Decisions made at last week's EU-Russia summit can be quickly summed up because in practice, there aren't any, as our report published in EUROPE 9907 explains. Assessing the results of this summit is not so easy: commentaries range from a moderate judgement to the “summit ship-wreck”. Any assessment, in fact, cannot disregard the underlying reality, which the authorities on both sides are aware of (I am talking about those who are in charge of these dossiers, not the person improvising as chairman of a meeting) but which actually remains in the shadows. This reality is made up at the same time of factors that are either well-known or ignored or forgotten. A cursory reminder of what these are wouldn't go amiss.
1. The need to cooperate is reciprocal. The EU cannot do without Russia for its energy supplies. This won't be indefinite but it will, nonetheless, be for quite some time. Russia cannot manage without its European outlets, however much it tries (including the decision to hold the summit in a location that was 7 hours away from Moscow by plane and 30 kilometres away from the Chinese border) to get us to believe that it has alternatives in this respect. The Russian political regime allows the Kremlin to ignore, when it deems opportune, immediate demands and to pay the price in the short term for this position by using energy as an instrument of foreign policy. Such behaviour is practically impossible for the EU, which does not have a common energy policy and whose major companies have more autonomy.
Russian dependency on the EU is staggering: 58% of its exports go to the EU (2008 statistics), whereas the EU imports 28% of its oil and 40% of its natural gas from Russia. New projects and investment will increase these percentages, and mutual dependency is therefore forecast to increase with time. The balance of payments in trade is significantly in Russia's favour.
2. Russia favours bilateral relations with major European countries instead of those with EU as a whole. This is understandable because it is in its interest. The EU should strengthen its unity and speak as much as possible with one voice. Those harbouring the most misgivings in this context are sometimes the member states that initially appear to need EU support in the dialogue with Moscow: the most Eurosceptic heads of state reside in Warsaw and Prague. It is up to the Poles and Czechs to choose; if they prefer a weak EU with less solidarity, it is their right.
3. The definition of new and closer relations is moving ahead very slowly, particularly in the energy arena. The principle of a new partnership agreement has been accepted for a long time and negotiations began in July 2008 but have only moved forward very slowly. Creating a free-trade zone is tied to Russia joining the WTO but on this point substantial divergences persist. Energy cooperation has made concrete progress but there is no consensus on the principles. The EU considers that the principles in the Energy Charter (which Russia has signed but not ratified) remain valid. Last week, Moscow reaffirmed that it would never sign it and is proposing negotiations for an international agreement. The EU is prepared to accept an updating of the charter but its principles must be safeguarded. The stakes at play are colossal. Europe believes that the opening up of the energy markets should be reciprocal and also applied to investment, plant ownership and supplies to end-users. On the face of it, Russia is not rejecting any of these principles, just the legal body of the agreement that it wants to be completely renegotiated. In the meantime, most of the former agreements between the Russian oil giants (closely controlled by the political authorities) and their Western counterparts have been significantly revised and new agreements or contracts have been concluded, often without the Community authorities knowing about them or at least without them having any say.
The positions of principles were reaffirmed by both sides at the summit last week but the main dossiers are not moving forward. In reality, energy cooperation initiatives are mushrooming but the European institutions remain on the sidelines. The difference between the energy sector (where a common European policy does not exist) and the trade sector (where common policy does exist and only the EU as a whole can make decisions and negotiate with third countries) is being surveyed by both sides. The Lisbon Treaty, as we know, would open the way to a common energy policy.
4. Political distrust persists. The delays and divergences mentioned in the previous point underline a political distrust that is by and large still quite sharp. It would be naive to seek to resume, in this instance, attitudes that have been the subject of so many detailed analyses, without pointing out that distrust is understandable from member states that until just a few years ago were under Moscow's tutelage, indeed inserted by force into the former USSR. In part of the EU, memories of the past influence behaviour, with the fear that Russia is still keeping and extending certain aspects of its historic imperialism. Certain milieu in Moscow are not hiding the fact that they consider the dissolution of the former USSR as a historic error.
