Relations between Europe and Africa are undergoing deep change, with the system of association still in force but institutions on both sides sometimes not appearing aware of it. The ties that have existed for more than half a century no longer correspond to the current situation. African countries are gradually strengthening their freedom of action and decision-making, which is an appropriate correlation with the independence acquired. European countries that have special historical links with one or other of the countries or regions in Africa are changing or abandoning them entirely. France is moving away from the usual habit of taking a position in the domestic affairs of new states, of either supporting one political fraction against another or backing the government encountering an opposition that seeks to replace it. Belgium has had some very sharp quarrels with the Congolese government, to the extent that its minister for foreign affairs can no longer return there. The United Kingdom has conflicting relationships with countries from its former empire. Italy has lost any special link or influence in Ethiopia or Somalia.
Rejection of EPAs. I have cited bilateral relations between member states and their former colonies but “European” relations continue. This is partially true but behind the façade, the situation is evolving. The economic partnership agreements (EPAs) based on trade reciprocity, with the aim of complying with WTO rules, have got off to an inauspicious start. They are making a little progress in relations with the two other regions of the EU/ACP Association (the Caribbean and Pacific), but in Africa this project is largely a failure and most African countries reject the EPAs. Modest results have partially been observed, such as the recent signing of the EU/Côte d'Ivoire temporary trade agreement, which responds to the specific situation of the country concerned and which is prepared to open its market to European products and keep its access to the European market. But in principle, however, trade reciprocity has not been accepted, despite the flexibility agreed by the Europeans for applying the conditions and timetable. Euro-African trade relations are in need of profound change.
Less advanced African countries will obviously continue to benefit from free access to almost all the EU market but this will no longer be preferential: all countries in the world that are in the same category have already obtained or will gradually obtain the same advantages. African countries that are not on the list of “less advanced” countries will be subject to the customs regime of a “third country” if they do not accept a certain degree of reciprocity. Nigeria has already opted for this latter regime and its main export product, oil, will be sought after everywhere, without restrictions.
“Conditionality” is becoming impractical. The future trade regime will, perhaps, involve the most spectacular change, but it is not the most important. The change in relations will be characterised even more by the rejection of “conditionality” for European support. EU funding and others aspects of European action are in principle subject to political, civil and environmental conditions that beneficiary countries must respect: democratisation, free elections, respect for human rights, environmental protection. African states are increasingly less willing to accept this kind of monitoring. Even those that express a willingness to respect democratic principles are rejecting the principle of European control, which appears as a form of tutelage. This attitude is understandable on the part of sovereign countries and is facilitated by the attitude of crucial third countries that do not pose any similar conditions, such as China, in particular. The EU, however, cannot abandon conditionality. The European Development Fund (EDF), for example, and the European Investment Bank (EIB) are obliged to take the ecological effects of a project they fund into consideration. Permanent attention to respect for human rights and the regularity of elections remain a pillar of the European position.
Europe has lost its exclusivity. Ongoing developments do not constitute a distant prospect but rather, a real situation. Economically, Europe has lost its previous exclusivity (or almost). The USA is increasingly attentive to Africa's oil resources, and China has, above all, taken pride of place in the purchase and exploitation of Africa's mining and other resources. The Republic of Congo has, in particular, ceded long term exclusive rights to China over most of its immense mining resources, in exchange for substantial loans. Sudan sells its oil to China too. Senegal is doing the same for some of its fishing resources. These are only a few examples. At the same time, China has become the biggest supplier of manufactured goods to a number of African countries and has replaced Europe in this respect.
The EU, as it stands, appears to be slow on the uptake with regard to the inevitable conclusions to be drawn from the developments mentioned, but it will have to significantly adapt both politically and economically. France, as we have said, is gradually changing its habit of intervening in the domestic affairs of some African countries; Belgium is forced to do likewise, faced with the behaviour of some of their former colonies.
Other member states that have never played a colonising role in Africa or for whom these are but distant memories, have always been in favour of a comprehensive European policy with regard to all poor countries in the world, and do not regret the decline of African specificity in European external relations. I am not referring to member states that are reluctant to respect aid commitments - on the contrary, Denmark and Sweden etc are the most generous countries. Quite simply because, in their opinion, all poor countries are on a level playing field.
Declining military presence. Military intervention is increasingly rare and is an orientation that is gradually winning over all member states. I will underline, as a case in point, the conflict in the East of the Republic of Congo, for two reasons: it is the oldest and most bloody of conflicts (going on for 12 years and has already killed five million people, as well as seeing a shocking number of rapes, children kidnapped from their families to be forcibly enrolled in the armed groups etc) and it is still continuing: the hypothesis of an armed EU intervention has been debated in Europe at a ministerial level, this very week.
Karel De Gucht sounded out his European colleagues about the possibility of sending a European military force to the conflict zone, while waiting for a reinforced NATO presence but the answer was no. No member state is prepared to take the initiative for such an operation. Belgium intends to provide exclusively logistic support to UN forces and continues to fund training of the Congolese army. On 10 November, the Council of the EU discussed the matter and its president, Bernard Kouchner, had already pointed out that member states are “reluctant, indeed against” the idea of sending troops. He explained that “the situation continues to get worse…we are in a situation where everything is mixed up and where different rebel groups and the national army are committing exactions”. He did, however, confirm the EU's commitment towards humanitarian aid (EUROPE 9779). On Wednesday, the Kinshasa government expressed its disappointment: “we do not understand the reasons for such indifference, we feel that we have been abandoned”. It should not be forgotten, however, that this same government withdrew its ambassador to Belgium and is refusing access to the Belgian foreign department, to preserve its independence and political autonomy.
Accepting the consequences. We are therefore arriving at a key juncture in new relations between the EU and Africa: African countries have to understand that political independence, autonomy and total freedom of choice in economic and trade questions imply a duty to assume and accept the consequences of policies they choose and the decisions they make. Here are three examples:
a) in the Doha Round, some African countries supported the position calling on the EU to increase the opening up of the EU's borders to agricultural imports; this logically implies the gradual disappearance of “trade preferences” and African countries will have to face direct competition with the big producers and global exporters. African banana and sugar producers are already subject to the consequences and will be so increasingly because on a daily basis, the EU is finding it more difficult to defend its “preferences” at the WTO (its banana regime has again just been criticised);
b) certain agreements with China, based on long term loans will again, sooner or later, pose the problem of debt, which is considered as the worst scourge for the economy and social progress in Africa. These loans will also involve long term Chinese control over Africa's natural and mining resources. Some commitments made to China have already been opposed in the countries involved;
c) the rejection of “conditionality” involves the decline of European support and finance (except for food and humanitarian aid) because the EU cannot abandon political or environmental conditions (human rights and democratisation). The European Parliament would never agree to this.
Time for a rethink. Some African countries appear to be at least partly aware of the changes occurring and are taking them into account in their political and economic orientations. Sometimes they point out that cooperation with the Europeans is still better and more efficient, despite the weight of the past, because many Europeans sincerely love Africa and its civilisation. The political forces and authorities, however, on either side, do not appear ready or willing to accept the repercussions of the unavoidable changes that are currently happening. The time has come for a rethink on the matter, particularly at the European Parliament, which sometimes appears to be a prisoner of the points of view of the past and its old habits.
(F.R./transl.rh)