Europe's decisions regarding the Lebanon and what Europe is actually accomplishing in re-establishing normality there, has, in the different political communities and press, received a very broad and positive welcome. Even if this does not involve a truly “common action”, commentators have described it as being the first example of putting EU foreign policy into practice, which in their opinion has been so talked about but previously inexistent. The importance of the commitments made by Member States in the European context regarding action in Lebanon, and the positive effects, despite the uncertainties and dangers, which can result from this action, explain and justify these judgements. Nonetheless, excessive conclusions should not be drawn, which could lead to disappointment and demoralisation. We can see that CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy), and ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) even more so, are moving forward and gradually being consolidated but we have to be realistic and not ignore the obstacles and limits, especially the inevitable pace at which this development occurs.
Public opinion's support. The starting point is a solid one: in all surveys on citizens' expectations from Europe, foreign and defence policy are among the priorities. The same can be said for the debates (parliamentary and others), in seminars and conferences and in the press. Jean-Luc Dehaene, vice president of the Convention responsible for drawing up the Constitutional Treaty, again recently affirmed that “I have never heard any criticism of issues related to strengthening Europe's foreign and defence policy”. These fields for the vast majority of the public represent the “new frontier” of European construction and the putting it into practice would hugely contribute to improving the international situation and resolving existing crises.
Limits. Nevertheless, we ought not to imagine that the EU has already or, in the foreseeable future, will be able to have a genuine common policy that functions according to the “Community method” (which would grant the Commission the exclusive right of proposals, co-decision to the European Parliament/Council, with decisions made at majority voting). I am well aware that majority decision in these fields are sometimes called for, even by MEPs but in my opinion, it is unrealistic and could ultimately result in demagogy. The responsibility of deciding on peace or war, deciding on possible armed interventions, of calling on citizens to put their lives on the line, is up to national governments and parliaments. We should not impose participation in military action on a country by decisions reached at majority voting. European foreign policy is not built on the same rules as those for agricultural or transport policy.
The lessons of Jacques Delors. Let's not forget the remarks made by Jacques Delors in his “Memoirs”: European countries “have their traditions, their geopolitical history, privileged relations with certain parts of the world. How can they be asked to abandon all this for an artificial merger in common foreign policy? However, faced with certain events and problems, it is possible and desirable to consider that the interests of European countries are common and that they do their best to succeed together”. He therefore called for the divergences that can appear to not be transformed into a drama “but, on the contrary, to build common actions every time there is a convergence of analyses, interests and aspiration…We can only progress through clearly defined common actions on which consensus is possible”.
The way forward suggested by Mr Delors therefore consists of two factors: a) developing the tradition of working together, discussing before taking national decisions and striving to reconcile positions; b) implementation of common actions when in agreement, with the possibility that some Member States will not participate in them. This way is being pursued in practice and is beginning to yield encouraging results.
The most striking and dramatic example of radical divergences between Member States was that of the war in 2003 against Iraq, resulting in the splitting up of countries that supported participating in the US initiative from those that opposed it. Although CFSP at the time consisted of decision making made at majority voting, these mechanisms blew up as the result of a possible vote would have been rejected by the United Kingdom, in the event of a vote against participation or by France and Germany in the case of voting for participation. The effect would have been devastating and all progress would have been at a standstill for a long time. It is absolutely meaningless to “transform divergences that will still be inevitable, into dramas.
Regrets about the Constitutional treaty. If Europe had the Constitutional treaty it would now be much better equipped in areas of foreign and defence policy. The innovations developed by the Convention and which were definitively accepted by all the different governments go further than the initial ambitions: a foreign affairs minister “in charge of external relations and the coordination of other aspects of the Union's external action” who would at the same time be a vice president at the Commission; a European diplomatic corps; a common defence policy ensuring that the Union has “an operational capability drawing from civilian and military resources”; “structured cooperation” open to Member States prepared to participate in it and fulfil certain conditions that would constitute a genuine autonomous “defence avant-guard” with its own decision making capacity; “closer cooperation” including a mutual assistance clause in which, if a participating country is attacked, “ the other participating countries will come to its aid and assistance by all the means they have, military and otherwise”.
The terminology is certainly not always the most joyful and implementation of the provisions cited will not be easy; the preparatory work started before the French referendum shed light on the difficulties and divergences regarding the role of the foreign affairs minister at the Commission and the composition of the common diplomatic service and how it would work, as well as with regard to the list of countries participating in “closer cooperation”. But the design was clear and audacious to the point that, personally, I do not believe that the future re-launch of the Constitutional treaty, if this occurs, could go further; it is likely, on the other hand, that some backtracking happens. The draft also had the merit of responding to an essential concern of Jacques Delors, as mentioned in his “Memoirs” referred to above, “when the European Union is involved in foreign policy it should have all its advantages in the same hand: diplomacy, of course, but also trade policy, financial resources, multiple aid for development and humanitarian action”. This demand would have been covered by wearing the “two hats” of the foreign affairs minister (who would have been a Commission vice president at the same time), whatever the difficulties and ambiguities of this duplication of tasks.
Real progress. The blockage of the Constitutional treaty has prevented the described progress and I don't think that my generation will see this progress, perhaps our grand children will. But in the meantime, the CFSP and ESDP are, in substance, moving in the direction anticipated by Jacques Delors, even if the institutional framework is not as he would have wished. This also proves that when developments correspond to obvious necessities supported by the public, the pettiness of politicians (I am thinking of those who worked to get the Constitutional treaty rejected) can not oppose it indefinitely.
In this column I do not intend to summarise the achievements and workings of the CFSP, on which our bulletin regularly reports and which are included in the texts of High Representative Javier Solana (elaborated in general with the European Commission), contained in the declarations of the European Council or the Foreign Affairs Committee and which are the basis for the Union's strategies with regard to countries or groups of countries: “European Neighbourhood Policy”, the strategic partnership with Russia and so forth. All this represents the conceptual aspect of CFSP, which was very sensitively developed and opens the way to action. However, the essential development can be seen in the concrete and tangible progress in security and defence matters, which considerably supersede, in my opinion, the perception the public has of it: who, outside the milieus directly concerned and the specialists, before European involvement in Lebanon, were aware of the level of progress?
The first aspect of the Jacques Delors formula is already operational: the tradition being established of discussing a priori all subjects. This is what Michel Barnier (who chaired the “defence” group at the Convention) called the “European reflex” and which has practically been achieved. At a level of Ambassadors, COPS (which in security and defence plays the role the famous COREPER plays in other areas) meets regularly, as well as other specialist bodies. Cooperation is increasingly extending into essential and inter-connected domains such as the arms industry, despite understandable political and strategic difficulties and rough patches in the relationship with the USA and the colossal economic interests at stake.
The British presence. One essential political aspect characterises this evolution: the increasingly active participation of all Member States. The so-called “neutral” countries have become much more subtle in their reservations and participate with seriousness and conviction in many elements of ESDP, including Denmark, despite its “opting out”. Above all, the reticence and reservations characterising the British attitude in most other areas of European activity do not impact on the CFSP and even less so on the ESPD. On the contrary, the United Kingdom is in this area, indispensable and often in the avant-guard. I will indicate how and why tomorrow.
(F.R.)