Three aspects. With the goal of obtaining information about the Kosovo problem from a European point of view (see this column yesterday), I was able to find out about a number of positions taken in the Balkan press on the general situation. I don't regret having done this. It is always interesting to be aware of public opinion in candidate countries, whether they are currently negotiating accession or hope to do so. I got three impressions, which are not in themselves really new: a) joining the EU remains the aspiration of all Balkan countries; b) the EU is sometimes criticised for being more severe and demanding with regard to the Balkans than to other candidate countries or regions; c) the solutions that Europe, the US and other international organisations have sometimes imposed for tackling the rivalry and quarrels between the countries in question cannot be considered as sustainable and unequivocally agreed to in all the different cases.
There is no point in overemphasising the first aspect. Balkan countries know that it is their vocation to join the EU and from joining, they first of all expect economic and social progress. We are also aware of the importance that their citizens attach to a result that is almost symbolic, such as the facility of being able to cross the border of the Schengen area, by simply showing their passports and without needing a visa. With regard to point b), it is necessary to understand that the opening of negotiations with Iceland and the receptiveness of the EU towards Norway and Switzerland, contrasts with the sluggishness and misgivings displayed with regard to several Balkan countries. It remains to be seen whether the cause of the latter can be located in Brussels or in the countries concerned. The third subject is the most sensitive of all. It involves, for example, assessing whether the unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a multi-ethnic state corresponds to the wishes and interests of the local communities and whether it is, therefore, viable to evaluate whether the borders of Serbia, as set out in the era of Marshal Tito, correspond to current ethnic and historical considerations.
The acquis communautaire must be accepted. There is not a lot to add on the first point, apart from reaffirming that all the Balkan countries have accession prospects and that the well-known criteria must be respected. We join the EU on the condition that differences with neighbouring countries have been resolved and not because we seek to strengthen our position in regard to these divergences.
The second aspect depends more on the countries concerned themselves than on the EU. Norway, Switzerland and Iceland are already part of the Schengen area and the unified economic area because these countries have fulfilled the necessary conditions. In the case of all these countries, it has been calculated that 22 chapters out of the 35 which accession involves were met from the very outset. This is why everything is much easier. The EU cannot water down the acquis, which has been developed over the course of half a century; candidate countries must accept it. Checks and balances on respect for the acquis are more likely to be reinforced. It is no secret that certain political currents are attacking the EU for not being sufficiently rigorous with Romania and Bulgaria, and a number of MEPs have openly stated this. Some of the press articles I found include one contained in a daily Sofia tabloid that attacks the special surveillance mechanism applied to Bulgaria and Romania. The editorial asserts that this is a humiliating situation because, in the editor's opinion, this mechanism places these two countries in the European second division and he urges his government and people to call for its immediate suppression. Such positions can lead to the new accession process being slowed down and further precautionary measures or even distrust.
The prerequisite. The third aspect is the most sensitive. The splitting up of Yugoslavia had positive effects insofar as it allowed homogenous countries seeking autonomy, such as Croatia, Slovenia and a number of others, to become countries in their own right. The choice or, indeed, the imposition of multi-ethnic states has largely failed. Wishing to remain anonymous, one diplomat did not hesitate to explain that the painful and often cruel conflicts that followed the shattering of Yugoslavia led to a “stabilising” in the situation by way of certainly inadmissible and cruel displacements of entire communities but which would in the long-term go in the direction of creating a homogenous states, whereas the solutions that had been imposed prolonged divergences and instability. The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina is emblematic and the example of Kosovo indicates one orientation but it has not been supported unanimously. Other difficult situations persist.
Obviously, the EU must try and help resolve these problems and support these determined nascent states, but it must avoid importing the quarrels and divergences and making them into its own. It is true that reconciliation between the different communities was the priority objective in European construction and it must remain the prerequisite for all future accession. (F.R./transl.fl)