. These contracts would be concluded between the Commission and each member state, specifying the partners' commitments at national and regional level, together with those of the Commission. Some institutions, led by the Committee of the Regions, take the view that the Commission's text is too vague on the precise role devolved to the member states and the regions under this agreement. Multi-level governance would not, they argue, be applied sufficiently. Over at the European Parliament as well, there are hopes that the regions, and even the cities, could have greater involvement in drawing up these partnership contracts.
5% set aside? The Commission's idea of putting 5% of the budget of the structural funds into reserve is not to everyone's tastes. This 5% would be allocated, after a mid-term review, to member states whose programmes have resulted in the desired performance levels. The aim of this manoeuvre is to encourage the beneficiaries to be more efficient and thereby get more from the Union. But in the view of some, at the Council and Committee of the Regions alike, this could end up being counter-productive. The mechanism could provide an incentive for the stakeholders to establish scaled-down objectives, in order to be sure of achieving them.
Where does the urban dimension come in? “The 21st century will be urban”, the President of the European Commission said at the 5th Summit of the Cities and Regions in Copenhagen on 22 March, with now over 70% of Europeans living in built-up areas. The Commission's proposals seem to be reaching out to the cities, guaranteeing them a minimum of 5% of the ERDF for sustainable urban development. Those most closely involved, on the other hand, are concerned by the way the Commission intends to implement it all. An urban platform would be set in place to facilitate the exchange of best practice. It would group together 300 cities (a maximum of 20 per country), selected by the member states, which is upsetting the local authorities ahead of the fight to be included. The new tool has also awakened the misgivings of the Committee of the Regions (CoR), whose president Mercedes Bresso told the 5th Summit of the Cities and Regions that the platform has “the worrying profile of the political and technical hybrid and, in particular, uses vertical procedures incompatible with modern partnership practices”. The cities are also entitled to wonder whether the introduction of the platform would spell the end of the current European programme URBACT, which is funded by the ERDF for very similar purposes.
Simplification, not so easy. In presenting a common regulation, the Commission wanted to combine the various documents into a single one, thereby making the beneficiaries' work easier for them. The fact remains that numerous exceptions, percentages, ex ante and ex post conditions, indicators or other stages to be complied with still make the cohesion policy one of the Union's most complicated policies to implement on the ground. After the presentation of the legislative package, many observers noted that the Commission had missed the simplification objective. During the discussions on the dossier, many voices pointed out that “the devil is in the detail”.
WILL THE PROPOSED BUDGET BE REDUCED?
By the end of this year, what will remain of the€336 billion proposed by the Commission for the cohesion policy? At this stage of the negotiations on the multi-annual financial framework, it is impossible to state whether this envelope will be capped at its current level, increased or cut. The pressure brought to bear by certain Member States is likely to tip the balance towards a reduction of the resources earmarked for cohesion. We will not know the verdict on the final envelope until the end of 2012, when Cyprus holds the Presidency of the EU Coouncil of Ministers, when a compromise is anticipated on the whole of the multi-annual financial framework 2014-2020.
In September of last year, eight States expressed their desire to cut the budget earmarked for the cohesion policy. Austria, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom are all of the opinion that the Commission's budgetary proposals for 2014-2020 are too high. However, they are not particularly ambitious or inordinately high, because they represent, more or less, a total of €120 billion a year until 2020, which is similar to that for the programming period ending in 2013. The situation has changed little since then, because the net contributors still do not support a high budget for cohesion in times of crisis. In the opposite corner, the so-called “friends of cohesion” countries support an ambitious budget which is capable of helping to overcome the crisis.
The conclusion drawn by MEP Danuta Hübner (EPP, Poland), chairwoman of the Parliamentary committee responsible for regional development and former European Commissioner for Regional Policy, is hardly encouraging, however: “Clearly, the final amount that will be dedicated to cohesion policy will also depend on how big the budget will be. And what we hear from the main member states is that there is a competition for who will offer the bigger cut in the budget. We will cut if that's the case on the policy that is the major policy that delivers growth, jobs and competitiveness, I don't see any logic in this approach” she said. What she expects is a budget is “at least at the level that is proposed by the Commission” and one that does not leave “the entire envelope for the CAP ... and cut what leads to growth and jobs”.
Of the €336 billion proposed by the Commission, €68.7 billion would go to the cohesion fund, €53.1 to the most-developed regions, €162.6 to the least-developed regions and €39 billion to the transition regions (with the remainder to be shared out between the Connecting Europe Facility, the outermost regions and cooperation).
