It is no accident that the European Council has decided that the “technical work” on the implementation of the institutional provisions of the Lisbon Treaty will “start in Brussels in January on the basis of a work programme which will be presented under the authority of the incoming president of the European Council”, i.e. the prime minister of Slovenia (paragraph 4 of the conclusions of 14 December, see our Special Edition of 16 December). In saying this, the heads of state and government recognised that the institutional innovations, or at least some of them, involve difficulties or raise issues which merit reflection. This was well known, and specific studies have already been devoted to it, the most significant of them (to the best of my knowledge) being that led by Philippe De Schoutheete, which was presented in our bulletin 9552 and commented on in this column at the beginning of December (bulletin 9556).
Risk of a new intergovernmental institutional circuit. Among the innovations decided on, the creation of an extended presidency of the European Council (two and a half years, extendable once, with the president banned from exercising any national mandates) was generally received positively, including by the European Parliament; at the start, however, it caused some confusion. The president of the Commission, Mr Barroso, has acknowledged that he was opposed to it when he was prime minister of his country; his reservations disappeared subsequently in the light of later clarifications. His fears concerned the danger of creating a new circuit, alongside the Commission and Parliament. Uncertainty on this score was also expressed by such figures as Jacques Delors and Pascal Lamy (who talked of a “ticking time bomb” for the Community method) and within several governments. The fear was that there was a danger of the longer-term president having an intergovernmental type of structure for preparing summits which would be outside of the Community institutions and dominated by the larger countries. A shift in this direction would have implications for the summit meetings with larger third countries and on how the Union's foreign policy is conducted in general.
The response to these fears is twofold: a) the preparations for European Councils already takes place largely outside the Community institutions, in parallel circuits; b) the high representative for foreign policy will also be the vice-president of the Commission, which will therefore not be left out. On the contrary: it will be more involved than it is currently.
The reasons behind this innovation remain valid, especially considering Henry Kissinger's famous jest: if I want to call Europe, what number do I call? How can we avoid disorientating the president of the USA, or Vladimir Putin, or other long-term interlocutors who get a passing glimpse of new faces every time they meet Europe?
The key is in the application. The result of the new arrangements will ultimately depend on the way in which they are interpreted. Will the future president have a relationship of trust with the president of the Commission? Will he have ambitions for a new staff of his own, or will he be content to trust in the existing arrangements for the mostpart? Will he have in-depth knowledge of the day-to-day realities of Europe and the Community mechanisms, or will he be more concerned with personal ambition?
Another aspect, which is less essential but nonetheless not insignificant, is the internal significance of the president of the European Council, particularly in those member states which have never exercised that function. The fact of hosting a European summit, even one which is legally “informal”, with all the ceremony and media attention which goes along with it, has a dual impact: making national public opinion more aware of the significance of European construction and its importance for their country; increasing the visibility of that country in the public opinion of other member states. Under the new system even the presidency of the External Relations Council will become stable, being permanently confided to the high representative for the CFSP. The six-monthly national rotation will only continue for informal sessions of sectoral ministerial Councils, which have a much less significant impact. This aspect should not be overlooked. However, reflections should first and foremost concern the structures which the future longer-term presidents of the Council will have at their disposal and the coordination with existing Community structures.
Tomorrow I will look at another institutional reform which is creating even more confusion and reservations: the future composition of the European Commission.
(F.R.)