Two formulae, both wrong. When I fleetingly took stock of the state of play in negotiations on the Constitution (see this column yesterday), I left aside the specific issue of the European Commission. The reason is that, according to the available indications, the future composition of the Commission will be part of the overall compromise on the outstanding institutional problems, covering the modalities of majority voting within the Council and the number of MEPs per Member State. In this overall compromise, the main concession allowed to the small countries concerned the Commission's composition: the principle of "one Commissioner of each nationality" would be prolonged, and the eventual system of fewer Commissioners than Member States done on "equal rotation". Do I really need to repeat how very dangerous I feel either of these formulae could be for the Commission itself? The formula of one Commissioner per country is justified, even indispensable, for now, because public opinion in the new Member States demands it: the absence of a "national" Commissioner would be seen by these countries as a downgrade. Their presence in the College is needed, not just to allow each country's voice to be heard in Brussels and its national sensitivities put across, but also to allow each Commissioner to spread the word about the realities of the European Union in their country of origin, to explain some badly-understood decisions and clarify the advantages of membership of the Union.
But this formula is dangerous in the long term, because it is arbitrary and lacks legitimacy. The number of Member States is partly artificial: Czechoslovakia used to be a country, now it is two, and the number of Commissioners has doubled. The former Yugoslavia used to be a country, now it's five, and the number of Commissioners will automatically multiply as and when they join. And it's not over, because Montenegro and Kosovo also have one eye on independence. For its part, Cyprus is still divided; the Turkish Republic of Cyprus is recognised only by Turkey; but nobody knows what the future holds. There are voices in Scotland, the Basque country and elsewhere, calling for independence. Whatever happens, a College of 35 members and more (a figure which could be reached without the creation of any more States) is no longer an Executive, it's an Assembly, and the weight of the large countries, which account for the lion's share of the population, power and financial wherewithal in the EU will be negligible: five or six out of 30 or 35.
The formula of equal rotation is even worse. It means that any changes to the Commission are determined by the rotation of nationalities rather than the quality of the candidates. A new Jacques Delors wouldn't be entitled to a third term, because he would have to make way for a Commissioner of a pre-established nationality, even if he or she is inexperienced and/or ill-qualified.
An idea from Rome. I concede that it is impossible to put together an acceptable, detailed formula, in a couple of weeks. But there is nothing to say that this formula needs to be included in the Constitution, which could just go so far as to lay down principles and criteria, and leave it up to the institutions to add the details at a later date, via a procedure offering genuine guarantees to all. I am convinced that once the new Member States have sufficient experience of how the EU works and the role of the Commission, they will take part constructively in the definition of the appropriate formula (which, if not laid down in the Constitution, can always be revised and improved). In the meantime, the reflection continues and an ingenious and interesting suggestion was put forward in Italy by the "Group of Ten" (chaired by former European Commissioner Cesidio Guazzaroni and of which former Vice-President of the Commission, Filippo Pandolfi, former EP Secretary General Enrico Vinci and former permanent representative to the EU Piero Calamia are members). This group suggests that the future Commission be made up of 15 to 18 Commissioners, each in relation to "a significant proportion of the population of the Union". Smaller countries would therefore have to group together in twos (or threes, in some cases) to appoint a Commissioner, with rotation between themselves. This would encourage regional groupings, "indispensable in a Union of in excess of 25 members".
Let's be realistic: it will only be possible to move towards formula of this kind (or to other satisfactory solutions) after several years of experience of the enlarged EU. In the meantime, who will dare to propose that the Constitution should just indicate principles and criteria, to allow it to be approved rapidly? Let's hope that the Commission's authority and prestige aren't squandered in the years of 25 members, just 6 of whom originate from the largest Member States...
(F.R.)