The new category of regions has attracted much criticism. Although all agree that the objective of cohesion is to concentrate assistance on the poorest regions, the new concept of transition regions has confused more than one observer. This category is supposed to replace the transition period (phasing-in or phasing-out) brought in for the convergence regions. What a number of member states are criticising is the fact that this new division could end up costing more, because it creates additional structures with needs in the long term.
In the framework of the budgetary negotiations, many member states are against the project on macroeconomic conditionality and the upper limit of 2.5% of GDP. Under the Danish Presidency, the ECOFIN Council will discuss the budget 2014-2020 at its informal meeting in Copenhagen on 30 and 31 March. The next step will be at the end of May, when the “negotiating box”, which brings together the main themes of the negotiation, is created, ahead of the negotiations at the highest political level in December, at daggers drawn, on the final figures for the forthcoming financial framework 2014-2020.
WORK BEHIND THE SCENES: THE PRESIDENCY AND ITS FRIENDS
A considerable proportion of the inter-institutional negotiations on cohesion policy are carried out behind the scenes, in working groups. One of these, which answers to the name of the “Friends of the Presidency”, is currently preparing the ground for the multi-annual financial framework, and therefore also for the sums to be allocated to the cohesion policy.
Friends of the Presidency. This group is made up of financial experts of the member states, who also discuss many problematic provisions of the general regulation. These are mostly experts from the finance ministries, who have less sensitivity regarding the issues surrounding the cohesion policy. Therefore, parallel debates are also held between the various working groups regarding cohesion, on the one hand on the architecture of the Commission's proposal and on the other, the figures relating to it. It is believed that the Parliament does not entirely approve of this way of working, because this removes entire chunks of the general regulation from the co-decision procedure.
Danuta Hübner (EPP, Poland) is highly critical of the way in which the Council works. “Our concern is that there is not a meeting point at the different stages of negotiation between the Friends of the Presidency and those who negotiate the regulatory framework. We have separate parallel negotiations that don't advance at the same speed, and that will meet when the figures appear”, lamented Ms Hübner. But what worries her even more is the fact that crucial issues such as eligibility, upper limits and macroeconomic conditions will not be in the hands of the working group which focuses on the general regulation, but in those of the Friends of the Presidency, thus allowing them to escape a decision-making procedure which puts the Parliament on an equal footing with the Council. “I believe that all those issues belonging to the regulatory should be negotiated between the Council and the European Parliament through the co-decision procedure, and we see that things are not because they belong to the Friends of the Presidency procedure”, Ms Hübner continued.
The priorities of the Presidency. The work of the Friends of the Presidency are led by the Danish delegation, which holds the rotating Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the EU until the end of June. The Danish Presidency wishes to take the discussions “as far as possible”, in other words to a partial general approach agreed by the end of June. This will be based on exchanges underway between the 27 delegations on eligibility and the financial instruments, and on financial management and control systems. There is still the possibility that the work will pave the way for compromise texts on the ex ante conditions, and also on performance. The 11 investment priorities and the thematic concentration are also to be the subject of discussions over the next few months. It is therefore the Presidency's job to prepare the ground ahead of an agreement on the whole financial framework 2014-2020 by the end of the Cypriot Presidency (December 2012).
INTERVIEW WITH JOHANNES HAHN
EUROPEAN REGIONAL POLICY COMMISSIONER
(AE) Do you believe the budget proposed for the cohesion will be maintained? Or are the threats from the member states to reduce it still alive? And if so, by how much could it be reduced?
(JH) I think we have proposed a very balanced budget in general but also concerning regional policy it's an investment budget. It is also the new philosophy of our policy to invest with the aim of getting back more than we have paid in. I hope we can convince the member states about this philosophy, because the structural funds are the only tools available to the European Institutions to transfer European goals, now written down in the European strategy, into concrete actions. There are ideas by some member states; that's not really a secret. The net contributors would like to have a lower budget than we have proposed and the European Parliament would like to have a higher budget. So it depends on the discussion amongst the member states, the economic situation, etc…
(AE) Many regret the lack of flexibility of the proposals, namely regarding the 11 priorities and their ring fencing. Is there some room for improvement? Do you see any compromise on this issue?
(JH) Prioritisation is one of the three big innovative elements of the whole policy, because we often criticise that the policy is less visible, less tangible. So we need a certain kind of focusing, but nevertheless there is still room for a certain flexibility. If we take these 11 priorities, four of them are mainly covered by the European social fund, two are mainly covered by cohesion funds. There remain 5, of which three priorities support SMEs, innovation and energy efficiency and saving, which are the most important for us. What we have proposed is that in the most developed regions, 80% of the money should be dedicated to this three areas, whereas in the transition regions it should be 50%, and for the less developed regions 20%. So I think that even within these priority areas how to implement things, how to make certain areas eligible, is something where you can really have tailor-made solutions for each of the 271 regions. So I think these key words of focusing and flexibility are not a contradiction.
