It will be for June. Jean-Luc Dehaene, vice-president of the Convention, and Etienne Davignon, spoke with a certain optimism, at a meeting of the association "Friends of Europe", on prospects for the adoption of the European Constitution. They see things quite positively, because of Spain and Poland's new attitude and the awareness- which we hope is general- of the importance of sending out a positive message to the public. Viscount Davignon did, however, warn against excessively high hopes for now: this week's Summit won't be taking any decisions. That will be for June. This view is shared by Bertie Ahern, who, as President of the European Council, knows the situation better than anyone: on Monday evening in Paris, he spoke for the first time about concrete chances of concluding in June. We must stick to that as a timetable. If people start believing in an immediate decision, it could lead to yet more disappointment. The Heads of Government will be talking about this on Thursday evening, but this can't be a genuine negotiation just yet, for several reasons.
The first is that the Presidency will not convene the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), the only body that can debate this, until it is satisfied that solutions are in sight on all aspects, including the "hidden differences", which people pretend not to notice, but which can no longer be hidden behind the two institutional stumbling blocks (composition of the Commission, voting procedure in the Council), officially the only points outstanding. A lot will depend on Tony Blair, to say nothing of the Spanish Prime Minister; in this Summit, Spain will still be represented by Mr Aznar, and he cannot be asked to present his country's new position, much less negotiate it. The compromise formulae on the voting procedure have already been put to Poland; we must now wait for Messrs Zapatero and Moratinos to take up their duties to be able to negotiate them with Spain too. According to certain sources, the formula put to the Polish Prime Minister by Chancellor Schröder is difficult for France (due to the "population" aspect); it will have to be tuned up a bit more.
With Andrew Duff. On the composition of the Commission, I don't even need to say how much I agree with MEP Andrew Duff, former member of the Convention: neither the number of Commissioners nor the principle of their "equal rotation" need to be laid down in the Constitution. It would be such a mistake to set these two in stone! In particular, the "One Commissioner per country" rule, which was inevitable and even a good thing in early years, cannot be definitive. The number of Member States is a changeable figure; and this can be seen clearly these days, with people talking about territorial sharing of Kosovo with a view to creating it a State further down the line (with entitlement to its own Commissioner). We've already seen the case of former Czechoslovakia: it is divided, and entitled to two Commissioners. A Scottish figure recently put the problem of regions which enjoy broad autonomy: why shouldn't they too have a Commissioner? This has also been said of Bavaria, without challenging the identity of the German State. If the Union retains the independence of a State as the sole criterion for determining the Commission's composition, the long-term result would be to make authority and legitimacy subordinate to this. When it has exceeded 30 Commissioners, and will in all likelihood continue to expand, it will be more like an Assembly than an executive body. And if the large countries (Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Poland) only have six votes out of thirty or more, and if decisions are taken by simple majority, where would the Commission draw its legitimacy as an executive power? Its powers of decisions would be inevitably, and radically, reduced; wave goodbye to the Community method, say hello to the intergovernmental method.
It is quite discouraging to note how many small and medium countries fail to see that the Community method is their security against the power and might of the large countries. Initially, a Commission "à 25" is inevitable, and even desirable, as the new Commissioners will be responsible not only for getting the sensibilities of their countries of origin across in Brussels, but also, and above all, helping their citizens to understand the reasons behind and significance of decisions made in Brussels. These will be dangerous days for the Commission, which will need a President who knows his or her way around Community affairs, and fair and realistic internal rules to keep its authority and autonomy. But then, this institution, which is at the heart of the Community method, will have to be transformed from the bottom up.
They can't make this one up as they go. This is why Mr Duff is right: the dimensions and functioning of the Commission should not be laid down "ne varietur" in the Constitution, but defined thereafter by the institutions, with the option of revising them periodically. The Constitutions should just lay down the principles. (F.R.)