In his proposal on the financial perspectives 2007 -2013, Tony Blair was shrewd enough to make a few concessions to practically all of the other Member States, to try to reduce the risks of outright opposition of principle much as possible. Inevitably, these concessions go against the spirit of Community ambitions, as the Presidents of both the Commission and the European Parliament have pointed out. José Manuel Barroso described the draft as unacceptable because it is unrealistic, as being good only for a mini-Europe and not for the strong Europe we need. As for Josep Borrell, he made the following enlightening remark: "some of the Member States should take care not to win on the budget and lose on the European project". But which Heads of Government would, under the current circumstances, be sensitive to this kind of remark? Mr Verhofstadt and Mr Juncker perhaps, but I can't see many others. And they are the ones that make the decisions.
Here are a few considerations about factors which may influence the yes or no of the European Council at the end of next week.
1. Sacrifice called for of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Presenting the text, the British minister Jack Straw hammered home the point that the EU's effort in favour of these countries will, under the Blair project, remain impressive. This is true: 150 billion EUR over seven years. According to certain observers, this represents the absolute maximum these countries will be able to absorb under good conditions, avoiding any waste. According to unofficial indications, the Polish authorities, during discussions held last week, indicated that Poland could agree to a reduction of 5% in the sums allocated to it: 57 billion EUR instead of 60. As a last resort, Tony Blair proposed 56 billion. And the sacrifice called for of the other new Member States is, in terms of percentage, somewhat similar. Would the difference between offer and demand justify failure? These countries would be gaining the certain knowledge that the cohesion programmes would definitely be in force on 1 January 2007, and that complete mechanisms of support to agriculture would, at the same time, come into being. However, the small amount of experience already garnered indicates that this latter support becomes inefficient the fastest and that it would allow the effective relaunch of agriculture throughout central and eastern Europe, under ecologically satisfactory conditions. For the time being, it is quite understandable that the governments of these countries are complaining (see this column yesterday), but they could agree to make an effort. It remains to be seen just how far they are prepared to go.
2. Concessions to the "net contributor" countries. Tony Blair has made an effort to please the net contributor countries. Sweden and the Netherlands are virtually fully satisfied, as they are calling for a reduction in their contribution (it is particularly high compared to their level of population), even though the Dutch government says that it is still dissatisfied. For Germany, the advantage would lie in the reduction of its overall contribution to the perspectives: if this contribution is reduced as outlined in the Blair project, the proportion of the number-one contributor would be proportionately reduced. In favour of France, the concession lies in keeping the agricultural budget unchanged (market expenditure and direct payments), which will be paid for by reducing credits for rural development, which, sadly, is of less concern to the government. Italy would enjoy certain amount of flexibility concerning the duration of aid to the regions lagging behind. Obviously, everybody still says they are dissatisfied, but with the odd nip and tuck here and there, a compromise seems within view.
3. Compensation for Spain and a British concession. The losses suffered by Spain under the heading of regional funding (Regional Fund and Cohesion Fund) would be partially cancelled out by support for research and innovation, valued at 2.8 billion EUR. The United Kingdom, for its part, would pay 8 billion EUR (over seven years) as an additional contribution to the new Member States, it being understood that legally, the "British rebate" would not be reduced. It could be reduced later on, if the common agricultural policy is radically revised.
A second-rate Europe? As there is no such thing as a miracle, the above-mentioned concessions and a reduction of the overall envelope would be achieved at the expense of European ambitions. Money for the Lisbon Strategy (including research) would not be increased, rural development would be slowed down, and so on. From these points of view, the label of a "second-rate Europe" would be well justified. This could be acceptable if it meant that other prospects would open up instead: relaunch of the constitutional treaty, new initiatives on the part of willing Member States under the heading of "differentiation", etc. But this is another matter altogether. (F.R.)