Significant developments. The recent report by Notre Europe on the new transatlantic partnership that I commented on in this column a few days ago (Reshaping EU-US Relations: A Concept Paper) takes no account of the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in the way the EU operates. Is this due to caution while waiting to see how the Lisbon Treaty is applied in practice or scepticism about the outcome? In my opinion, the Lisbon Treaty has introduced changes to the EU institutions that could be used to help restore Europe's autonomy and freedom of manoeuvre, which is the main objective of the new EU-US partnership recommended in the policy paper. Two crucial aspects need to be respected:
1. The European Council is now a full EU institution with decision-making powers and the responsibility of encouraging the EU's development and deciding on political guidelines and general policy priorities. It already had some of these powers in the past, of course, but only informally and its guidelines were not always very clear. Heads of state are now officially and directly involved in shaping EU policies. When it comes to foreign policy, they have been given such clear powers that EU foreign ministers have been wondering whether the heads of state have taken over their work and some foreign ministers are even experiencing an existential identity crisis (see issue No. 10098). The European Council is now just as key to decision-making on economic and financial issues; the ECOFIN Council has in effect handed over responsibly to the heads of state for deciding on a bailout for Greece and areas of the new financial regulation package that will impact on the EU's relations with the United States. The Lisbon Treaty gives a partial answer to the famous question of Henry Kissinger's about who exactly he should phone if he wants to discuss policy in the EU - there is now a permanent president of the European Council.
2. The crucial new powers of the European Parliament, are already being used in connection with relations with the United States because the EP has rejected a draft agreement that it deemed unsatisfactory and is making demands about a new deal still on the negotiating table. It is now able to ensure its desires are met.
There are other areas I could quote, but these two examples suffice to demonstrate that the Lisbon Treaty has provided the EU with key mechanisms to ensure European autonomy from the United States.
Tricky borders. My second comment smacks more of congratulations to the writers of the Notre Europe report (including Notre Europe's deputy chair, Nicole Gnesotto, who drafted the “concept paper”, and the project coordinators Gaëtane Ricard-Nihoul, Sami Andoura and Timo Behr) for the following excerpt: “The greatest difficulty facing the Euro-American partnership is the need, when faced with a crisis or challenge, to simultaneously remain true to these principles and devise pragmatic solutions. This tension is not merely rhetorical”. Principles clearly have to be defended, pure and simply. When human rights activists learn about infringements, wrongful arrests, restrictions on freedom of the press and the like, they are right to denounce them. The EU's political authorities, led by the European Parliament, are right to make these criticisms official and are right to consider sanctions where appropriate, but when should denouncements and criticisms be turned into sanctions?
In my view, the European Parliament often gets the emphasis wrong, for example when it calls for the interruption of various aid projects with a country or even the abandoning of aid, particularly because in other, more or less equivalent resolutions, it calls for stronger ties with the very same countries! A key European protagonist suggests that this is a left-over from the days when the EP has no real powers. It is not only the EP, however, that has a tendency to go too far and make contradictory statements - everyone finds it tricky to combine fidelity to principles with pragmatism on the ground. Aid or some form of cooperation often cannot be avoided and some EU projects take years or even decades to come to fruition - like the gas pipeline to be built with Russia under the Baltic Sea or the Nabucco pipeline project with Turkey, projects on which the future security of the EU's energy supplies depend. How can principles be defended when certain stubborn facts demand action? Notre Europe raised the question, and without claiming to have the ideal solution, it suggests: “On the question of democracy, the examples of Iraq, Afghanistan and even Iran show that it cannot be promoted by force of arms (as the US sometimes tends to think) or the magic of words (as Europeans too often believe)”.
A call to get out of Afghanistan and to never consider waging war anywhere else?
(F.R./transl/fl)