Recent developments in the sensitive issue of Turkey's accession to the EU bring out the real problems, beyond the statements of principle for or against, which too often form the main part of the stances taken. Recently Jean-Claude Juncker said that it could in fact be Turkey itself which gives up on full accession, because of all that this would involve. This opinion from one of the key players in recent and current European history is of comfort to me, because I feel that, from the Turkish point of view, is ill-timed, even leaving aside the perplexities and reservations from the European side. I am not a last minute convert to this position. That Mr Juncker holds a similar position has encouraged me to explain at greater length my reasoning, without any of the reticence and care that would be politically advisable.
My feeling is that a growing section of political, religious, cultural and even military opinion in Turkey is beginning to realise that joining the EU would require changes which would be partly incompatible with the political, psychological and strategic situation of their country, and that the ideal solution to avoid conflict and misunderstanding would be for the two sides to come to the reciprocal and consensual position that full accession is not the best way forward for future relations. Some of the reasons from the Turkish point of view.
1. Political autonomy. Turkey plays, and could increasingly play in the future, a key role in the huge region of independent Turkish-speaking republics born out of the break-up of the USSR. Even if the EU does not have (and will not have for a long time to come) a genuine common foreign policy, European political coordination will become progressively wider and, it is to be hoped, more binding. Turkish interests in this part of the world do not necessarily coincide in every case with those of Europe (except perhaps in the American design). Several commentators and political scientists believe it would be better for Turkey if it had an autonomous role, taking account of its historic, linguistic and other links.
2. Autonomy in energy negotiations. The comments above are all the more valid when one considers that politics have become more and more closely linked with energy. Turkey sits between the production zones (the oil, and especially gas, reserves of countries like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are vast) and the main import zone - the EU. Only by passing through Turkey can Caucasian gas reach Europe without going through Russia or Iran. From the Turkish point of view, a certain freedom of action is preferable to the tight Community rules controlled by the European Commission and would allow the development of strong industrial and technical cooperation projects with the governments and companies of the European countries. There are already several exciting examples within the framework of the current EU-Turkey association.
3. Application of Community rules. The application of Community rules, under the control of the European institutions in general and the European Parliament in particular, involves the requirement to grant rights far beyond what currently exists to minorities (the Kurds in particular but not exclusively): linguistic, cultural and increasingly political autonomy would have to become more general, and would mean the loss of national authorities' exclusive control. A foretaste of the consequences can already be found in a few relatively minor issues raised periodically in the European institutions, for example the confiscation by Turkish authorities of the Saint George Koudounas monastery, and, more generally, full freedom (right of legal entity, right of ownership, right to provide a religious education, etc.) for non-Islamic communities.
It is obvious that, from the EU, and particularly MEPs', point of view, any pressure to bring freedom (of expression, of religious observance, etc.) and any progress made in this direction are positive and to be welcomed, and it is normal that Kurdish communities (in their regions of origin as well as in Member States as immigrants) want to push as much as possible for accession. But my aim today is to try to understand the situation from the Turkish point of view.
4. Political freedom and full democracy. The form of democracy implied by the status of EU Member State (and already largely observed in Turkey), strengthens, at least provisionally, the influence of Islam in the governance of the country. The last elections proved this. Turkey is not alone in this; but it is a phenomenon that is much more marked in other Muslim countries, with examples there for everyone to see (even if we pretend to pay no attention to them or forget them). Almost everywhere where European pressure has encouraged free elections, whether in Algeria, where only the annulment of the second round of voting prevented an Islamic government from coming to power), in Egypt (progress of the Muslim brotherhood) or in Palestine (with the victory by Hamas), a large proportion of the population has chosen, for partly valid reasons, political forces close to Islamism.
Certainly, the situation in Turkey must not be seen as the same as in other countries: Islamic extremism is much weaker, terrorism is vigorously tackled and controlled, no one is considering imposing Sharia law and amendments to the national Constitution have brought greater freedom. During the “Danish caricatures” affair, everyone could see and appreciate the difference between the moderate reactions in Turkey and the fanaticism in other countries where the response became violence, even in Europe, against our freedom of expression. So let us not lump everything together. The developments mentioned above, though, gave cause for reflection on the very notion of democracy, with the reaffirmation of the principle that freedom of elections is only one factor in determining whether or not a country is democratic. Other factors are every bit as important: freedom of expression, the rights of the opposition, respect for minorities, the possibility to change the parties in power. Only when all these conditions are met can one speak about the acquisition of democracy and freedom.
5. Question mark over internal Turkish cohesion. Officially and viewed from outside, Turkey is unanimous in its desire to accede to the EU. Reality, however, could be slightly different. There is no doubt that the organised economic world is fully committed to accession; indeed it is one of the motors. The organisation of Turkish industrialists, TUSIAD, with its office in Brussels and a competent and efficient delegation, presents a positive image of the country, representing a body of open, modern firms, in line with European standards. Moreover, even on the diplomatic level, Turkey has almost always been represented in Brussels. This is already Europe. I don't recall ever having to raise a religious issue either with diplomats or with industrialists. Religion is a private matter, beliefs are personal.
Questions can be asked, however, about internal cohesion. The military, guardians of the secular legacy of Ataturk, are silent and respect civil authority to which they are subject, in line with Western standards. Would this silence continue if the position of the civil authorities on secularism changed? I don't know who could answer with any certainty. It is true that it is never fair to try to judge people's intentions and, as far as I know, there is nothing in the present circumstances that could justify doing so. But I recall an ironic sentence from the Turkish Prime Minister on the fact that young women, university students, would have the right to wear the veil in the United States, but not in Turkish universities.
As for the industrialists, local sources in Turkey suggest that, in negotiations with the EU, they would like the civil authorities to be more concerned with economic issues rather than with the socio-religious ones, which are the source of such controversy, slowing and sometimes poisoning the talks. The industrialists would prefer to avoid recurrent criticisms from the European institutions over some of Ankara's attitudes, and they let it be known, to the point of provoking the annoyance of the young economy minister Ali Babacan.
Reflection whose time will come. Faced with the extent of the change required by accession, some Turkish, as well as European, circles wonder if it would not be better to improve and strengthen current links with the EU, particularly the Customs union already set up and association schemes in general. This thought may seem unacceptable at the moment, but it is one that will gradually grow.
At a meeting of European and Turkish journalists organised by the European Commission's representation to Ankara in April, some Turkish journalists wondered about the negotiations that were going on. In their opinion, there was no real negotiation: Turkey had to adapt to Community demands. They were not wrong, but how could things be otherwise? The acquis communautaire exists, the EU cannot review it at the request of a candidate country. But the candidate country could feel that too much was being asked of it. And that it was better to keep to an apparently less ambitious kind of relations, and safeguard its soul. Clearly, I am not referring to that part of Turkey which includes Istanbul, that magical meeting place of cultures and traditions which have moulded it over the centuries, nor to the Mediterranean coast as a whole, but to the immensity of the Asian part of the country which is not and never will be truly European. (F.R.)