It is the doctrine of encirclement that explains Russia's distrust and sensitiveness. The US was considered the main culprit. Developments appear to be afoot in Washington but to what extent it is still too early to tell. The EU is also considered, at least partly, to be responsible for this with its Eastern Partnership initiative being perceived by the Russians as an expression of encirclement. The two sides spoke about this at last week's summit. Russia affirms that it does not want to practise a zones-of-influence policy and the EU explained that its Eastern Partnership (involving Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus) is not aimed at Russia at all and, on the contrary, aims to strengthen stability and prosperity in zones near Russia and the EU. It says that this partnership will also be helpful to Russia itself. The case of Ukraine was mentioned explicitly (see following point).
Is there any need to point out that the few conciliatory statements about the good faith and good intentions of the reciprocal exchanges at the summit did nothing to dissipate this distrust? The situation is far more complex than the official declarations. There are many areas of difficulty, which are sometimes exceedingly problematic and which involve areas in Georgia where Russia has proclaimed independence, as well as in the Crimea. Who will be able to anticipate what will happen in this region when the current compromises in force expire? And to what extent can we consider the situation in Chechnya as being resolved? In addition to these divergences, which are essentially political, distrust and rivalry is manifest in actual behaviour - a few examples of which are mentioned below.
5. Divergences and wrong notes. At an official level, Russia appears ready to cooperate in EU projects to develop the Southern Corridor for its energy supplies - in other words, essentially gas pipelines bypassing Russian territory. Vladimir Putin has affirmed this on several occasions (see this column in EUROPE 9906). The fact is that three former USSR countries, whilst having taken part in the 8 May summit in Prague on the Southern Corridor, refused to sign the summit's final declaration. These countries were Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (EUROPE 9898) which are rich in hydrocarbons and have been called on, together with other sources, to supply the three Southern Corridor projects,: Nabucco, ITGI and South Stream. The Prague declaration was signed by the EU, Turkey, Georgia, Egypt and Azerbaijan; apart from the latter, these are more transit countries than countries of production.
The refusal of these three countries was not given an official explanation and those signing on behalf of the EU - José Manuel Barroso and Mirek Topolánek - chose not to dramatise this unexpected development. Observers believe that uncertainties about the legal status of the Caspian Sea played a role. The Russian vice minister for energy, Anatoli Yanovski, who attended the meeting, endorsed this legalistic explanation. Who can say to what extent Moscow influenced the decision made by the three countries?
With regard to Ukraine, two points in Russia's position have been stated quite clearly: a) very sharp official protests against the European project to modernise gas transit through the Ukraine without Russian participation (EUROPE 9871); b) an indication of the danger of further Russian supply cuts in the Ukraine if it does not meet its financial obligations to Moscow. Russia says that it will try and be understanding towards Ukraine but considers that the EU should ensure a substantial part of this work. Brussels has explained that the EU's Eastern Partnership will facilitate the Ukraine's economic and political stability. This is why it would be in Moscow's interest to support this partnership (EUROPE 9907).
Other cooperation. Events affecting the Southern Corridor are now at the centre of attention but, at the same time, the North Stream project is making progress. Public consultation of neighbouring countries on the ecological safety of the pipeline under the sea is taking place and is expected to end next month, after which, construction will begin in 2010 and the first Russian gas supplies are already planned for 2011.
The energy sector is talked about the most, but the economic links between the EU and Russia go much further. The German press has indicated that Russia is directly involved in the Opel car-maker dossier because the Austro-Canadian firm, Magna, belongs to the Russian bank Sberbank and the planned partnership between Opel and a Russian company would allow for a million Opel cars to reach the Russian market every year.
This column will try and draw a few conclusions about all the different items of information tomorrow.
(F.R./transl.rh)