All is clearer, but nothing is resolved. That wording may appear a little abrupt, but there is no point in hiding reality. At its session in Kigali, the EU-ACP Joint Parliamentary Assembly laid down a few principles, but it did not give any solutions. On the economic partnership agreements (EPAs), it retained one comment and one request: a) it is impossible for these agreements to be concluded before the prescribed cut-off date at the end of the year; b) no ACP should find itself, at the start of next year, with a commercial regime which is less favourable than the one it has now, because the rules of the WTO must not prevail over the letter and spirit of the partnership.
With these affirmations came no effective operational suggestions, and they are partially incompatible with Europe's national obligations. The attitude of the assembly, which is made up of elected members of Parliament of both groupings, is entirely understandable from a political point of view: why should the rules of the WTO take precedence over the commitments of the EU towards the ACP states and over the future of Africa? At first sight, this is an unanswerable argument; but the reality is highly complex. The climax of ideas and rows which we have seen just now should have been seen much earlier. Most of the African countries concerned and the members of the European Parliament seem to be finding out about the guiding principles of the European Commission for the first time, even though in reality, they have known them for years and they have already been the subject of in-depth negotiations.
Inevitable consequences. It is true that the future of Euro-African connections and the development of Africa are of such importance that an open and contradictory debate was necessary, and the clash of opinions is always a positive sign. And it appears more logical not to stick to a legal deadline than to compromise the future of a large proportion of the African countries. But the delay will not be without its repercussions: the situation of the EU with regard to its obligations under the heading of the WTO will be extremely delicate, and reciprocal trade will suffer from it. As of 1 January next year, all third parties will be in a position to attack the preferences granted by the EU to the ACP, and the plaintiffs will be poor or emerging countries calling for a similar deal. If they get it, these countries will then be able to invade the European market, easily wiping out all trace of the less organised and less competitive ACP states from it. It is true that procedures at the WTO take time, and the EU will not find itself in the dock tomorrow; but the European importers will immediately find themselves in a situation of legal uncertainty and, due to fears of penalties at a later date, will hesitate to buy ACP products. This fact was brought up in Kigali by the co-president of the Parliamentary Assembly, Radembino-Coniquet, who voiced his concern at the negative impact of uncertainty over the future trade regime on the behaviour of European importers of ACP products; but his comments did not seem to find an audience.
Ms Kinnock's remarks. A possible fight-back over the deadline of 1 January next year (which European Commissioners Peter Mandelson and Louis Michel see as inevitable) was raised in Kigali by MEP Glenys Kinnock: she pointed out that this date is linked to the assumption that the Doha Round of trade negotiations at the WTO (known as the Development Round) would be concluded before the end of the year, which has now been ruled out. The significance of this reminder is clear: Given that the Doha Round will continue in 2008, the deadline for the preferential regime in favour of the ACPs should be extended accordingly. But to my knowledge, this idea was neither taken up nor developed. The only basis retained by the Declaration of Kigali to call for the current trade regime to remain in place is article 37.6 of the Cotonou Agreement, in virtue of which the EU must offer ACP goods future access to its market under a regime at least as favourable as the current one. This is a political commitment, not a legal one.
Various other aspects. In any case, the commercial plank is just one urgent aspect, it is true, among those which were debated by the Joint Assembly. Tomorrow, I will list the other elements, with a preliminary recommendation: any readers looking for a serviceable overview of the situation should first of all read the summaries of the Kigali sessions, which were published in our bulletin last week and which cover all aspects, including the declarations of the two European commissioners, the question of Chinese presence in Africa, etc. It is the lessons to be learned from this general debate that I intend to write about tomorrow. (F.R.)