There is a clear divide between the ambitious objectives of the financial perspectives 2007-2013 (relaunch of European construction, including central and eastern Europe in the Community economic fabric, new orientations for innovation and research, and so on) and the limited and, on first sight, petty-minded debates within the European Council. José Manuel Barroso recently used an English saying to describe the situation: "you can like haggis without necessarily wanting to see how it is made". The same is true of European budgetary affairs: "squabbling about big money in is not particularly savoury. The tone rises, accusations fly. Statistics are tweaked to serve one's own interests". And reading the budget of the Union is about as exciting as reading a telephone directory. But behind the figures, the President of the Commission pointed out, is everything that Europe and its citizens could want; helping scientists to develop safer and cleaner energy sources; fostering the management of rural areas (which are the main part of Europe's territory); creating networks which will transform life for outlying and remote regions; protecting nature and biodiversity; giving the poor countries drugs to fight AIDS, and so on. At the same time, however, with the current situation of the national budgets, you have to understand why each government will fight tooth and nail to defend the money of its taxpayers. And so, enough sarcasm about the problems with the debate (not all that different from the sarcasm which accompanied the previous financial perspectives, if I remember correctly). Let us dispense with easy populist rhetoric, which always blames the neighbour for any obstacles, and let us try to look reality in the eye.
I believe that success or failure will ride on: a) one fundamental dossier, that of the "British rebate"; b) several details, which may appear insignificant when compared with the whole shooting match, but which are of vital importance for various of the Member States; c) a politico-institutional issue. Let us sum up these three points:
1. How far can Tony Blair go with the British rebate? An additional effort on top of what has already been proposed would open up the way to an overall compromise. For my money, it would be fruitless to demand a definitive legal amendment of the current regime from the United Kingdom; this will only be possible within the context of the reflection on the own resources of the EU and on the very structure of the budget, which is due to kick off in 2008 or 2009 and which will, in particular, cover agricultural expenditure. In the meantime, Mr Blair has agreed to give up 8 billion EUR. On first sight, this gesture may appear generous; in reality, it represents just a proportion of the increase in the British rebate which would come about if we continue to apply the current mechanism in its current form. The figures put on the table by Ms Grybauskaité, Commissioner for the Budget, speak for themselves: this rebate would rise from 5.4 billion (2004 figures) to 7.7 billion a year from 2007 to 2013, but the 8 billion promised by Tony Blair covers the entire period. It is not hard to see why the three largest contributors to this rebate (France with 29%, Italy with 24% and Spain with 14%) cannot agree to this. France has called upon Tony Blair to raise his offer to 14 billion and to make the change to the mechanism definitive as of now, and Spain is proposing to return to the formula included in the Juncker compromise, which is to set a ceiling for this rebate at 5.5 billion a year. If it wants a decision to be made, the United Kingdom will have to take a step in this direction. For Tony Blair, it is above all an internal issue, due to the unfortunate climate of the vast majority of British political circles and the press. And yet it is vital. How far does he think he will be able to go??
2. National problems. If the sum of money Tony Blair is able to put on the table is satisfactory, it will help to resolve most of the specific problems of the various countries, even though some of these are delicate, and it will then no longer be necessary to cut the budgetary allocation for rural development, a future policy.
3. The EP's dilemma. The politico-institutional problem is that of the European Parliament. It is entirely understandable that it will try to obtain the maximum. But it will not get everything it is asking for. If it finds itself faced with a compromise which can be agreed to by all the Member States, including those from Central and Eastern Europe, would it be reasonable for the EP to fight against this compromise? Stating that in the absence of multi-annual perspectives, we could fall back on annual budgets, is a polemic argument, but not a reality, because the first to fall victim of this would be the new Member States; the very countries it is hoping to defend. The Parliament must steer clear of overbidding, because this is not a position it will be able to hold onto right to the bitter end. (F.R.)