Divergences regarding EU financial support to Greece continue and a compromise at the beginning of next week remains uncertain. In the meantime, I consider it useful to look at three questions - the demonstrations in Greece, the attitude of the banks and the opinions of representative Community players.
The protesters. The division of the Greek population into protesters and those resigned to make efforts and sacrifices has been underlined in this column in EUROPE 10388. The first category has certainly been making itself heard over the past few days. Nonetheless, according to certain observers' analyses in Greece, protesters include: (a) a preponderance of civil servants, as a result of the former demagogic policy of the political parties; (b) citizens who have never paid taxes and who prefer the situation to the discipline that the government is attempting to push through; (c) those who are concerned about the privatisation of public companies, which guarantee them juicy returns without much effort.
One investigative journalist in the field quoted an important comment made by Mr Papandreou - “one of the major problems is the ability of our civil servants to apply reforms”. These civil servants have declared a work-to-rule, even though they have often obtained their jobs because of their affiliation to one or other of the parties that held office. Part of the population would prefer abandoning the euro rather than accepting the rules. This choice would have a negative impact on the country and its future but it would favour those who benefit from certain national traditions such as tax breaks for ship-owners, an absence of a land registry (which prevents real estate being taxed) and the fact that it is almost impossible to sack civil servants.
Those defending their own personal interests are also a reason why this column has often underlined (an argument that is not appreciated by anybody) the fact that the euro is not a prison but a choice: if a country does not obey the rules or disregards them, the door is always open to those that want to leave and any country can choose to return to its respective national currency. For those that want to be part of the eurozone, however, they must respect the rules and be able to benefit from the support mechanisms (in place or currently being developed) as well as cohesion policy and other EU policies supporting member states that are less well off.
A question for the banks. As part of the complicated and controversial Greek crisis, one of the most important and controversial aspects involves the attitude of the banks that control the Greek Treasury bonds. In addition to what has already been said at great length and which continues to be written about whether they should participate in the rescue operations or not, I would like to ask a very simple question - what level of interest do the banks get on the Greek treasury bonds if they are based in Greece or abroad? If these interest rates are totally or partly abnormally high due to the risk that the banks are exposing themselves to, then these banks should participate in the measures which extend the deadlines because this risk is the only justification for such high rates. If they are unwilling to participate in this respect, then it is a purely speculative venture and therefore inadmissible.
In an open and unofficial context… Without wishing to return to the plethora of different positions taken and commentaries made regarding the trajectory of the eurozone, I think it useful to look at some of the different viewpoints in an open and unofficial context rather than the parliamentary debates and institutional declarations. In this respect I would like to refer to the blog of my colleague Jean Quatremer. Why should this be of interest? Because often figures in positions of responsibility can use pseudonyms and therefore express themselves with a frankness that would otherwise be impossible.
In this connection, a recent debate illustrated the following opinions: (a) those most responsible for the situation in Greece are the Greeks themselves; but so are the other member states just as much, particularly the Germans (who own a significant part of Greece); ( b) solidarity (including that from private lenders) is required because all of them knew about the situation;( c) the misuse of European funds occurs at a colossal level in Greece. For example, the Salonika motorway bridge does not exist because European funds have been embezzled; (d) the Greeks should accept a tough approach in order to recover (despite the inevitable sacrifices) and it is best to have the EU onside in order to ensure reforms and therefore future living conditions; (e) a loss of sovereignty is inevitable but EU pressure is going in the right direction; (f) the sale of public companies is an absurdity because they provide a benefit: they should be better managed and not sold off cheaply.
The conclusions of Mr Quatremer are as follows: it is imperative that real estate, ship-owners and the Orthodox Church be taxed, and that the defence budget be cut. If Greeks want to make decisions autonomously they have to assume the consequences of their decisions. Greece is not a victim of the European Union.
(F.R.trans/fl)