The media clamour surrounding the support expressed by the President of the United States for Turkey's accession to the EU, and the reactions that followed it, are easy to understand. Disagreement at the highest level between Europe and America makes for interesting titles and offers the delicious prospect of controversy. There was, however, no difference in substance. US support for Turkey's accession to the EU is not new, nor is France's opposition or reservations from elsewhere.
Significance of the speech. It was not to reignite the difference of opinion that Mr Obama raised the subject, but because, during his visit of reconciliation to Ankara, he wanted to tell the Turks what they wanted to hear. The section on Turkish relations with the EU was of secondary importance in his speech, and even partially contradicted the more significant points. After the difficult times of the Bush period, which saw some unfriendly Turkish actions (such as refusing passage to US soldiers and banning flights through Turkish airspace) and with an eye on the issue of Iraqi Kurdistan, the American aim was to rebuild bilateral relations. Barack Obama was, at the same time, telling Muslims throughout the world that “the United States is not at war with Islam” and demonstrating a desire for partnership with the Muslim world. Careful reading of his speech shows that he was speaking of Turkey with its own independent foreign policy, not restricted by what is happening in the Community. Turkey's greatness, he said, came from its being at the centre: it was not the place where East was divided from West, but where they came together. He spoke of a bridge, which, by definition, cannot belong to either side. Ankara should play a key role in peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine and in other areas, such as dialogue with Iran, rebuilding relations with Syria and perhaps even in cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Let us not forget that a number of former USSR republics speak a Turkic language and used to be part of the Ottoman Empire.
Nicolas Sarkozy's reaction, underlining that any decision on enlarging the EU was for member states, and member states alone, to make, was to be expected, and he was right to make the point, as was Mr Obama to say that he was simply expressing an opinion, just as Europeans comment on (and sometimes vigorously criticise) US policy. That should have been the end of the matter.
However, given the media attention paid to Barack Obama and Nicolas Sarkozy, it was the issue of Turkish accession that grabbed all the headlines, without any new arguments either for or against. The three positions so far seen can be summarised as follows:
1. Support for accession is based on showing that the EU is not a “Christian club” and on what Turkish accession would do for the dialogue between civilisations, and increasing the European presence in this vital part of the globe. Nor must the need to meet an old political commitment be forgotten, or the economic advantages the operation would bring.
2. Opposition to accession points to the geographical situation (most of Turkey is quite clearly in Asia, something that would be at odds with the very idea of a European Union) and, still more importantly, the abandonment of all thought or hope of taking the EU towards a more or less openly federal political Europe that would result.
3. The middle course supports the pursuit of negotiations without stating beforehand where it is we want to go: it could lead to some special partnership or association, to be decided at the appropriate time in the light of the outcome of the negotiations.
The weakness is that none of these three positions takes into account the arguments of the other two. Supporters of accession dismiss the very clear geographical objection out of hand and are not concerned about the abandonment of the European political integration that would result (to my knowledge, only Michel Rocard has said that, at any rate, the federal dream has already gone). The third position is perfectly logically supported by the president of the European Commission, in the hope of finding a compromise that will mean that the European commitment to negotiate is met, while, at the same time, taking account of differences over where we want to get to. The various points have to be taken into consideration.
This column will seek to set out the main points tomorrow. (F.R./transl.rt)