Small countries' concerns. We didn't have to wait long. The debate on the institutional dangers that could spring from having a European Council Presidency in place for up to five years (see yesterday's column) has already been the subject of intervention at ministerial level by Belgian Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht. Speaking in Dublin before the Irish Institute of European Affairs, Mr De Gucht affirmed that the long-standing president “will play a central rule in preparing the European Council and the various summits with our strategic partners. One can expect that this function will cast some shadow on the president of the Commission whose role will be de facto limited to traditional Community aspects” (i.e. economic issues). Answering questions raised by journalists from his country, he had gone on to say: “I imagine that the president of the Commission will still attend the G8 summits” (meaning that he was not too sure whether he would or not).
One can understand the concern of the Union's small and medium sized countries - they fear the “large” countries will in practice contribute to a sort of monopoly in the management of European foreign policy. In reality, the EU will have a third person to conduct this policy: the High Representative for CFSP, who will also be vice-president of the European Commission and at the same time chair the External Relations Council. This has not escaped Mr De Gucht's notice as one can see from the headlines in “Le Soir”: “Two presidents and one high representative to embody the 27 - a three-headed monster?” The permanent president of the European Council will not himself negotiate with third countries as that will be the task of the High Representative. The question is therefore: how can such a complex construction work in practice? Mr De Gucht admitted to journalists that “many practical questions remain unanswered” and that “the practical aspects often conceal political options, which will be the European external policy for decades to come”.
Real problems. The fact that Javier Solana (and his successors after him) will be part of the Commission, the guarantor of general interest, should ensure that the opinions and interests of all member states will be taken into consideration. But the functioning of the “three-headed monster” remains to be defined. When, before the referendums in France and the Netherlands, the Commission and Council had begun preparing the future “common diplomatic service”, the difficulties of the undertaking immediately became all too apparent. As one knows, this service will be composed of officials from both institutions and national diplomats. How can they be put together to form a whole?
Internal adjustments to the way the Commission works looks as though they will be just as difficult. The principle of a vice-president responsible for all aspects of external relations is reasonable as the current situation is illogical. The European negotiator changes according to whether negotiation is on political aspects, trade or development aid. But, for the third country concerned, these are all parts of a whole! Will the High Representative, in his capacity as vice-president of the Commission, have the right to make a prior verification of the documents and intentions of commissioners responsible for external relations, trade and development, or will these commissioners keep the power to submit them directly to the college? And, when presiding the External Relations Council, will he be able to distance himself from the Commission's position that he himself would have approved earlier as vice-president?
Pascal Lamy, who, as one knows, had served as European commissioner before being appointed director general of the WTO (World Trade Organisation), recently said that the creation of the stable European Council president is a “time bomb waiting to go off” under the Community edifice.
If objectives do not coincide … I do not believe that all these complications are necessarily insuperable. Europe has settled more complex and tricky issues in the past. Everything depends on whether or not there is the political will to move forward towards common objectives. Although it is the intention of certain member states to return to an intergovernmental way of working, to reduce the powers of the European institutions and to torpedo the Community mechanisms, all compromise would be practically impossible. And the formulas involving, one way or another, the formation of a vanguard would become inevitable. It already exists elsewhere - one only has to mention the eurozone, whose autonomy and strengthening are being studied. The problems cited will occur at any rate when the time comes.
Let's wait and see first of all whether the new Treaty is adopted this week and whether it has then been ratified. Depending on these results, the fundamental choices may then become inevitable.
(F.R.)