The pending launch of a new round of dialogue on the future of EU relations with Africa has to take account of the profound turmoil the African continent is undergoing and will continue to undergo. Africa is now in the front line of the global energy and raw materials war, with China and the United States battling it out and with Russia too soon about to join the fray. The importance of relations with Europe could fizzle out for some big African countries. The upcoming negotiations on the EU's economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with Africa must not ignore this. The information at our disposal already provides ample food for thought. Most of the conflicts still afflicting various areas of Africa are directly related to control of oil and gas resources and other natural resources, and against this backdrop calls for democracy and human rights can look like empty rhetoric or just plain naïve. Do the EPA negotiations run the risk of becoming empty words?
China and Congo's copper reserves. Let us consider the agreements signed by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with China. Paul Fortin, CEO of Gécamines, the Congolese state-run company that has signed the most eye-catching agreement with China, explained in an interview with Belgian investigative journalist Colette Braeckman that the Chinese have pledged to lend Gécamines some $9 billion, with $3bn as an upfront payment. 'Who these days could lend the DRC $3bn at a preferential rate so it can build essential infrastructure? Not the World Bank, not the EU and nobody else for that matter. Only China has such vast wads of dollars to invest,' he explained. In return, Gécamines has pledged to provide 10 million tonnes of copper! Chinese teams are already in the DRC and a vast copper mine partnership will soon be up and running (68% for China and 32% for Gécamines). The loans will be used to build 3,000 km of roads and 145 hospitals, restore rail connections and other infrastructure, and refurbish copper mines. Shackled by a billion dollars of debt, Gécamines could not dream of such investment alone. Fortin concluded that this deal, signed after two months of relentless negotiations in China, 'delighted everyone. Everything will happen very quickly so that the Congolese can see fast results'. Copper production should hit a million tonnes in the next five years, making the DRC the second biggest copper producer in the world (after Chile).
African oil for the United States. My second example is oil. It is not only the big oil producers like Nigeria and Sudan that are involved here - the United States predicts that in a few years' time, oil from Africa will meet 25% of US oil needs. They are looking at Kenya as their potential oil transit and trading centre, and were planning to build the African Command of the US armed forces in Kenya. The recent Kenyan conflicts that have been in the media spotlight are reported to have been between forces in favour of or hostile to the US African Command plans. Kenya is aspiring to become a hub for the processing and export of oil and mineral resources across the region and a financial services centre. Oil from southern Sudan would be transported through Kenya to Mombassa (competing with Port Sudan) and from there to Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC. The possible independence of the southern part of Sudan might be part of the United States' strategy vis-à-vis China which controls virtually all north Sudan's oil.
'Partnership' with China. Everyone is talking about the mushrooming presence of China. In addition to loans and investment, it is also exporting cheap consumer goods to Africa. Beijing's ambassador to Senegal, speaking at a recent conference in Dakar organised by the Gabriel Péri Foundation, said that Africans now had new partners, mentioning Chinese investments and loans and Chinese consumer goods at prices that defy all competition (€0-80 for a pair of children's shoes, for example). Some observers stress the negative aspect of the Chinese everywhere in Africa - their loans are increasing Africa's debts; cut-price products bleed local industries dry; dictatorial regimes are often given unconditional backing; cooperation can be in the form of military support and the supply of weapons; and environmental issues are being ignored. I will be returning to this.
But the fact remains that some big African states may well feel that the complicated, conditional agreements being put forward by the EU come at a high price compared with what's on offer from the Chinese.
(F.R.)