The exchange between Barack Obama and Nicolas Sarkozy regarding Turkey joining the EU did not really bring any new elements to the fore (see this column yesterday). In the reactions that followed, the reaffirmation of familiar arguments reflected the political stances that already existed. Each position tends to ignore the aspects of the dossier that invalidate it or that appear inconsistent. I believe that an objective and comprehensive assessment ought to take the following elements into account:
1. EU already has links with Turkey that are closer than with any other country. The current association regime not only includes free trade (which is the most, in other cases, that can be hoped for) but also a customs union that has been totally completed. The EU's borders are open to Turkish goods and at the same time Turkey applies the European trade regime to third countries. This is a unique situation that not only strengthens Euro-Turkish trade ties but also industrial and economic relations. It is meaningless to suggest a strengthened partnership in these conditions: it already exists. There are numerous examples of other areas where the Euro-Turkish partnership is already a reality. What Turkey now wants is participation in the definition and management of Community policies and instruments. It has already formally made a request for trade policy, leaning on the fact that it is already obliged to apply this policy. In this sector, it is impossible for the EU to go further than an information/consultation mechanism because it cannot restrict its freedom of negotiating with third countries, such as the US in pride of place.
2. EU “common policies” would not be able to exist as they are. Current mechanisms in the Regional and other funds, or those planned for the future, would not be able to continue unchanged because Turkey would become by far the main beneficiary. This would also apply to the budgetary aspects of the common agricultural policy (CAP). Some net Community budget beneficiary member states would lose out substantially from current funding and some would gradually become net contributors. Transition systems would undoubtedly be envisaged as they were for Central and Eastern European countries but they would only be provisional.
A profound transformation of structural policies and the CAP would become inevitable, something certain member states would like but which others find unacceptable. Similar considerations are valid with regard to the free movement of workers and the Schengen System and the abolition of border controls.
3. Institutional repercussions. Given demographic evolution, there would be more Turkish MEPs at the European Parliament than from any other country. It is true that in principle, MEPs are part of political and not national groups, but experience teaches us that when a country's specific interest is at stake the MEPs of a given nationality often form a block. In the case of Turkey, the number would amplify the effects.
Turkey's demographic weight would also play a role in the decisions made by the Council at majority voting, due to the “double majority” mechanism.
4. An abnormal and unacceptable situation. We can understand the political reasons leading the EU towards tacitly accepting the Turkish army's occupation of part of Cyprus (because the military invasion occurred before Cyprus became an EU member state and at a time when the Green majority was preparing unification with Greece) but the situation is, nonetheless, mind blowing: Turkey is by force of arms occupying Community territory! Consequently, it is not applying certain aspects of the association regime with the EU to the Cypriot state. The two parts of Cyprus are currently negotiating a hypothetical reunification but anomalies will persist, such as the presence of Cypriot MEPs at the European Parliament who are in fact Turkish.
These observations, in my opinion, indicate that Turkey's possible accession would imply an abandonment of the project for a political Europe, as well as an end to current common policies and their funding. Are Central and Eastern European countries aware of this development? Some member states want it and this is their right. The dream of an integrated Europe, however, will not be abandoned; it will, one day, be reborn among the member states that seek it.
(F.R./transl.rh)