In the affair of the possible opening of accession negotiations with Turkey, we should go beyond the simple alternative "yes" or "no". Otherwise, whatever the European Commission's decision first of all, and that of the Summit afterwards, there will be serious fractures between member states and even within some of them, with an additional risk of considerable repercussions for the ratification of the Constitution (see this column of yesterday). Certainly the EU will have to make a choice when the time comes, but first it should take number of precautions, in particular:
1. Not to consider respecting the "Copenhagen criteria" (regarding liberty, pluralist democracy, human rights etc.) as the only element of assessment. This respect is obviously crucial and it makes it possible to maintain the pressure on Ankara to carry through reform; but other issues are also a priority. The current debate proves that the questions being asked by the authorities, political groups, historians and even public opinion go beyond analysing gradual and changing progress towards European political standards, to include permanent factors concerning the effects of Turkish accession on European integration and the possibility of the Union maintaining its political ambitions come what may. The state of reform in Turkey is by definition ever-changing. A few days ago, several political groups and non-governmental organisations declared themselves against opening negotiations because of a Turkish bill to make adultery a crime. The bill has just been dismissed. Is this sufficient reason to pass suddenly from a "no" to a "yes"? Whatever their importance, the details which can change from day to day cannot be a definitive criterion. That is not how we decide a permanent change for European integration.
2. Make a clear distinction between the opening of negotiations and their outcome. Most observers seem to think that once negotiations are opened, accession has been achieved. This theory must be rejected. Turkey itself could reach the conclusion that accession is not the right formula. This is not a personal opinion. In his book "L'Europe, une puissance dans la mondialisation", Pierre Moscovici wrote in 2001: "It is highly possible, indeed it is even a realistic prediction, that Ankara could end up choosing in its own interests to have the status of a privileged partner on the margins of the Union; a status which preserves its political autonomy and its regional power". More recently, Wolfgang Schäuble declared in an interview: "I am convinced that, once the Turks fully realise the implications of accession on the autonomy of their country and their national sovereignty, many voices will oppose it vigorously", adding that, if negotiations are opened, "the two solutions - full entry or privileged partnership - must be clearly planned from the start".
3. Leave Ankara time for assessment. I believe, like Messrs Moscovici and Schäuble and many other (who cannot all be quoted here), that Turkey is not yet fully aware of all the limitations which accession would place on its sovereignty, of the number of decisions which would be subject to authorisation from Brussels (for example concerning oil pipelines), of the direct implications of Community law in the Kurdish and Cypriot affairs and also the significance of the CFSP and ESDP. I read with interest what Michel Rocard (among others) wrote on the links between Turkey and some of the former Soviet republics, on its influence and interests in the region, and I came to the conclusion that Turkey needs political autonomy in order to play a role in line with its ambitions.
For the moment Ankara sees only accession and rejects any other formula. This is understandable, but I believe that the situation will change, especially if the "privileged partnership" ensures most of the economic advantages that Turkey expects and if it includes the same obligations in terms of reform.
4. The legal argument is not a priority. We sometimes emphasise that Europe cannot renege on the promises made to turkey and the commitments undertaken with regard to it. This is a justified observation, but we should not forget the comment of Mr Bourlanges and several others that what Europe promised was participation in the European Economic Community, the former EEC, and that in practice this commitment has already been honoured with the customs union. This already exists and would be completed and perfected by the "privileged partnership". The legal argument is therefore not crucial.
Conclusion: if we want to avoid partisans from both sides pulling away from each other with a bang in a few weeks, the Commission's report should take account of the aspects mentioned above and not definitively settle the issue of accession.