A saga of mistrust. After having underlined the political and psychological significance of approving the Constitution as well as the prospects that it opens up for a pro-European upsurge in public opinion (see this same column in our special edition yesterday), one must also recognise the negative aspects of what has happened. Such aspects include not only a number of elements of the text approved but also the atmosphere of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) itself which was morose, at times tense and unpleasant. What a difference with the festive air that surrounded the conclusion of the Convention just one year ago!
Above all, the whole discussion on majority voting procedure within the Council was a real "saga of mistrust". Concrete substance was to be given to the principle of double majority (States and populations), representing the very nature of the Union. In order to reach a compromise, it was necessary to accompany this principle with such a large number of complementary provisions, exemptions and procedures that the final result had become unreadable for citizens and unworthy of a constitutional text. Experience proves that never in any real Community situation would such strange majorities form between, for example, all the small countries against the large, or a coalition of three large countries against all the others. Composite majorities always form around each controversial dossier. If one looks, for example, at the financial perspectives, the Netherlands is on the side of the large countries. But mutual mistrust has meant that nearly every country carries out complex and purely hypothetical calculations that have lead to the result achieved. Instead of seeking a mechanism that will facilitate decisions and flexibility, most are only concerned by the relative weight of their own country. Furthermore, some of the post-IGC comments by heads of government were explicit on this (read for example that by Polish Prime Minister Marek Belka in our Special Edition on Sunday, p.4).
Who wants to move forward and who does not?. Similar considerations are valid for the debates (extra-IGC, it is true, but in fact the meeting formed a whole) on the new Commission president. I will come back to this specific issue. For now, I shall simply make a few general remarks. Mistrust in this case did not concern the rivalry between large and small countries but the fear of a common Franco-German front which, with the support of a number of close countries, such as Belgium and perhaps Spain, would endeavour to form a "directorate" on fundamental policy direction. President Chirac and Chancellor Schröder challenge all hesitation in this direction but Tony Blair was quite explicit in his final declarations, speaking of a new Europe where the United Kingdom can form alliances (mainly with the new Member States) and feel "at home" as there will be no consensus for more integration (see page 5 of the above-mentioned bulletin).
There was no direct response to the remarks by Tony Blair but Jacques Chirac had replied indirectly placing emphasis on improving strengthened cooperation: What counts, he said, is progress in strengthened cooperation, which will make it possible to take action with those that wish to go further faster (see same bulletin, page 4).
It would seem, therefore, that the division, if there is to be a division, is not between France and Germany on one hand and the United Kingdom on the other, but between those who in any case intend to move forward along the road of integration and those who are opposed to this. I do not believe there will be an immediate split, but it would become inevitable if any major country does not ratify the Constitution, and even sooner if enhanced cooperation advocated by some countries is not approved, as, in this case, it would be achieved on the fringe of the Union as was the case for the Schengen Agreement, before being reintegrated into the context of the EU. This would also have happened for single currency if it had proved impossible to achieve it within the Union).
A move forward despite everything. The above analysis is not reassuring. Approval of the Constitution has not smoothed out the fundamental differences and the continuation of deliberations on who is to become the president of the Commission will be neither pleasant nor easy. I do not, however, change my fundamentally positive opinion on the Constitution. Even though the Heads of Government did not give the impression they were aware of the fact that they were living a historic moment in European construction, we must not allow all the difficulties, pettiness and failings make us forget that the Constitution mainly brings: a) progress in the democratic functioning of Europe, with the Parliament becoming co-legislator with equal rights (or almost) with the Council; b) the principle of " double majority" for Council decisions; and c) strengthening of the strengthened cooperation instrument which safeguards future prospects. (F.R.)