The value of the first phase of the “reflection period” on the future of Europe and the Constitutional Treaty has until now been highlighting the deep-seated differences between national approaches and illustrating the fact that some orientations have very little future. The exploration carried out over the last few days in this section allows for some conclusions to be made which are not altogether negative.
Indispensable exercise. In the absence of the shock of the French and Dutch “no” votes, would official Europe have had the lucidity and courage to admit to what extent an increasing section of public opinion had broken off from and lost any sense of the European project? For younger generations, the revolution represented by reconciliation and definitive peace between countries that had previously only torn each other apart for centuries, does not have much importance (we are not surprised by what we have grown up with) and does not represent an objective for rallying around. Confrontation with public opinion has now become inevitable.
Some orientations on the future. It is normal that France is one of the Member States having one of the liveliest debates because the “no” vote from the French people lays largely behind current uncertainties. Certain suggested solutions, however, raise a number of problems. The Nicolas Sarkosy formula whereby six of the “big counties” of the EU compose the driving force for revival, neglects the fact that two of these countries, the United Kingdom and Poland are presently very far away from any idea of strengthening the Union and it ignores the unavoidably essential role played by small countries in European construction. Half a century proves that new ideas (and sometimes public figures can push them forward) often come from these countries and their reduced size is more conducive to “European reasoning” as they are less weighed down by national interests. Defining the common interest on the margins of institutional mechanisms of the Community method is unthinkable.
Another French orientation consists of choosing some reforms in the Constitutional treaty within the current texts in force but this would reduce the effect of the Constitution to a very small institutional reform that fails to take into account the overall balance of this treaty and the reciprocity of concessions which made it possible. According to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing this would involve an unravelling of the Constitution.
The eternal question of the avant-guard. In a way that is more or less explicit, most of the projects supporting a deepening of the Union take into consideration the hypothesis of going ahead anyway, with the 25 if possible, with fewer if they do not want to or cannot follow. But the modalities envisaged are not in any way uniform. What we call a “Europe à la carte” would be based on a series of initiatives in which countries that wanted to would participate, with each of them choosing their own menu. It would inevitably be founded on extensive inter-governmental cooperation and would destroy the institutional unity of the Union. Most of those that speak about an avant-guard have never taken the trouble to really analyse the concept. I still believe that the only valid formula is that of Jacques Delors, which is based on “differentiation” and the vocation of everyone taking part in each task. How many times in this section has the Delors concept been described and commented upon? Those who are interested should consult this section in our bulletin 9110 of 17 January last.
Ratification. At present, the constitutional treaty has been ratified by 14 Member States. Some observers, notably within the European Parliament, hope that the figure of 20 ratifications (planned so that the European Council can re-examine the situation and “difficulties” of countries lagging behind) can be rapidly achieved. Finland and Portugal, however, two countries where the yes vote is almost a done deal, recently announced that they are slowing down the procedure. The Finnish Parliament will soon confirm its support for ratification but without formally moving towards it and Portugal will be organising its referendum a bit later. These two countries obviously hope to wait for the adjustments that can be brought to the current text but consider that these arrangements will only be “marginal” (see bulletin 9146). Ireland, Sweden and perhaps Denmark are also expected to confirm their yes votes but neither the United Kingdom, Poland nor the Netherlands are for the moment planning on ratifying the treaty.
The objective of 20 ratifications is looking somewhat like Scotch mist.
(F.R.)