(AE) Introducing the ex ante and ex post conditionalities, to focus more on the results and the performance, is it in some way a recognition of the low absorption level of previous programming period? Is it to compensate for some earlier failures?
(JH) First of all, I have to say that all these conditions have to be agreed with the member states or with the regions, depending on who is our vis-à-vis in the negotiations, depending on the constitutional framework of a country and, indeed, this condition should help overcome more quickly than in the past some deficiencies, bottlenecks, etc... which have hindered smooth and quick implementation of our projects, of the projects of member states (…) Yes, there is work in progress, and there are always some problems - I would like to call them challenges - but I think this is quite normal. I mean, the historical task of structural or regional policy is to reduce the disparities amongst member states, amongst the regions. Of course the main priority is economic welfare, but it is also disparities that concern for instance administrative capacities etc.
(AE) You constantly refer to macro-economic conditionality as a last resort measure. Many say it would only doubly penalised member states, already in difficulties, and would target regions that are not responsible of budget deficit. Taking that into account now, would you improve the proposals? Do you think a way of making this condition more “fair” towards the regions would be to apply it to all EU funds?
(JH) What we have to do, and what I have already been doing for several months, is to sell this proposal in a way that, as is already written in our proposal and as you have rightly said, this last resort sanction mechanism should be proportionate and balanced. Nobody is saying or demanding, for instance, that all the money for structural funding should be suspended at once. There has to be an appropriate and proportionate sanction relation compared to the EU zone countries (Ed: reference to the six pack). At the moment, it is possible only for the cohesion fund, which is one of the structural funds. But in the future it would be possible for all the Structural Funds. But of course the impact is higher normally in non-eurozone countries than in eurozone countries, because, with maybe a few exemptions, eurozone countries are not cohesion-fund countries. So, in the country I know best, Austria, the structural funds play a negligible role because the amount compared to the overall budget and GDP is very low. Here definitely the possibility to impose a fine is more relevant, but in countries like the new member states, where 30-50% of public investment is done by structural fund money, that will have an influence. Therefore we have to apply it - if we have to do it - in a proportionate, balanced and appropriate way. Again, in my opinion, it is kind of last resort, because it should only be applied if a country is repeatedly ignoring Council recommendations.
(AE) What do you say to the four states complaining about the cap allowing funding up to a maximum of 2.5% of the GDP?
(JH) Capping already exists. The discussion is always the threshold. Currently we have different thresholds, which are the outcome of the negotiations last time. So the thresholds at the moment are between 3.2% and 3.8%, depending on the development of countries, the whole architecture, the whole financing concept, the development of the regions. I think it's important to recognise that currently we have 84 less developed regions, and, in the next financial perspective, we expect only 64-68 regions being less developed. So that means an improvement of living conditions and welfare levels for 31 to 35 million people. This has all to be taken into account when we calculate the next financial perspectives and at the moment we have proposed this general capping of 2.5%. I think that, in the meantime, it's well understood, even by the affected countries, that the Commission cannot propose a different capping level. This is definitely something that must be negotiated by the member states. But the European Commission has to treat all the member states equally.
(AE) The Danish Presidency approach to cohesion policy is dramatically different to that of the Polish Presidency. Do you regret that?
(JH) I'm quite fine with the Danish approach. As I was with the Polish approach - please don't misunderstand me. But the Danish are not really affected, Poland is the biggest beneficiary. So the Danish can play the role of honest broker - and they will. And they have promised and already started to do that, to discuss and to reach agreement as far as possible during their presidency in order to prepare the ground for the Cypriot presidency, to finalise all negotiations concerning structural funds. The Polish have already started, and now the Danes are part of the current troika so there is a kind of continuation. That's fine.
(AE) The friends of the presidency will take care of the budget side of the negotiations. Do you think this is the right approach? Do participants taking part in the discussions have the right mandate (mainly financial)?
(JH) These are also discussions which have to be conducted at national level. It is again a political decision and, finally, like always, financial decisions concerning the budget are taken by the heads of state and prime ministers. But their positions certainly reflect internal national discussions and debates and therefore I always ask all the stakeholders, and beneficiaries from structural funds, to lobby inside their member states. The time when they had to lobby here in Brussels is over - now it's time to lobby inside the member states.
I have asked, and this is for instance something which is done by the Danish presidency, to discuss in parallel the architecture of the policy and the budgetary elements, rather than to have one after the other, first the budget, and then discussion on architecture, because that could lead to the risk of there being a different approach into the whole systems. So I prefer parallel negotiation, and this is indeed the case.
Interview took place in February 2012