Three repercussions. The arguments which, in my opinion, are against Turkey's accession to the EU have been made on several occasions in this column. Why repeat these arguments again and risk being rather repetitive? Because, certain recent developments have again reinforced these arguments (see this column yesterday). Turkish accession would have three fundamental repercussions on Europe:
1) Abandonment of geographical identity. The adjective “European” has assumed a number of different names in Community construction (ECSC, EEC, EU) but would be meaningless because Turkey is an essentially Asian country. It is an honour to be Asian, if we consider what Asia has brought the world but Europe has its own identity. The president of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, recently made a rather sarcastic remark when he referred to those who had decided to negotiate Turkish accession having “created the possibility of Europe going beyond the geographical borders taught in primary school”. Why not include Morocco, which would like to join or Quebec, which De Gaulle wanted to be “free”?
2) The disappearance of cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy (CAP), as they currently stand. The funding of these policies is based on certain criteria, the result of which would be to orientate most of the funding towards Turkey, if it participates in the Union. This would hugely expand the cost of the CAP and lead to the scrapping or reduction of cohesion policy funding in several other member states. The situation would become politically fraught and financially untenable.
3) Involvement in policies and complex and controversial questions that do not concern Europe. Two examples suffice: a) the existence ( or non-existence) of a “Kurdish identity”, which could end up with the demand to unify the different “Kurdistans” by certain publications in Iraq (where the name, Kurdistan, is officially recognised), Turkey and Iran; b) the specific role played by Turkey in certain regions or countries of the former Ottoman Empire (which have kept, in part, the Turkish language).
Four categories. In light of the three observations made above, supporters of accession usually belong to one of the following categories: a) those who want restricted integration in Europe and exclusively strengthened cooperation; b) those who no longer believe in the dream of integration that they originally believed in; c) those who believe that a “two-speed Europe” is inevitable, in which all countries would have their place but with a genuinely integrated hard-core; d) those who have not thought about the repercussions of Turkish accession. Eleven ministers of agriculture (from Central and Eastern Europe, in addition to Cyprus) have formally demanded that the financial dimension of the CAP respects the solidarity principle and maintains development aid to rural zones (modernisation, competitiveness, etc.). They also reject the hypothesis of diversified subsidies. How many of these subsidies would therefore be redirected to the agricultural development of Anatolia?
The members of this group: a) do not attempt to conceal their objective. Charles Tannock MEP declared during a plenary session that support from the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) for EU enlargement primarily aimed to “dilute federalist ambition”. The most illustrious representative from the second group is Michel Rocard, according to whom the dream of integration has vanished and Turkey has its place in a less ambitious and more intergovernmental Europe. The thesis of the inevitable hard-core is, notably, supported by Guy Verhofstadt, who does not believe that a genuinely ambitious EU with around 30 member states is possible; the two-speed formula is not very much appreciated in a number of member states.
As for the last group, it is astonishing that certain member states (especially from Central and Eastern Europe) do not understand to what extent they currently benefit from funding and that this would be reduced if they had to share it with Turkey, which would become the main beneficiary.
It is true that some of the European Parliament continues to support Turkish accession in the belief that it represents the most effective spur to convince Ankara to carry out crucial domestic reform but the list of reforms that the EP has called for by a vote of hands (EUROPE 10075) is so demanding that it resembles a theoretical wish list. There is a horrendous chasm between the principle of support for Turkish accession and the list of conditions that need to be met.
Mario David, from the EPP Group suggested that a referendum be organised in Turkey, which asks citizens whether they accept European values and rules or whether they prefer to keep their own values and to negotiate a “privileged partnership” with the EU. We therefore arrive at the second fundamental aspect of accession: is it actually desirable for Turkey itself? This column will return to the subject soon. (F.R./transl.fl)